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FOREWORD                                    
At 4:40 AM on November 8, 2013, Super Typhoon Yolanda made first 
landfall over Guiuan, Eastern Samar and caused immediate destruction in 
wide area of central Philippines. Over the course of a few hours, it 
massive damages, with more than 6,000 individuals reported dead and 
thousands more accounted missing in the aftermath of remarkably strong 
winds, storm surge and large waves induced by the tropical cyclone. 
 
As early as three days before landfall, the Philippine government made 
necessary preparations of the historic super typhoon. Assessing forecasts from various numerical models, the 
Philippine Atmospheric Geophysical and Astronomical Services Administration (PAGASA), one of the attached 
agencies of the Department of Science and Technology (DOST) under its Scientific and Technical Services 
Institutes, officially issued Weather Advisory #1 for Tropical Cyclone Yolanda (Haiyan) at 11:00 AM of November 
5 to serve as a public warning for the imminent danger.  Two days after, on November 7, the Weather Bureau 
issued Severe Weather Bulletin #3, raising the alarm and informing the public that storm surges may reach up to 
seven meters in wave height along the coastal areas of Samar, Leyte, Biliran, Bantayan and Camotes islands, 
Northern Cebu -- including Cebu City and Bohol. However, in spite of the efforts of the government to reduce and 
mitigate the disaster’s effects, Yolanda still caused widespread destruction and an alarming number of casualties in 
the Philippines.  
 
Because of this, PAGASA has taken a proactive approach to prepare for future occurrences of such devastating 
tropical cyclones. As PAGASA is mandated to “provide protection against natural calamities and utilize scientific 
knowledge as an effective instrument to insure safety, well-being and economic security”, we must scientifically 
evaluate the reasons for the magnification of the damage brought by this super typhoon in order to improve our 
products and prevent another disaster of this magnitude. “Our mission is protecting lives and properties through 
timely, accurate and reliable weather-related information and services” and therefore, we must improve on our 
current policies and strategies to come up with better products for the Filipino people. 
 
The International Research Institute of Disaster Science (IRIDeS) at Tohoku University, one of PAGASA’s 
counterparts in Japan, conducted several on-site surveys regarding the damage of Yolanda and shared important 
lessons learned with our local weather agency. Without a doubt, these kinds of scientific surveys and research, in 
general, will contribute to future disaster mitigation in the Philippines.  
 
Taking this opportunity, I would like to extend my sincerest gratitude and appreciation to all the assistance provided 
by IRIDeS and other organizations from all over the world. We hope this report on the “IRIDeS fact-finding 
missions in the Philippines” will be beneficial to us all and serve as a guideline and reference for the future in our 
quest to resolve the chaos that our atmosphere brings. 
 
Vicente B. Malano, Ph.D. 
Acting Administrator, PAGASA 
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1. Executive Summary 
 
Super Typhoon Haiyan, called Yolanda in the Philippines, devastated the Eastern Visayas and part of the Central 
Visayas on November, 8, 2013. Haiyan caused over 7,000 casualties, displaced over 4 million people, and damaged 
or destroyed over 1 million houses due to remarkably high wind speed, storm surge and large waves. 
The International Research Institute of Disaster Science (IRIDeS), at Tohoku University in Sendai, Japan 
dispatched several investigating teams from December, 2013 through February, 2015 to gather information from 
governmental, hospital and research organizations in Philippines. In addition, the teams assessed damage in several 
areas on Leyte and Samar islands with local counterparts. The name of the mission was the “IRIDeS fact-finding 
mission,” and the IRIDeS survey team consisted of 4 teams; 1) Hazard and Damage Evaluation team, 2) Warning 
and Evacuation Assessment team, 3) Disaster Medical Science team, and 4) Disaster Recovery team. 
 
The Hazard and Damage Evaluation team first conducted the damage interpretation using satellite images in 
order to identify severly damaged areas and to provide important information to focus the activities for the on-site 
field survey (Chapter 3). This kind of rapid damage assessment can contribute actively to emergency response and 
relief effort allocation and management when disasters impact a large area. In addition, a numerical simulation of 
the storm surge and large waves using Delft-3D and SWAN with a parametric hurricane model was promptly 
conducted for Leyte and Samar Islands in order to understand the magnitude and features of surges and waves 
induced by Haiyan (Chapter 4). From the simulation results, it was found that the water levels were dominated by 
wind-driven storm surge near Tacloban and by waves in eastern Samar. 
During the on-site survey in Leyte and Eastern Samar on January 16 – 24, 2014 and other additional surveys, 
inundation heights of storm surges and large waves were measured, and a detailed inundation map in Tacloban was 
developed (Chapter 5), mainly based on local interviews with eyewitnesses. For example, storm surge heights up 
to 6 m were measured near the shoreline in Tacloban and wave runup of up to 12 m were measured in Eastern 
Samar. In addition, typical damage to houses and seawalls by strong wind, storm surge and high waves in Leyte 
and Eastern Samar were investigated throughout the survey. Based upon the initial analysis and on-site survey, 
several problems and recommendations are presented in this report. Data analysis and numerical simulations are 
still ongoing. 
 
The Warning and Evacuation Assessment team aimed at examining and recording evacuation behavior and 
information notification in the area affected by Haiyan. A questionnaire survey in Tacloban city and Palo and 
Tanauan municipalities on Leyte Island was implemented from March 14, 2014 to March 22, 2014 and in total 642 
samples were taken. The survey shows that the ratio of evacuation away from home was about 70%. Patterns of 
evacuation behavior differ with location, gender and age. Although all survey sites are located in the same coastal 
area, preliminary analysis shows that reasons and clues for evacuation are different at each site (Chapter 6). 
 
The Disaster medical science team (Chapter 7) investigated the immediate medical and long-term public health 
response, domestic and international medical aid, outbreak of infectious diseases, psychosocial problems and 
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mental health of the affected people in collaboration with medical and public health researchers in the Philippines, 
WHO, the Department of Health (DOH) and others to promote collaborative research and publicizing of the results. 
According to the geographical mapping of the possible hospitals and health related facilities in the affected area, 
individual visits to health facilities and interviews were very effective for understanding the structural, 
non-structural and functional damage of health related facilities. They observed the sanitary and health condition of 
the affected people and also visited international humanitarian assistance agencies. They established and extended 
the collaborative relationships between IRIDeS and San Lazaro Hospital, DOH, WHO and WPRO, Univ. 
Philippines Manila and Angeles Univ. to exchange information and knowledge about disaster medicine and public 
health. They shared their experience of the Great East Japan Earthquake and made recommendations at DOH in a 
technical discussion to establish safe hospitals as a building last standing in a disaster. Basic concept and strategy of 
psychosocial interventions at post-disaster settings has been shared between Japanese and Philippine mental health 
workers, and cultural and social differences in mental health between two countries and perspectives in 
international collaboration on disaster mental health has been depicted. 
In addition to the Disaster Medical Science team’s activity, simple construction practices for health facilities safe 
from typhoons and storm surges are summarized in Chapter 8 by Prof. Cristopher Stonewall P. Espina, University 
of the Philippines, Diliman. 
 
Research on post-disaster recovery needs to track several areas affected by the typhoon in the Philippines for a 
long time. The Disaster Recovery team organized three groups according to timing of surveys and topics.  
The first group (Chapter 9) was in charge of data acquisition necessary to understand the social context of the 
Philippines, to study long-term recovery phenomena, and to obtain basic information. They obtained statistic data, 
maps and geospatial data from the Government for IRIDeS’s study. They also conducted field surveys, including 
building damage records and interviews of affected people and local governments, in Daanbantayan in Cebu, and in 
Basey on Samar Island. Although some analysis of building damage is in progress, several regional specific 
problems facing recovery were clarified by the surveys. 
 
The second group (Chapter 10) conducted a collaborative field survey between UCL-IRDR and Tohoku 
University-IRIDeS four months after the typhoon. Interviews and accompanying structural engineering surveys of 
the respondents’ dwellings were conducted for 160 households in 12 coastal barangays. Regarding evacuation, the 
system of using barangay leaders to disseminate warnings appeared successful in terms of reaching people, 
although in many cases the severity of the storm surge was underestimated. Almost all interviewees knew about the 
40m no-build zones, but this policy does not reflect variations in hazard associated with variable coastline 
topography. Even though the idea of prohibiting development along the shore existed before typhoon Haiyan, those 
within these zones seemed to have little idea about relocation plans while most households outside these zones 
wanted to stay in place. It appears that cash distributions from an NGO, despite likely causing price inflation, were 
useful in allowing the purchase of reconstruction materials. Property insurance is sparse in the Philippines and the 
surveys highlighted the lack of awareness about it. More than half of the temporary shelters examined were built 
without the aid of professional advice or help leading to people living in precarious, makeshift conditions. 
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Therefore, training programs are needed in the early stages of the transitional phase of recovery to ensure lower 
vulnerability to future natural disasters. 
 
The third group (Chapter 11.) focused their research investigation on community resilience, post-disaster 
planning and policies as well as role of local stakeholders in disaster risk reduction (DRR). The aims for the two 
field visits were to learn: i) how governments (both national and locals), Civil Society Organizations (CSOs), 
private sectors and communities had prepared against disasters in the past, how they responded after Typhoon 
Haiyan; and ii) what were the emerging issues related to resettlement and livelihood rebuilding in the first few 
months after the disaster, and how recovery was progressing in the following year. Based on the first field mission 
in March 2014, when the team visited Manila, Tacloban, and Ormoc, interviews and observations verified that land 
use along the seashore was been seriously discussed after typhoon Haiyan, and local governments are planning land 
use measures to reduce risk, including relocation of communities.  
Although the national government became less persistent with the control of hazardous areas, in February 2015, 
Tacloban City was continuing with their “no-build-zone” policy, with a main aspect of recovery focusing on the 
relocation of residents from vulnerable coastal areas to relocation sites in the northern part of the City, where 
housing construction is progressing quickly. Support from and involvement of the national government, private 
sectors, and non-governmental organizations inside and outside the Philippines enabled Tacloban City to secure 
almost all land areas and housing units that are currently counted. Barangay members are also aware of the 
government efforts, and are still hope to benefit from this program. Many members are even willing to change their 
means of living, if that supports their long-term survival in new relocation area. 
 
In addition to the above main 4 team’s activities, a geological survey and disaster education workshop were 
conducted. Geological traces were observed as the 2013 storm deposit in Tanauan and Tolosa on the Southeast 
coast of Leyte Island, Philippines (Chapter 12.). Inundation extent of the storm event ranged from 1.4 km to 3.1 
km inland in these areas. On the other hand, maximum inland extents of the sand layer distributed by the storm 
ranged from 0.13 to 0.18 km (7-8% of inundation extent) and the relationship between inundation extent and 
maximum sand extent were significantly different from those of other recent tsunamis. Maximum inland extent of 
the sand layer may be key evidence to differentiate deposits formed by tsunami and storm events. Although the 
survey team could not locate paleo-storm deposits, our findings are critically important to estimate the size of storm 
events from geological evidence. 
Disaster education workshops (Chapter 13.) were conducted in four elementary schools. Disaster education for 
children is a main disaster-prevention topic in the education. The purpose of disaster education is to guide people to 
a discovery of their own solutions and their own capabilities. This idea is consisted with The Hyogo Framework for 
Action 2005–2015 (HFA). In this project, we specifically assessed group activities, Quizzes and disaster drills as 
educational tools because games might enhance learner motivation and because previous studies showed the 
beneficial effects of games on education. We derived two main preliminary results. First, this disaster education 
program, which can reduce negative feelings related to storm surges, presents the possibility that disaster education 
can help to improve mental health in the Philippines. Second, after disaster education, the students had a positive 
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attitude about disaster education. The positive attitude for the disaster education might increase motivation to 
participate in disaster education programs, which can increase the capacity to address disasters. 
   
 
The results of these fact finding surveys are presented in this report. Priority proposed activities for investigating 
the disaster caused by Typhoon Haiyan are listed below. 
 
1. A rapid response Task Force Team is formed within IRIDeS 
 
2. The Task Force Team will consider conducting the following activities: 
 
1) Setting clear objectives and deliverables of the Task Force Team and giving assignments to each Division 
Chief and volunteer 
2) Gathering information on the identified subjects and setting up a website to share information within IRIDeS 
and beyond 
3) Dispatching research missions to the affected area to gather on-site information for better analysis and provide 
useful guidance to the authorities and communities 
4) Publishing IRIDeS reports based on the findings of the Task Force 
5) Sharing lessons learnt from the disaster in an international symposium 
 
3. Proposed subjects to be pursued and confirmed by IRIDeS researchers are as follows: 
 
1) Hazard perspective: investigation of storm surge, flooding, landslides, and wind. 
2) Structural and engineering perspective: survey of buildings damaged by storm surge and strong wind 
3) Non-structural measures: early warning system, public awareness and education. 
4) Social, human and behavioral perspective: impacts on socially vulnerable communities including illegal 
settlements, gender and other social issues, review of evacuation and shelter options, management of shelters. 
5) Environmental perspective: land use. 
6) Public health and medical perspective: epidemiological survey of victims, management of transmittable 
diseases, mid-term to long-term medical assistance, psychological impacts. 
7) Economic perspective: investigation of damages and losses, recovery processes, business continuity plans. 
8) Others 
 
4.   Interaction with exchange students from the Philippines  
 





2. Summary of Typhoon Haiyan 
 
A powerful tropical cyclone, named as Typhoon Haiyan, struck some areas of Southeast Asian countries. The 
Philippines was one of the most affected regions due to high winds and storm surges. Thousands of people are 
feared dead or missing after Typhoon Haiyan swept across the central Philippines on November 8, 2013. The 
details of Haiyan are described below. 
 
2.1 Track of Typhoon Haiyan 
 
According to the National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council (NDRRMC), at 4:40 am on 
November 8, 2013 at Philippine time, Haiyan made its first landfall over Guiuan, Eastern Samar with the maximum 
wind speed of 125 kt and central pressure of 895 hPa (Category 5 on the Saffir-Simpson Hurricane Scale). Haiyan 
kept the same maximum wind speed and made the 2nd landfall over Tolosa, Leyte at 7:00 am and its 3rd landfall 
over Daanbantayan, Cebu at about 9:40 am. At 10:40 am, Haiyan made its 4th landfall over Bantayan Island, Cebu 
and by 12:00 its 5th landfall over Concepcion, Iloilo. In the afternoon, it maintained its strength as it approached 
the Calamian Group of Islands, and it made its 6th landfall over Busuanga, Palawan at 8:00 pm. Haiyan weakened 
as it continued to traverse over the West Philippines Sea. Fig. 2-1 shows the track of Haiyan at the Philippines local 
time: UTC + 8 hrs (Unisys Weather, 2013). Fig. 2-2 shows the track of Haiyan in a large domain with the time 
series of the central pressure (NII, 2013). A rapid decrease of the central pressure of Haiyan can be seen from Fig. 
2-2. 
 
Fig. 2-1. Track of Haiyan shown by white line and red circles (Google earth). The time indicating along the track is 





Fig. 2-2. Track of Haiyan (left) and time series of the central pressure of Haiyan (right), UTC (National Institute of 
Informatics [NII], Digital Typhoon: Typhoon 201330 [Haiyan]). 
 
 
2.2 Ground observations and satellite data 
 
Fig. 2-3 shows the time series of the observed wind speed and mean sea level pressure at Tacloban weather station 
in Leyte and Guiuan station in Eastern Samar. The data was provided by the Philippine Atmospheric Geophysical 
and Astronomical Services Administration (PAGASA). The rainfall data is also measured at Tacloban station. The 
landfall time is around 8:00 am in Tacloban and 5:00 am in Guiuan on November 8. A rapid increase of wind speed 
and rainfall and a decrease of mean sea level pressure toward the peak landfall time can be clearly seen from Fig. 
2-3. It should be emphasized that the observation equipment was totally destroyed due to the high wind and/or 
storm surge inundation and data recordings stopped around the peak time, so that the observation may have missed 
the peak values of the wind speed and pressure. These incidents prove that the wind speed on the ground and storm 
surge were enormously strong during the Haiyan event. 
   Fig. 2-4 shows the time series of the predicted astronomical tide at Tacloban and Guiuan. The data was also 
provided by PAGASA. The tide levels are based on the average mean sea level. It is noted that the tide level data at 
Tacloban in Fig. 2-4 is based on the linear interpolation of the predicted peak tide level data. It can be seen from the 
figure that the tide level was not so high during the landfall of Haiyan. If the landfall had occurred during the high 
tide, the damage by storm surges and high waves would have been more serious. 
   Fig. 2-5 shows 24-hr rainfall depth during the Haiyan event (13:00, Nov. 6 – 12:00, Nov. 9, UTC) over the 
Philippines obtained from GSMaP data (JAXA). GSMaP (e.g. Kubota et al., 2007) developed by JAXA is based on 
satellite-derived rainfall data. From this figure relatively high 24-rainfall more than 150 mm was observed in 
several regions during the Haiyan event. Fig. 2-6 also shows 3-hour rainfall depth with the plots of the typhoon 
center (Blue circle) during the Haiyan event. These heavy rainfalls may have caused flooding in rivers and 
landslides in the mountainous regions. However, it should be noted that satellite-driven rainfall data provided by 




Fig. 2-3. Time series of wind speed and mean sea level pressure at Tacloban station in Leyte Island and Guiuan 
station in Eastern Samar from 0:00 on November 7 through 8:00 am on November 8. 
 
Fig. 2-4. Time series of the predicted astronomical tide level at Tacloban and Guiuan from 0:00 on November 7 
through 8:00 am on November 8. 
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Fig. 2-6. 3-hr rainfall depth [mm] with the plots of the typhoon center during the Haiyan event over Philippines 
obtained from GSMaP data (Kure et al., 2015). 
 
      
Fig. 2-7. Observed water depth data at river gauge stations in Leyte Island (left side) and the location of the gauge 
stations and river names (right side) [Kure et al., 2015]. 
 
 
Fig. 2-7 shows flood runoff responses to the Haiyan induced heavy rainfall in the seven rivers in Leyte Island. The 
locations and names of the rivers can be found in Fig. 2-7 (right side). It can be seen from Fig.2-7 that the water 
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depth is increased by the increase of the rainfall induced by Haiyan. These water depth data was recorded at river 
gauge stations by members of the DPWH regional office by visual measurements at 7:00 am, 12:00 noon and 5:00 
pm every day. Through the local interviews by the IRIDeS team, it was confirmed that the typhoon induced heavy 
rainfall caused river flood inundation in the midstream area of the Lingayon River, and the flood water flowed 
down to the municipal district of Palo. It should be emphasized that there is a time difference between the 
rainfall-induced flood peak and the storm surge peak. It was confirmed based on several numerical simulations and 
local interviews that the storm surge occurred in the San Pedro bay around 6:30-8:00 am on November 8, 2013, but 
the rainfall induced flooding in the rivers show the peak flood time in the afternoon. If the peak flooding in the 
rivers had occurred during the storm surge peak time, the damage by storm surges and river flooding would have 




2.3 Summary of Damage 
 
Haiyan caused massive damages in Philippines. As of 6:00 am on March 14, 2014, 6,268 individuals were reported 
dead, 28,689 injured and 1,061 are still missing. A total of 3,424,593 families (16,078,181 persons) were affected in 
12,139 barangays in 44 provinces, 591 municipalities and 57 cities of Regions IV-A, IV-B, V, VI, VII, VIII, X, XI, 
and Caraga in Philippines. The number of damaged houses was 1,140,332 (550,928 totally and 589,404 partially). 
The total cost of damage is PHP 39,821,497,852.17 with PHP 19,559,379,136.11 for infrastructures and PHP 
20,262,118,716.06 for agriculture in Regions IV-A, IV-B,V,VI, VII, VIII, and CARASA (NDRRMC, 2014).  
Especially, human casualties in Tacloban city and Palo and Tanauan municipalities of Leyte were very high. 
The locations of those places and DEM of Leyte and Samar are shown in Fig. 2-8. The number of deaths and 
missing people are 2,603 in Tacloban, 1,101 in Palo and 859 in Tanauan (as of February 25, 2014) according to the 
information provided by each municipality. It means that more than 60 % of human casualties from Haiyan were 
concentrated in those 3 cities in Leyte. Fig. 2-9 shows the population, the number of deaths and missing people due 
to Haiyan and fatality ratio [%] in each barangay in Tacloban, Palo and Tanauan of Northern Leyte Island. A 
barangay is the smallest administrative division in the Philippines. Each barangay population data of Palo and 
Tanauan was obtained from the Census of Population and Housing 2010 data (NSO, 2014). However, in Tacloban 
City, the current barangay boundaries and numbering systems used at Haiyan event are different from 2010 data, so 
that each barangay population (as of March, 2014) was provided from Tacloban City. It should be noted that the 
population data at each barangay and precise barangay boundaries in Tacloban City are not yet finalized and thus 
there may be minor changes in the near future. Also, some barangay population data was directly provided through 
barangay offices because Tacloban City’s population survey did not cover those barangays as of March, 2014.  
Barangays with more than 10 % of the fatalities can be found along the coastal zones in three cities, and the 
damage clearly indicates the massive external force of the storm surge during the Haiyan event and the 





Fig. 2-8. Locations of Tacloban, Palo and Tanauan and DEM of Leyte and Samar Islands (Kure et al., 2014). 
 
Fig. 2-9. Population (left), number of deaths and missing people (middle) due to Haiyan and fatality ratio [%] 








2.4 Evacuation Warning 
 
Warning Record 
A tropical storm spotted over the Caroline island in the Pacific Ocean on November 4 and it was named as 
Haiyan at 8:00 am at the Philippines local time. PAGASA officially announced the Weather Advisory #1 as 
the warning of Haiyan at 11:00 am on November 5. The Joint Typhoon Warning Center (JTWC) assessed the 
system as a Category 5 super typhoon on the Saffir-Simpson hurricane wind scale on November 6. 
Accordingly PAGASA upgraded the warning to the Sever Weather Bulletin #1 at 11:00 am on November 6. 
The Japan Meteorological Agency (JMA) estimated the system’s one-minute sustained winds to 315 km/h and 
gusts up to 378 km/h at 3:00 am on November 7. At 11:00 am, PAGASA announced the Sever Weather 
Bulletin #3, warning that the storm surges might reach up to a 7-meter wave height in the coastal areas of 
Eastern Samar, Samar, Leyte and Southern Leyte in Visayas. Then, as explained in Section 2.1, Haiyan made 
its first landfall over Guiuan, Eastern Samar with the peak intensity at 4:40 am on November 8. President Aquino 
declared the state of “National Disaster” from the damage of Haiyan on November 11.  
It should be emphasized that PAGASA estimated and warned the 7-meter wave height in the coastal areas with 
the leading time of about 18 hours before the first landfall in Guinuan. This estimation was based on the numerical 
simulations technically supported by the JMA and historical records of the waves that PAGASA has. It was found 
from the survey after the Haiyan event that the estimation of 7 m wave height of PAGASA was appropriate, and the 
storm surge of about 6 m high attacked Tacloban city in Leyte. 
 
Disaster Information Transfer System 
A disaster information transfer system in Philippines is shown in Fig. 2-10 (Miyamoto et al. 2014). The figure was 
provided by Dr. Mamoru Miyamoto (International Centre for Water Hazard and Risk Management [ICHARM]). 
Disaster information from PAGASA is transferred to the NDRRMC, National Media, and the public departments 
concerned such as the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH). The NDRRMC transfers the 
information to the Barangay through the Regional, Provincial and Municipality Disaster Risk Reduction 
Management Councils (DRRMC). Then, the disaster information is conveyed to a house to a house in local 
barangays. As explained in the previous section, PAGASA warned the 7-meter wave height in the coastal areas 
before the landfall. Thus, it is important to assess whether this information transfer system worked well or not 





Fig. 2-10. Disaster information transfer system in Philippines (Miyamoto et al., 2014). 
 
Problems for Evacuation 
Several problems related to the evacuation to prepare for Haiyan were found through the on-site survey and local 
interviews by the IRIDeS team, as discussed in later chapters. Main problems were lack of education, poverty and 
inappropriate evacuation facilities. It is a famous story that many people did not understand what a storm surge is. 
During the local interview by the IRIDeS team, many people claimed that they did not understand the meaning of 
the storm surge that was used in the evacuation warning from PAGASA and local DRRMCs. They also claimed that 
if the warning had been made by using the word “tsunami,” they would have evacuated. This incident clearly 
indicates the importance of disaster education and also the importance of the method to transfer the disaster-related 
information to the local people. 
Another problem is the poverty. Young strong men had to stay in their houses during the Haiyan event in order 
to protect their properties from being stolen by somebody during the evacuation. This kind of social problem 
should be seriously considered by the government, and some kind of insurance system or a guarantee system from 
the government should be discussed. 
It is also a famous story of Haiyan that the evacuation facilities were not appropriate against the storm surges 
and enormously strong wind. For example, the Tacloban City Convention Center in Tacloban is located near the 
coastline as shown in Fig. 2-11 (left). About a thousand people evacuated to the center, and the center was 
inundated by the storm surge induced by Haiyan. Again, this incident shows the importance of disaster education. 
Another example is the Leyte Convention Center located in Palo. About 400 people evacuated to this center but this 
center was completely destroyed by the strong wind as shown in Fig. 2-11 (right). It was very fortunate that nobody 
died from Haiyan in those centers because people who evacuated to the Tacloban City Convention Center could 
escape upstairs after the center began to be inundated by the storm surge, and those who went to the Leyte 
Convention Center could evacuate to another facility before it collapsed. We confirmed this with local offices. For 
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future typhoons, evacuation facilities should be evaluated and selected considering their strength and 
appropriateness. However, the population of Tacloban is more than 200,000, so that it is not easy for the 
government to provide appropriate evacuation facilities for all the people living in Tacloban. It is highly 
recommended to establish and promote a project to re-build, find, and/or newly construct appropriate 
evacuation facilities and to develop an evacuation plan in Leyte Island against typhoons with storm surges. The 
Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA, 2014) developed a detailed storm surge hazard map based on a 
numerical simulation, and conducted a location and capacity assessment of evacuation centers based on the 
developed hazard map. This kind of project should be announced widely and the hazard map developed by JICA is 
strongly encouraged to introduce and explain to local people so that they can understand the situation and find an 
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3. Initial damage mapping by satellite images 
 
3.1 Rapid Damage Assessment 
 
Introduction 
After the impact of Super Typhoon Haiyan to the coast of Tacloban city, a set of satellite images was obtained to 
grasp the extension of the damage using visual interpretation of pre- and post-event satellite optical images. 
Satellite imagery has been used to assess the extent and level of damage in areas with limited access and on need 
for support and quick emergency response (Wegscheider et al., 2013). 
Manual visual interpretation method was used following the first steps described on the methodology to 
develop tsunami fragility functions (Koshimura et al., 2009; Suppasri et al., 2011; Mas et al., 2012). It is one of the 
most accurate methods when using very-high-resolution (VHR) imagery (Wegscheider et al., 2013). 
 
Satellite Image Data 
The pre-event data used for the damage interpretation was obtained directly from Google Earth, retrieved by 
November 8, 2013; while the post-event image was acquired on November 13, 2013 through Digital Globe in 
Google Earth. A zoom into the Anibong area in Tacloban city is shown in Fig.3-1.  
 
Methodology 
For the visual inspection we classified the damage interpretation into two levels according to the following criteria: 
 
a. High damage or destruction. Here, roofs that had been reduced by more than 50% between pre- and post-event 
images are included together with structures that had been washed or blown away. 
 
b. Low damage or survival. These are structures where only a small variation on its geometry or roof shape could 
be observed.  Structures in areas near the coastline where flood was expected are also considered into this 
classification of low damage and survival. 
 
Results 
Fig.3-2 shows the area of Tacloban city and the damage interpretation resulted in this area. As shown in the figure, 
the areas to the north and the south near to the coastline presented high damage, while the center of Tacloban, the 
downtown area was less damaged by the winds or surges in comparison. 
Following the remote sensing approach, the field survey observations confirmed qualitatively the damage in 
these areas (Mas, E. et al., 2014). Reasons for the distribution of such damage in the areas were confirmed during 
the field survey and can be summarize as follows: 
 
a. The structures to the north and to the south of downtown Tacloban city were built based on lightweight material 
and very near to the shoreline. Thus, high vulnerability to wind and storm surge was confirmed. Structures in 
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downtown Tacloban are mainly of concrete frame buildings and brick walls with corrugated galvanized iron 
sheets for houses with one or two stories. 
 
b. The topography of downtown Tacloban is higher at some points compared to its northern and southern areas. In 
addition, to the north, in the Anibong area, following the low-lying flat area a immediate steep slope could be 
observed. This slope might have caused refraction of waves and wind damaging and triggering slope failures. 
 
c. At the Anibong area, ships were found stranded inland. The storm surges carrying these ships inland caused more 
damage to the urban settlements. 
 
Conclusion 
The damage interpretation using satellite images provided important information to grasp the damage in the areas 
and, in our field survey team case, focus the activities for our field survey. A rapid damage assessment such as the 
one developed here can contribute actively to the emergency response and relief effort allocation and management 
when disasters impact on wide areas. 
 
 
Fig. 3-1. Close view of the Anibong area in Tacloban city from pre- and post-event satellite images used on the 





Fig.3-2. Result of the visual damage assessment using pre- and post-event satellite images of Tacloban city. 
 
3.2 Rapid Inundation Mapping 
 
Introduction 
In response to the Super Typhoon Haiyan event, a rapid inundation mapping was conducted (Adriano, B. et al., 
2014a). Here, visible near-infrared (VNIR) imagery from the Advanced Spaceborne Thermal Emission and 
Reflection Radiometer (ASTER) sensor was used to infer the extent of the possible flooded areas. Using the 
Normalized Difference Water Index (NDWI), the presence of water features can be enhanced and then observed as 
a result of image processing. 
 
Satellite Image Data 
ASTER data was used, where the pre-event VNIR image was taken on June 1, 2008 and the post-event VNIR 
image was taken on November 15, 2013.  
 
Methodology 
The index analysis of ASTER’s VNIR images using NDWI was performed using ArcGIS software. To enhance the 
water features and discover wetland areas, the following equation is applied during image processing: 
NDWI = (Green – NIR)/(Green + NIR) 
Where “Green” refers to the green band from the color band spectrum of the VNIR image; and “NIR” stands for the 
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near-infra red band of the VNIR image. 
The equation is applied to both, the pre- and the post-event, images and finally the difference of post- minus 
pre-event image is applied to obtain the new wetland areas presenting the post-event image condition, as shown in 
blue in Fig.3-3. 
 
Results 
The blue areas presented in Fig.3-3 correspond to areas with high probability of presence of water. A preliminary 
estimation of flooded areas by the typhoon was observed from the shoreline to the inland following the blue 
colored areas. However, field survey observations and measurements were needed to differentiate the cause of the 
flood, either by storm surge, rainfall or river. 
 
Conclusion 
A rapid assessment of possible inundated areas form the storm surges in Super Typhoon Haiyan event was 
conducted using satellite imagery. The NDWI analysis of pre- and post-event images provided a preliminary 
estimation of areas possibly flooded and where damage could occur. Field survey was necessary to confirm the 
origin and intensity of the flood at each location. 
 
 
Fig.3-3. Result of the NDWI analysis of pre- and post-event satellite images. The blue areas represent areas which 
experienced flooding. Areas where storm surge was responsible for the flooding can be inferred by connectivity 




3.3 Damage interpretation from radar images 
 
Introduction 
The manual visual interpretation method explained in section 3.1 is suitable to estimate the damage of elements by 
observation and comparison. However, as a limitation of the method, it requires good optical image resolution data, 
visibility can be affected by cloud condition and it depends on the user experience for image interpretation. On the 
other hand, to grasp a wide image of the disaster condition in affected areas, image processing can be use to 
conduct damage interpretation. Moreover, to avoid restrictions by cloud conditions that affect visibility in optical 
images, other type of sensors can be used. In this case synthetics aperture radar (SAR) sensors were used to obtain 
images without weather disturbance (Adriano, B. et al., 2014b, 2015). Characteristics of radar signature were used 
to define and estimate the changes between pre- and post-event scenes. These changes can be considered as 
possible damages. 
 
Satellite Image Data 
Two synthetic aperture radar (SAR) images from the COSMO-SkyMed (CSK) system were used. One image is a 
pre-event scene from August 19, 2013 and the second image is a post-event scene acquired on November 20, 2013 
















Fig.3-4. COSMO-SkyMed (SAR) images of pre- and post-event in Tacloban city, the Philippines. 
 
Methodology 
Comparison between pre- and post-event images is straightforwardly made by the calculation of the difference (d) 
and the correlation (r) coefficients of average values of digital numbers from pixels in a local window moving 












Where i is the sample number, and Iai and Ibi are digital numbers with their corresponding overlines or vinculums 
as the averaged digital numbers within a local window in the post- and pre-images, respectively. N is the total 
number of pixels within the local window. 
 
Results 
Difference and correlation coefficients are calculated for the whole area and changes can be identified based on 
higher or lower values. Still resolution and accuracy needs to be improved, however the difference coefficient in 
SAR image gave better results which can be observed in Figure 3-5. The areas in blue show negative difference 













Fig.3-5. On the left, pre- and post-event optical images were clipped from the study area for reference and 
comparison with results shown on the right side of the figure. Values towards zero denote no difference or 
correlation, while extreme upper and bottom values can be interpreted as changes or possible damage areas. 
 
Conclusion 
SAR images can be used to detect the extensive damage after disasters. We are developing methods to better detect 
and grasp the damage conditions in affected areas by typhoon or tsunami. Accurate interpretation of damage in 
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4. Storm Surge Simulation 
 
Damage near Tacloban was mainly due to storm surge resulting from wind-induced setup of the water surface, 
together with large waves in some places.  These processes are sufficiently modeled by a phase-averaged wave 
and storm surge model. However, much of the damage in Eastern Samar was due to the infragravity (long period) 
wave processes of surf beat, which phase-averaged wave and storm surge models cannot reproduce. Therefore, 
storm surge and waves near Tacloban were hindcast with Delft-3D/SWAN, a phase-averaged wave and storm surge 
model. The behavior of the flood in Eastern Samar, however, was modeled with OpenFOAM, a phase-resolving 
computational fluid dynamics model, and also with BOSZ, a phase-resolving Boussinesq wave model.   
 
4.1 Methodology of phase-averaged storm surge and wave simulation 
 
The behavior of Typhoon Haiyan was hindcast by Bricker et. al. (2014) using typhoon track data from the Japan 
Meteorological Agency (2013), which was input into a parametric hurricane model (Holland, 1980) for air-pressure 
field estimation, followed by the moving-typhoon model of Fujii & Mitsuda (1986) as described in Veltcheva & 
Kawaii (2002) for estimation of the wind field. The typhoon track data included data on location of the center of the 
storm, surface-level air pressure at the storm center, and maximum sustained wind speed vmax [m/s].  However, it 
did not contain information on the radius to maximum winds rm [m], so the relation of Quiring (2011) is used to 
estimate this (Eq. 4-1).   
1852 49.67 0.47      (4-1) 
The hindcast pressure and wind fields are input into a combined hydrodynamic and wave model to hindcast the 
water level and wave heights induced by the typhoon. The hydrodynamic model used is Delft-3D (Deltares, 2011), 
and the spectral wave model used is SWAN (Booij et al., 1999). Delft-3D and SWAN are run together, with the 
hydrodynamic model repeatedly passing water level and current fields to the wave model, which calculates the 
wave field including the effects of currents and storm surge. The wave model in turn passes the radiation stress 
field back to the hydrodynamic model, which uses this information to calculate wave-induced setup and nearshore 
currents. Tides are included using the Global Tide database TPXO (2014) as a boundary condition to the 
hydrodynamic model.  
Rough bathymetry was taken from GEBCO (2014) and topography from SRTM (NASA, 2014). Detailed 
bathymetry of Leyte Gulf was digitized from a nautical chart (NAMRIA, 1980) by Associate Prof. Hiroshi Takagi 
of the Tokyo Institute of Technology, and topography of downtown Tacloban and Tacloban Airport were surveyed 
during the January 2014 IRIDeS site visit. Nearshore coral reef topography east of Samar is not available, so the 
horizontal extents of reefs were digitized from Google Earth images, and a depth of 1 m relative to mean sea level 
was assumed. Model resolution is 2.5 km for the large domain (Fig.4-1), 100 m for the Tacloban domain (Fig.4-2), 
and 50 m for the Guiuan (Fig.4-3) and Hernani (Fig.4-4) domains. Manning’s n was assumed to be 0.025 
everywhere, though for more detailed inundation analysis in the future, this will need to be adjusted for land use. 
An important adjustment to the default SWAN setup was the use of an air-sea drag coefficient limiter of 0.003 
(Powell, 2006; Dietrich et. al., 2011) imposed on the drag law of Wu (1982). This drag coefficient limiter is the 
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result of multiple airborne sonde drop measurements in hurricanes (Powell, 2006), and is necessary to prevent the 
development of unphysical wave heights in the model. 
 
 
4.2 Results and Discussion of phase-averaged storm surge and wave simulation 
 
The water levels shown in Fig.4-1 were dominated by wind-driven storm surge near Tacloban and waves in 
eastern Samar (Bricker et. al., 2014). Fig.4-1 (right) shows maximum (in time) hindcast significant wave heights 
during the storm, reaching up to 20 m off Eastern Samar, and decreasing to less than 5 m in Leyte Gulf near 
Tacloban. Fig.4-2 shows the storm surge (wind-dominated) near Tacloban, including inundation of downtown 
Tacloban and Tacloban Airport. The 5-m surge extends up the San Juanico Strait to Bogulibas, then rapidly 
dissipates where the strait narrows. Damage along Tacloban’s shoreline (Fig.4-2c) indicated waves atop the surge 
(Fig.4-2b) were strong enough to wreck RC structures, and to cause erosion near building foundations. Inland from 
the shoreline (Fig.4-2d), damage resembled that of a slow, deep flood. In Eastern Samar (Fig.4-3 and 4-4), wind- 
and pressure-driven storm surges were small (Fig.4-3a and 4-4a), but wave-induced setup over the broad coral 
reefs in these areas generated a surge up to 5 m high (Fig.4-3b and 4-4b). Waves on top of this wave setup 
(Fig.4-3c and 4-4c) together with bore-like surf beat (Chapters 4.3 and 4.4) wrecked structures (Fig.4-3d and 
4-4d) and transported concrete and coral debris up to 50 m inland. 
 
 
Fig.4-1. (left) Maximum water level (including both surge and waves) measured by the IRIDeS survey team 








Fig.4-2. (a) Maximum storm surge for small domain (1) of Fig.4-1. (b) Maximum significant wave height. (c) 
Typical damage along the coast of downtown Tacloban. (d) Typical water line in inland downtown Tacloban. 
 
 
Fig.4-3. (a) Maximum storm surge neglecting wave setup for domain (2) of Fig.4-1. (b) Maximum storm surge 




Fig.4-4. (a) Maximum storm surge neglecting wave setup for domain (3) of Fig.4-1. (b) Maximum storm surge 
including wave setup. (c) Maximum significant wave height. (d) Damage to seawall in Hernani. 
 
4.3 Methodology of phase-resolving storm surge and wave simulation 
 
In Hernani, Eastern Samar, the phase-averaged storm surge model discussed above is not sufficient to reproduce 


















4-5).  To determine what was responsible for this damaging event, Bricker and Roeber (2015) carried out a field 
survey of topography and bathymetry in Hernani, and applied a phase-resolving model (which models individual 
ocean waves).   
Land surface elevation in Hernani was measured from May 25-26, 2014 via walking and driving surveys with 
two Ashtech ProMark 100 GPS units, in base/rover differential configuration (Fig. 4-6). The base station was left in 
place for 4 hours, in order to ensure vertical accuracy on the order of centimeters. DGPS data were post-processed 
for vertical accuracy with GNSS Solutions software, to correct the rover-measured elevations to the base-station 
accuracy. The base station elevation was surveyed with respect to local instantaneous sea level at the beginning of 
each measurement day with a LaserTech TruPulse 200 rangefinder, and this was related to local mean sea level 
(MSL) using the TPXO (2014) global tide database.   
Water depth seaward of the coral reef crest (Fig. 4-6) was measured from a hired fishing canoe, using a Hondex 
PS-7 handheld digital sounder. Sounder readings were photographed with a Canon PowerShot D20 GPS camera to 
record the location of each measurement.   
Since the elevation of the coral reef flat in Hernani was not measured during the May 25-26 field campaign in 
Hernani, the reef flat elevation of a similar reef in Guiuan (35 km southeast of Hernani) was measured during low 
tide on May 27, using the same DGPS base/rover configuration as described above, and corrected to local MSL 
using TPXO (2014).  The measured reef flat elevation was flat and uniform, varying from MSL to about 10 cm 
below MSL.  Therefore, for the storm surge modeling to follow, the reef flat in Hernani was assumed to have an 
elevation of 5 cm below MSL in the area surrounded by the topography and bathymetry measurements show in Fig. 
4-6.   
 
 
Fig. 4-5.  Frames from the video of Gensis (2013), showing a house being swept away by an infragravity wave.  
Onshore-directed flow lasted at least 20 seconds (the duration of the film).  The base of the house is located 3 m 
above mean sea level (MSL). Images courtesy of Plan International.   
In order to evaluate the potential for infragravity motion (surf beat and resonance) to create the bore seen in Fig. 
4-5, the InterFOAM phase-resolving Volume of Fluid (VOF) Navier Stokes Solver, part of the OpenFOAM CFD 
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package, was used. OpenFOAM was applied along a 1-dimensional transect (Fig. 4-6) passing through the house 
seen washed away in Gensis’ film, with a variable grid size reducing to a minimum of 0.5 m in the vertical and 2 m 
in the horizontal within the region of wave breaking and runup.  A uniform roughness height of 1 cm was assumed 
for both the seabed and coral/land surface. The upper and right-hand boundaries of the domain were assumed to be 
open to the atmosphere.  Turbulence was modeled with the RANS standard k-epsilon model.  The PISO 
algorithm was used for transient Navier-Stokes solution. First order-implicit Euler differencing was used for 
differencing the unsteady term, second-order Gaussian for the pressure gradient, second-order upwind for 
momentum advection terms, first-order upwind for turbulence advection, and second-order Gaussian for the 
diffusion term. Quantities on grid cell faces were determined using linear interpolation. Enhanced interface 
compression (anti-diffusion) was enacted in order to maintain a sharp air-water interface. The model time step was 
variable, to keep the Courant number below 0.5. Typically, this resulted in a time step on the order of 0.001 sec. 
 
 
Fig. 4-6.  Overview of Hernani. Red lines indicate DGPS field survey locations, red dots indicate bathymetric 
survey locations, the white triangle indicates the location of the house in Fig. 4-5, and the white line indicates the 
transect used for phase-resolving modeling. Inset at the top left shows DGPS survey locations from Guiuan 35 km 
to the southeast.  
The left-hand boundary of the OpenFOAM model (located at a distance x=290 m in Fig. 4-7) was a 
smooth-surface piston-type wavemaker, implemented via the dynamic mesh capability of the InterDyMFOAM 
model. To generate the motion of the piston, the SWAN wave spectrum output at the peak of the storm (Fig. 4-8, 
with significant wave height 19 m and peak wave period 18 sec, at 6:30 am JST) was extracted in 150 m water 
depth offshore of Hernani. The variance of each spectral frequency component was converted to a corresponding 
piston stroke length via the complete wavemaker theory of Dean and Dalrymple (1991) shown as Eq.(4-2) 
     (4-2) 
where H is wave height (proportional to the square root of the variance), S is stroke length, h is water depth, and k 
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is wavenumber determined via the full dispersion relation for each frequency component.  The piston stroke 
length spectrum was then inverse Fourier transformed into a time series of piston position via an assumption of 
random initial phase for each individual frequency component. The spacing between frequency bins df was small 
enough to avoid creating artificial wave envelope beating (which occurs at a return period of 1/df) during the 
1-hour time series for which the OpenFOAM model was run.  This piston position time series was used to drive 
the left wall of the model as a wavemaker. Waves were then allowed to propagate freely and break over the reef and 
shoreline.  
 
Fig. 4-7. Left: bathymetry and topography of transect used in 1-D OpenFOAM simulation, as a function of distance 
x along the transect. Right: Zoomed in topography of the reef and onshore region. Dashed line indicates the 
location of the house swept away by the tsunami as seen in Fig. 4-5. The spike seaward of the house is the town’s 
seawall.   
 
Fig. 4-8.  Wave variance spectrum output from SWAN in 150 m water depth offshore of Hernani, and used to 
drive the wavemaker at x=290 m (left boundary) in the OpenFOAM domain of Fig. 4-7.   
In addition to the OpenFOAM simulation, a 1-dimensional BOSZ (Roeber and Cheung, 2012) Boussinesq wave 
simulation was run over the same model domain with the same input wave timeseries. This allowed the direct 
comparison of results from two completely different types of numerical models.  Phase-resolving storm surge and 
wave model setup is described in detail in Bricker and Roeber (2015).   
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4.4 Results of phase-resolving storm surge and wave simulation 
 
Fig. 4-9 shows the time series of water level hindcast by OpenFOAM at the house in Fig. 4-5, and Fig. 4-10 
shows flow velocity.  Both OpenFOAM and BOSZ give similar results, with the exception of the arrival time of 
the initial wave. This is due to the difference in wave breaking processes resolved over the reef. OpenFOAM 
resolves the physics of wave breaking, and so reproduces the distortion of waves as they plunge and collapse. 
BOSZ, though correctly reproducing the energy loss due to breaking, represents all breakers as a shock front. 
Regardless of this difference, both models produce similar results for water level and flow speed at the house, 
giving confidence in each model’s result. In both models, individual short-period swell (10-20 sec period) are not 
prominent at this location.  Rather, infragravity oscillations with periods of hundreds of seconds are visible.  The 
flow depth (up to 3 m above the ground level at the house), flow speed (up to 6 m/s), and landward flow duration 
(on the order of minutes) are in close agreement with the video of Gensis (2013), in which a flow depth of 
approximately 2 m, flow speed of greater than 5 m/s, and landward flow duration of at least 20 seconds (before the 
video ceased) were observed.  Also in agreement with the video, each of these modeled infragravity oscillations 
strikes the location of the house as a sharp bore of 1 m to 2 m height.  This is the same phenomenon generated in 
the laboratory by Nakaza and Hino (1991) and modeled by Nwogu and Demirbilek (2010), and which these authors 
termed “bore-like” or “tsunami-like” surf beat.  
 




Fig. 4-10.  Flow speed at the location of the house seen in Fig. 4-5.  In the OpenFOAM case, the flow shown is 
extracted from the grid cell at an elevation of 3.5 m above MSL. In the BOSZ simulation, the flow is 
depth-averaged.   
The physics responsible for the generation of tsunami-like surf beat can be understood by Fig. 4-11, which 
shows the spatial variation of the power spectral density of the water surface elevation signal along the transect of 
Fig. 4-7.  Seaward of the reef crest (x<2700m), most of the energy is at a frequency f of about 0.055 Hz, which 
corresponds to the incident offshore wave spectrum of peak period 18 sec (Fig. 4-8).  Shoreward of the reef crest 
(x>2700m), energy in the incident wave band is no longer present, and most of the energy is at lower (infragravity) 
frequencies.   
The energy bands shoreward of the reef face are due in part to offshore wave groups incident on the shore as 
surf beat.  For a given incident wave spectrum, Longuet-Higgins (1984) showed the minimum wave envelope 
(group) return period T , 	is given by Eq. (4-3) 
T , 2πe      (4-3) 
where μ0=m0 and μ2=m2-m12/m0. The spectral moments mr are given by Eq. (4-4) 
m f E f df      (4-4) 
where f is frequency (Hz), E is spectral energy density (m2/Hz), and r is an integer. For the SWAN spectrum used 
as input to OpenFOAM (Fig. 4-8), Eq. (4-4) results in an offshore wave group (envelope) return period of 
approximately 230 sec (corresponding to a frequency of f=0.004 Hz).  This signal is most visible shoreward of the 
breaking location in Fig. 4-11, as the breaking process frees this infragravity wave envelope from the short-period 
swell it had been bound to in deep water, and allows it to propagate onto shore as surf beat (Masselink, 1995).  
Some energy is also present over the reef and land in Fig. 4-11 at two superharmonics of this signal (f=0.008 Hz 
and f=0.012 Hz).  These superharmonics are due to steepening of the surf beat, the process responsible for the 
bore-like shape of the observed and modeled surf beat.  
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The lowest-frequency energy band is due to the excitation of resonance over the reef. The resonant period of a 
quarter-wave oscillator is given by Eq. (4-5) 
T           (4-5) 
where T is resonant period, L is cross-shore length of the reef, g is acceleration due to gravity, h is mean water 
depth, and n is a positive integer. For the reef of Fig. 4-7, the length of interest is the distance between the location 
where the waves begin to break (approximately x=2700 m, according to Fig. 4-11), and the seawall (at x=3310 m), 
leading to L=710 m.  The average water depth over the reef during the simulation is h=4m.  This results in a 
quarter-wave oscillator period of T=450 sec, corresponding to a frequency of approximately f=0.0022 Hz.  
Landward of the breaking region, Fig. 4-11 shows that most of the infragravity energy is present at this 
quarter-wave oscillator frequency, indicating that resonance over the reef played a large role in exacerbating 
damage in Hernani.  
 
Fig. 4-11.  Power spectral density of water surface elevation extracted at 100 m intervals along the OpenFOAM 
transect.  Top plot shows the entire spectrum, while bottom shows only infragravity frequencies.   
4.5 Conclusions regarding storm surge and wave hazard modeling 
The numerical model results of Bricker and Roeber (2015) show that the tsunami-like bore which struck 
Hernani, Eastern Samar during Typhoon Haiyan was generated by infragravity energy released from wave groups 
overlapping closely in the spectral domain with the natural resonant frequency of the reef.  This is the same 
phenomenon recreated in the laboratory by Nakaza and Hino (1991) and modeled numerically by Nwogu and 
Demirbilek (2010).  In the present work, similar results were obtained using two entirely different types of 
phase-resolving models: the OpenFOAM Volume-of-Fluid (VOF) model and the BOSZ Boussinesq wave model.  
The agreement between these models corroborates the validity of each model’s result.   
The failure of the phase-averaged Delft-3D/SWAN model to reproduce this event underscores the importance of 
phase-resolving modeling for coastal disaster assessment in regions protected by fringing reefs. Phase-resolving 
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models (which simulate individual ocean waves) are not commonly used in coastal disaster planning in the US, 
Europe, or elsewhere. As such, the phenomenon that struck Hernani is not being accounted for.  In the US, FEMA 
and the National Flood Insurance Program determine the coastal wave hazard zone (V-zone for flood insurance rate 
map assessment) by use of a shallow water model together with a phase-averaged wave model (commonly the 
Delft-3D/SWAN or ADCIRC/SWAN coupling, which estimate statistical wave properties, but do not resolve 
individual ocean wind waves).  For places near shallow water (such as Tacloban, New Orleans, Bangladesh, and 
Nagoya), this is sufficient, but the hazard potential is being underestimated for places fronted by fringing reefs 
(such as Hernani, Hawaii, Puerto Rico, and Okinawa). This is also important for areas being developed for oil and 
gas terminals. For these places, coastal hazard must be assessed with a phase-resolving model such as BOSZ or 
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5. IRIDeS fact-finding mission, Hazard and Damage Evaluation Team 
 
5.1 Missions and local collaborators 
 
IRIDeS sent the Hazard and Damage Evaluation Team to conduct an on-site field survey to collect general 
information including evacuation response, inundation time and depth, emergency response by local government, 
etc. and obtain spatial data, statistical data and documents related to the damage caused by Typhoon Haiyan. And 
discussed with local authorities about possible collaborations to mitigate typhoon-related disasters in the future.  
 
Name of the mission 
IRIDeS Fact-finding mission to Philippines 
 
Hazard and Damage Evaluation team 
1.  Ass. Prof. Shuichi Kure (Team Leader, Disaster Potential Study) 
2.  Assoc. Prof. Jeremy D. Bricker (Technology for Global Disaster Risk)  
3.  Ass. Prof. Erick Mas (Remote Sensing and Geoinformatics for Disaster Management) 
4.  Ass. Prof. Carine J. YI (International Strategy for Disaster Mitigation) 
5.  Mr. Bruno Adriano (Remote Sensing and Geoinformatics for Disaster Management) 
 
Philippines counterparts 
1.  Dr. Maritess S. Quimpo (Bureau of Research and Standards, DPWH) 
2.  Prof. Cristopher Stonewall P Espina (College of Architecture, UP) 
3.  Mr. Karl Taberdo (College of Architecture, UP) 
4.  Mr. Paul Tupaz (BS Economics Student, UP) 
5.  Mr. Christer Kim Gerona (BS Political Science Student, UP) 
 
Tasks of the Hazard and Damage Evaluation team, IRIDeS 
 
Target Area:  
1) The city of Tacloban, Municipality of Palo, Municipality of Tanauan, and rural areas around rivers and  
mountains on Leyte Island 
2) Coastal areas on Eastern Samar Island 
 
Task 1. Verification of satellite image analysis using ground truth data and understanding the damage characteristics 
of buildings due to typhoons: 
 
 Measurement of inundation levels 
 Classification of buildings damaged by storm surge and strong wind 
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 Taking of photos with GPS information of damaged places and buildings 
 
Task 2. Data measurement and collection for detailed storm surge and wave modeling: 
 
 Measurement and/or collection of bathymetry data of Tacloban Bay and the straight that connects Tacloban 
Bay to Carigara Bay 
 Collection of fine-resolution topographic data of Tacloban city and other areas that experienced significant 
inundation and storm surge damage 
 Cataloging of coastal defenses (seawalls, levees, gates, if any) that existed before the storm, as well as their 
condition after the storm 
 
Task 3. Investigation of other hazards (flooding, landslides, wave intrusion along the river, etc.) induced by Haiyan: 
 
 Collection of hazard maps and hydro-meteorological data such as wind speed, rainfall, river discharge, tide 
level data, etc. 
 Travel around rivers and mountainous regions to identify flooding and landslide damage induced by the 
typhoon 
 Modeling of the flood due to heavy rainfall with high tide level induced by the typhoon. 
 
 
5.2 Inundation map 
 
The main objectives of the mission were to collect spatial data, statistic data and documents and measure the 
inundation heights from storm surge and waves to inspect the damage and magnitude of Haiyan, and to conduct and 
verify the numerical simulation and satellite image analysis results. In order to make an inundation map of Haiyan, 
we conducted an on-site survey in Tacloban city and towns on Leyte and Samar Islands. 
  The survey was mainly conducted based on local interviews to obtain inundation heights and reliable information 
because it was difficult to find clear water marks of the storm surge and high wave inundation due to heavy rainfall 
during the Haiyan event and severe building damage induced by the strong wind. On the other hand, many 
residents around the coast stayed in their houses until inundation occurred, and witnessed the flooding event. 
Measurements were conducted using a portable laser rangefinder referenced to sea water level at the time of the 
survey. Examples scenes from the survey are shown in Fig.5-1. 
Fig.5-2 shows the area of the city of Tacloban where the most of survey point data was taken by the team. The 
bottom left inset shows the inundation heights measured in downtown Tacloban. In the right inset an estimated 
inundation limit was drawn as a result of the Normalized Difference Water Index (NDWI) analysis explained in 
Chapter 3 of this report; the measurements were available from the field survey and interviews with eyewitnesses 
and residents in Tacloban (Adriano et al., 2014; Mas et al., 2014). The Storm surge height was measured as high as 
6m near the shoreline. The survivors reported waves up to 4 m high atop the surge. Wave runup up to 12 m high 
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was observed in Eastern Samar (Mas et al., 2014; Bricker et al., 2014). For more details, please see Bricker et al. 
(2014), Mas et al. (2014) and Kure et al. (2014). Also, the JSCE-PICE1 joint survey team reported detailed 




Fig.5-1. Pictures of the inundation survey in Leyte and Samar. 
                                                  





Fig.5-2. Measured inundation heights in Tacloban city based on survivors’ interviews (left) and inundated area 
estimated from NDWI analysis (right) [explained in Chapter 3]. 
 
5.3 Northern extent of surge 
 
The storm surge simulation hindcast a steep change in maximum surge elevation about 15 km north of downtown 
Tacloban, where the San Juanico Strait narrows and curves before widening again near Santa Rita to the north. 
Fig.5-3 shows the result of the storm surge simulation near Tacloban. Between Tacloban Airport and Bogulibas, 
maximum storm surge height was about 5 m above Mean Sea Level. North of Bogulibas, storm surge elevation 
rapidly diminished to less than 1 m. In Santa Rita, the modeled storm surge elevation was less than 1 m, and during 
our team’s field survey, interviewed residents reported no flooding in Santa Rita. Fig.5-4 shows surveyed water 
levels, in close agreement with the simulated surge levels of Fig.5-3 (since no flood was measured in Santa Rita, it 
is not included in Fig.5-4).   
Fig.5-5 shows damage along the coast in Uban. The row of homes closest to the shore (near the seawall in the 
foreground of the photo) was destroyed, and one set of concrete stilts can still be seen amongst the wreckage. 
Homes further inland had been damaged, but already rebuilt. Fig.5-6 shows wind waves up to 2 m high impacted 
Uban, and, atop the surge, these were likely responsible for destroying homes along the shoreline. Wind damage 
(i.e., missing roofing sheets) was not as severe in Uban as it was further south, and no wind damage was apparent 
in Santa Rita, indicating that the typhoon wind field diminished this far north. In addition to structural damage in 
Uban, surge flooded agricultural land tended by the town, destroying the season’s rice crop due to salinization, and 
damaged the town’s fishing industry because residents are hesitant to eat fish caught nearby the location of so many 





Fig.5-3. Simulated maximum water level due to storm surge near Tacloban. 
 
 











Fig.5-5. Damaged and rebuilt homes in Uban. 
 
 










5.4 Types of damage in Tacloban 
 
Water-related damage in downtown Tacloban varied between two regions of the town: inland and coastal. In inland 
downtown Tacloban, buildings were dirtied by storm surge and by rain falling in through roofs that had been blown 
away. Fig.5-7 and Fig.5-8 show water lines inside buildings in inland downtown Tacloban. Most buildings are built 
of concrete or wood. While concrete buildings are concentrated in downtown Tacloban, poorly built and unsafe 
wooden houses are along the coastline. Typical houses are built with bricks and a longitudinal wire through the 
bricks whenever financial conditions allow for it. Fig.5-9 is the typical brick house wall with only few longitudinal 
reinforced wires and this is common housing structure in Tacloban area. Soft walls and windows were broken out, 
equipment, furniture, and architectural elements inside these buildings were ruined by strong winds and rain. 
Fig.5-10 shows a house in downtown Tacloban that was reconstructed using wooden studs and corrugated 
galvanized iron sheet. Houses along the coast in the Anibong area of Tacloban were also rebuilt with debris and 
distributed tents as shown in Fig.5-11.  
Fig.5-3 shows the area of downtown Tacloban submerged by the storm surge, but Fig.5-6 shows that waves in 
the same location were very small. Waves that were incident onto the city from the bay around it, were broken 
when they impacted structures on the shoreline. Unlike the damage seen in Japan after the 2011 Tsunami, buoyancy 
of structures did not seem to contribute to building failure; this is because in Tacloban most buildings are very 
porous, with water quickly flooding in through doorways and windows.  
Along the coastline of downtown Tacloban, however, the presence of waves atop the wind-driven storm surge 
caused heavy damage. Fig.5-12 shows the remains of a reinforced concrete building, with only its foundation and 
damaged columns still remaining. The rubble of its concrete walls is seen around the building’s floor. Fig.5-13 
shows scour around the foundation of a building along the coastline. This is probably the result of waves; as such 
scour did not exist inland. Another mechanism of damage to coastal buildings was debris impact. Fig.5-14 shows 
the foundation of a house leveled by a ship that lost its moorings in Tacloban Harbor and was then blown onshore 
in a residential area. Many houses along Tacloban’s coastline were leveled by drifting ships. 
 
 




Fig.5-8. Water line inside a building in inland downtown Tacloban.  
 
Fig.5-9. Brick house wall with few longitudinal reinforced wire 
 
Fig.5-10. A partially damaged house reconstructed its outer wall in downtown Tacloban. 
 
a)   b)  






Fig.5-12. Destruction of Reinforced Concrete building in coastal downtown Tacloban.  
 
 





Fig.5-14. Flattening of houses by a drifting ship in coastal Tacloban. 
 
 
5.5 Wind damage 
 
Damage due to extreme wind was present throughout the survey area. The major mechanism of wind damage was 
the ripping off of roofing materials from roof frames. Once the roof was destroyed, rain poured into the structure, 
ruining the architectural elements, equipment, furniture, and other items inside. Fig.5-15 and Fig.5-16 show 
examples of roofs ripped off public structures. In addition to destroyed roofs, wind-borne projectiles shattered 
windows and soft walls.  
The most common roofing material in the region is Corrugated Galvanized Iron (GI) sheets, which are popular 
because of their low cost and ease of installation as shown as Fig.5-16. They are tied to the roofing frame/rafters 
(usually wooden, though sometimes metal) by nails. A common mechanism of failure of these ties is the nails 
ripping through the GI sheet. Sometimes the sheets and the nails are dissimilar metals, which can accelerate 
corrosion of both nail and sheet, further weakening the tie-down. In most cases, the roofing frames themselves 
remained tied down to the building structure quite well; contrast this to the US, in which the most common roof 
failure mode during hurricanes and tornadoes is the entire roofing frame lifting up off the building structure. The 
most direct method of preventing nails from ripping through GI sheet roofs is by using thicker GI sheets. However, 
this increases costs, and some hospitals complained that thicker GI sheets were not available (not in stock locally) 
for use in repair or reconstruction of their roofs after Haiyan, so thin GI sheets were used instead.  
Fig.5-17 shows a building that was totally damaged by wind and storm surge, and Fig.5-18 is a health facility 
partially damaged by only wind. Both health facilities were not functioning as of mid-January, 2014.  
Coconut trees dominate the vegetation in eastern Leyte Island. These are the source of the coconut oil industry in 
the area. Many trees fell and snapped off their trunks during the storm. A devastated canopy of coconut trees was 




Fig.5-15. Roof damage at a public area in Tacloban.  
 
 




Fig.5-17. Roof damage at a hospital in Palo (south of Tacloban).  
 
Fig.5-18. Tacloban Doctor’s Medical Center affected by only strong wind. 
 
Fig.5-19. The canopy of coconut trees was destroyed by strong wind. 
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5.6 Eastern Samar damage 
 
The eastern coast of Samar faces directly into the Pacific Ocean, thus it was exposed to the nearly 20 m height 
(offshore) waves generated during Haiyan. Most of the eastern coast drops rapidly to deep water, with coral reefs 
along the shoreline. However, there is a small, shallow bay (Matarinao Bay) near the town of General MacArthur. 
As Fig.5-20 shows, high water levels (6 to 10 m) were measured along the coastline. Inside Matarinao Bay, lower 
flood levels (about 3 m) were inferred via interviews.  
Near the Guiuan PAGASA station, Fig.5-21 shows a surge (mostly from wave setup) of 3 to 4 m, and wave 
heights of about 3 m on the landward side of the reef. Approximating runup as surge plus wave height (i.e. against a 
vertical wall), the 6.6 m recorded water level is reasonable. Fig.5-22 shows a foundation destroyed by the flood. 
Scour of sand under the foundation is responsible for some of the damage, as well as wave forces. Concrete blocks 
from foundations were drifted up to 30 m landward by the waves. In addition to the damage on the coast, the flood 
propagated far inland. Fig.5-23 shows a school building half kilometer inland flooded by the surge. However, due 
to lack of ground-level topography data in this location, inundation here cannot be simulated. Since a palm forest 
over 1/2 km wide separated this school from the coast, waves could no longer have been sizeable by the time they 
reached this location, so it is likely that the flood here was due to surge induced by wave setup.  
Further north, in a coastal Barangay of Salcedo, total water level was measured to have been at least 11.5 m 
above mean sea level. Fig.5-24 shows a toilet vault along a debris line located on land at 9 m above mean sea level, 
and a building with its top story washed away. The base of the top story is located at 11.5 m above mean sea level.  
From these photos, it is evident that scour was also a major cause of destruction. The toilet vault had been buried in 
the sand before the storm, so sand around the vault must have been scoured to have allowed the vault to float. Sever 
scour (greater than 1 m) is also seen around the foundation of the house in Fig.5-24. Scour caused the house’s 
approach stairway to collapse, though the house itself remained standing because its foundation footings remained 
partially supported by sand. The reason total water level was higher in Salcedo than in Guiuan was probably 
because the reef in Salcedo was much narrower than it was at the Guiuan site, allowing larger waves to runup 
onshore, whereas at the Guiuan site waves broke over the reef, causing a large setup but lower wave heights 
onshore.  
Fig.5-25 shows surge elevation and wave heights along the northern segment of Eastern Samar surveyed. At 
Quinapondan and General MacArthur, due to wave breaking over the broad reef at the entrance to Matarinao Bay, 
wave breaking inside the shallow bay itself, and shielding by islands inside the bay, wave heights were small.  
However, surge inside the bay, due to both wind-induced and wave-induced setup, was about 3 m above Mean Sea 
Level. This agrees with the water level measurements of Fig.5-20 at the locations inside Matarinao Bay. Fig.5-26 
shows damage seen in the fishing village of Quinapondan surveyed. Some traditional low-lying wooden homes on 
stilts were destroyed by the surge, but damage was not widespread, probably due to the lack of large waves. A 
similar situation existed in the town of General MacArthur.  
Further to the north, in the town of Hernani, damage was severe. Fig.5-25 shows about 3 m of surge and 3 m 
wave heights, thus about 6 m runup height would be expected on the landward side of the reef; however, runup up 
to 9 m was reported by eyewitness accounts (Fig.5-20), indicating that local topography might have played a role in 
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enhancing damage to this town (ground-level topography and actual nearshore bathymetry data for this area were 
not available). This town has been repeatedly damaged by typhoons, and had even been relocated from its previous 
location further southwest after the town in that location had been destroyed by a typhoon. Hernani has two 
seawalls, an old one slightly offshore which had already been demolished by previous storms, and a new one at the 
shoreward edge of the town. Nonetheless, damage to Hernani was severe. Fig.5-27 shows an example of scour 
measured in the town. Fig.5-28 shows the remaining frame columns of a wooden house washed away by a 
bore-like surge (filmed by Nickson Gensis, a member of Plan Philippines International). Fig.5-29 shows the 
damage seen along the coast of the town, reinforced concrete structures demolished by waves riding atop surge. 
Bricker and Roeber (2015) show the bore-like surge in Hernani was due to “bore-like” surf beat, where incident 
wave groups are transformed by the reef into infragravity (long-period) waves. Each of these infragravity waves 
steepens over the reef, and thus strikes the town as a bore.  Resonance of the reef with the periodicity of the wave 
groups amplifies the surf beat, resulting in the large, destructive, long-period wave observed.   
In Llorente, north of Hernani, maximum water level was reported by witnesses to be up to 6 m above Mean Sea 
Level (Fig.5-20). However, the town experienced little damage. One reason for this is the elevation of the town, the 
coastal part of which is about 5 m above Mean Sea Level; this is in contrast to Hernani, where most of the 
devastated area was at most 3.5 m above Mean Sea Level. Also different from Hernani is that Llorente is in a bay 
and has no coral reef offshore. The lack of a coral reef prevented the formation of the bore-like surf beat that 
destroyed Hernani.  Llorente was exposed to very large ocean waves, but these waves could not penetrate inland 
as far or as high as the bore-like surf beat in Hernani did.   
 
 












Fig.5-21. Surge water level and significant wave height near Guiuan.  
 
 
Fig.5-22. Damage near Guiuan PAGASA station. Damaged foundation located 4 m above Mean Sea Level. 
 
 










Fig.5-24. Damage in a coastal Barangay of Salcedo. Toilet vault (left) deposited on land at 9 m above Mean Sea 
Level. (right) top story at 11.6 m above Mean Sea Level washed away.  
 
 
Fig.5-25. Surge water level and significant wave height near Hernani.  
 
 






Fig.5-27. Scour up to 1 m deep around foundation in Hernani.  
 
Fig.5-28. Piles of house washed away by bore-like surge in Hernani.  
 
Fig.5-29. Debris from reinforced concrete house along coast in Hernani.  
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5.7 Seawall damage 
 
Seawall damage was observed in areas with significant wave activity, both in Leyte and Eastern Samar. Fig.5-30 
shows one of the breaches on the eastern shoreline of Tacloban Airport. The seawall was pushed from its base a few 
meters inland. Fig.5-31 shows similar damage at the MacArthur Memorial on the east coast of Palo, just south of 
Tacloban Airport. Damage was similar, with the revetment parapet pushed landward. The Palo seawall was a 
rubble-fill concrete structure with a concrete parapet. Fig.5-3 and Fig.5-6 show the maximum storm surge height 
and significant wave height at each of these sites. Surface waves were 3-4 meters high, on top of a 3-4 meter 
sustained surge. Since each seawall crest was about 3 m above water level, the mean water level (surge) reached at 
least the top of the parapets. This allowed the waves striking the seawalls to impact the full frontal area of the 
seawalls, and exert a large horizontal force. In addition, buoyancy caused by submergence of the seawalls reduced 
their weight, making them easier to slide. Finally, as seen clearly in Fig.5-31, overtopping caused severe scour 
landward of the seawalls, allowing them to be more easily displaced landward.  
Fig.5-32 shows the Hernani seawall in Eastern Samar. This seawall is a coral-fill embankment topped by a 
concrete parapet and covered with grouted concrete armor on the landward and seaward faces. The Hernani seawall 
was breached in multiple locations. Coral-fill debris and pieces of the parapet and facing armor were scattered both 
landward and seaward of the wall’s original location. Fig.5-33 shows a steady surge of over 3 m near Hernani, 
indicating that water had risen to at least the crest of the seawall. Fig.5-33 also shows wave heights on the landward 
side of Hernani’s coral reef to also have been over 3 m. In addition to large individual waves, the bore-like surf beat, 
described in Chapter 4.4 and Chapter 4.5, caused much of the damage in Hernani.  Fig. 5-34 shows a time series 
of these infragravity bores striking the seawall. The impact force of these bores as well as large individual waves 
was likely responsible for the seawall damage observed.   
Fig.5-35 shows the seawall in Llorente, north of Hernani. This seawall consists of a concrete bulkhead wall held 
in place by gravity to retain fill used to elevate the town’s coastline. The top section of the bulkhead wall is a 
recurved parapet. This seawall experienced no visible damage, indicating that the presence of fill behind the 
bulkhead wall prevented the wall from sliding under the wave forces to which it had been exposed. In addition to 
the strength imparted against sliding by fill, it’s likely this seawall contained rebar sufficient to prevent the parapet 
section of the wall from breaking off the bulkhead section; this is in contrast to Fig.5-31 and Fig.5-32, where the 
parapet section of each wall sheared off the revetment or bulkhead section. Another factor that likely prevented 
failure of the Llorente seawall is the concrete deck covering the fill on its landward side; this likely acted as armor 
to prevent scour of the fill behind the wall during wave overtopping of the parapet (wave overtopping of up to 2 m 
was reported by witnesses); this is in contrast to Fig.5-31, in which scour of the landside fill allowed waves to push 






Fig.5-30. Seawall breach on eastern coastline of Tacloban Airport. Crest height 3 m above Mean Sea Level. 
 
 
Fig.5-31. Seawall damage at the MacArthur Memorial south of Tacloban Airport. Crest height 3 m above Mean Sea 
Level.  
 





Fig.5-33. Maximum storm surge (left) and significant wave height (right) near Hernani.  
 
 
Fig. 5-34.  Water level (above MSL) landward of the seawall in Hernani, as simulated by phase-resolving wave 








Fig.5-35. Seawall in Llorente.  
 
 
5.8 Conclusions and Recommendations 
 
An on-site field survey in Leyte and Eastern Samar was conducted by the Hazard and Damage Evaluation Team, 
IRIDeS from January 16 through 24, 2014 in order to investigate damage due to storm surge, large waves, and 
strong wind induced by super typhoon Haiyan. 
  Inundation heights due to storm surge and high waves were measured by the team in Leyte and Samar and an 
inundation map of Tacloban city was developed mainly through local interviews. Storm surge heights up to 6 m 
were measured near the shoreline in Tacloban. Moreover, survivors reported waves up to 4 m high atop the surge. It 
was found from the survey that the surge travelled far to the north in the Samar-Leyte strait. Local river flooding 
and landslides due to heavy rainfall were also observed at several points in Tacloban and Palo. Also, runup due to 
large waves (up to 12 m) was measured in Eastern Samar.  
  Several types of damage induced by Haiyan were described in this chapter. Along the coastline of downtown 
Tacloban the presence of waves atop the wind-driven storm surge caused heavy damage. While concrete buildings 
are concentrated in downtown Tacloban, poorly built unsafe wooden houses are along the coastline because of 
poverty, causing vulnerability of Tacloban city against coastal water-related hazards. Another mechanism of 
damage to coastal buildings was debris impact. Also, seawall damage was observed in areas with significant wave 
activity, both in Leyte and Eastern Samar. 
Damage due to wind was present throughout the survey area. The major mechanism of wind damage was ripping 
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of the roofing materials off the roofing frame of each structure. Once a structure’s roof was destroyed, rain poured 
into the structure, ruining the architectural elements, equipment, furniture, and other items inside.  
The eastern coast of Samar faces directly into the open Pacific Ocean, and so was exposed to the nearly 20 m 
high waves (offshore) generated during the Haiyan event. Scour of sand by large waves of the foundations of 
houses is responsible for some of the damage, but wave force is also responsible for much of the damage. It should 
be emphasized that the bore-like surge that struck Hernani and washed away some houses. This bore was due to a 
large wave group having been transformed into “bore-like” surf beat by the presence of the coral reef offshore 
(Bricker and Roeber, 2015).   
From the survey the team concluded that storm surge, large waves, and high speed wind induced by Haiyan 
caused enormous damage to people, buildings and coastal structures in Leyte and Samar, and the vulnerability of 
the coastal area and fragility of houses made the damage more serious. Data analysis and numerical simulations of 
Haiyan are ongoing, but analysis and the survey results thus far have produced the following recommendations: 
 
 Several observation weather stations should be installed for the monitoring of the wind speed, air pressure, 
tide level, rainfall, etc. The monitoring system should be protected against strong wind and storm surge, so 
that it should be effective even in the event of a super typhoon like Haiyan. 
 Inland topography and local bathymetry along the coast should be measured in more detail for the numerical 
simulation of the storm surge and large waves in order to compute the inundation situation more precisely and 
clarify the mechanism of localized phenomena such as the bore-like surge that struck Hernani. 
 Storm surge hazard maps should be updated and developed in coastal areas in the Philippines under the worst 
scenario considering the impacts of climate change, land use/cover change, etc. 
 Seawalls should be reconstructed and multiple countermeasures such as combinations of seawalls, tide-water 
control forests, no building zones, etc. should be developed. These systems should be evaluated from the view 
point of efficiency, low cost and easy maintenance. 
 New building structures and roofing system should be developed to withstand strong wind speeds during super 
typhoons. A small design change such as implementing a curved roof, using thicker GI sheets instead thin GI 
sheets, and screws instead of nails for connections may make a big difference and might cost less and save 
lives. The effects of these design changes should be quantitatively evaluated.  
 Selection and construction of suitable evacuation centers and places 
 Education to emphasize the urgency of evacuation 
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Warning and Evacuation Assessment Team aims at examining and recording evacuation behavior and information 
notification in the affected area by Haiyan. Empirical studies contribute to develop policies that will mitigate 
damages by coming typhoons in the future. 
Although the team employed both of qualitative and quantitative methods for collecting information, it is 
focused on delivering some preliminary results by the qualitative approach in this article.  
 
Warning and Evacuation Assessment Team 
1.  Ass. Prof. Yasuhito Jibiki (Team Leader, International Regional Cooperation Office) 
2.  Assoc. Prof. Miwa Kuri (International Regional Cooperation Office) 
3.  Ass. Prof. Shuichi Kure (Disaster Potential Study) 
4.  Dr. Maritess Quimpo (Department of Public Works and Highways, Philippines) 
 
6.2 Method: Social survey 
 
A questionnaire survey at Tacloban, Palo and Tanauan cities in Leyte Island was implemented from 14th March 
2014 to 22nd March 2014. These three cities in the Philippines had different types of damages by storm surge, wind, 
and torrential rains.  
Fig.6-1 shows the death and missing ratio of each barangay in three cities based on hearing data from city 
governments and barangay offices. The designed total sample size is 600 and individual sample size of three cities 
is 200. High ratio sites are picked up in three cities as target sites. The complex situation and the heavy damages 
prevent the survey from employing the random sampling method based on the residential lists. 
200 samples divide into 8 cells based on the population condition of generation and gender. The generation 
brackets are composed of 4 groups: 20-29, 30-39, 40-49, and over 50. According to National Statistics Office of the 
Filipino government, the ratio of male and female are almost same. Thus, the each number of the sample is divided 
equally in terms of gender. Contrary, the number of the young generation is larger than that of the elder (see Table 
6-1). Therefore, designed number of 200 samples is allocated into 8 cells on actual population condition (see Table 
6-2). 
In addition with the settings above, geographical closeness are also considered. In each sites, it is biased if 
many samples are selected from specific barangays. However, the number of the samples in the survey is limited. 
Thus, samples are gathered from some barangays where locate along with coastal line of San Pedro and San Pablo 
Bay, and each barangays exist nearby in each other. For the control of geographical factors and hazard 
characteristics, the survey did not intend to distribute samples in Samar or other islands. 
Each respondent were interviewed by enumerators. Finally 642 samples are gained. The final number of 
samples is bigger than the original designed number. Although in gender condition the number of female is slightly 
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larger than that of male, a chi-square test demonstrates that the difference does not have statistical significance. In 
generation condition, the number of gained samples in each site is varied, but no statistical significance is observed 
amongst the difference. The final sample size is enough to be similar with the original designed sample size in the 
population condition of attribute, generation and gender.  
For complementary information, 645 residents joined the survey, but 3 samples were excluded because their age 
was under 20 years old. Table 6-3 shows the total number of the samples is 641. However, as shown in a note of 
Table 6-3, a respondent did not answer its gender and the respondent is included in the analysis in this report. 
 
Source: Hearing data from offices of city government and barangay by the authors 
Fig.6-1. Distribution of the death and missing ratio of each Barangay in survey area. 
 
Table 6-1. Distribution of age population. 
Age 20-29 30 - 39 40 - 49 Over 50 
Ratio 30.5% 24.6% 19.6% 25.2% 
Note: Age under 19 years old are excluded in the calculation. 






















Table 6-2. Design of allocated sample size in each cites (sample size: 200)． 
Age 20-29 30 - 39 40 - 49 Over 50 Sum 
Male 30 25 20 25 100 
Female 30 25 20 25 100 
Sum 60 50 40 50 200 
Source: This table is made by the authors. 
Table 6-3. The number of the obtained samples by each survey sites. 
Tacloban 
 20s 30s 40s Over 50s Sum 
Male 30 (14.4%) 24 (11.5%) 25 (12.0%) 22 (10.5%) 101 (48.3%) 
Female 31 (14.8%) 29 (13.9%) 22 (10.5%) 26 (12.4%) 108 (51.7%) 
Sum 61 (29.2%) 53 (25.4%) 47 (22.5%) 48 (23.0%) 209 (100.0%) 
 
Palo 
 20s 30s 40s Over 50s Sum 
Male 31 (14.5%) 26 (12.1%) 21 (9.8%) 27 (12.6%) 105 (49.1%)
Female 31 (14.5%) 31 (14.5%) 21 (9.8%) 26 (12.1%) 109 (50.9%)
Sum 62 (29.0%) 57 (26.6%) 42 (19.6%) 53 (24.8%) 214 (100.0%)
 
Tanauan 
 20s 30s 40s Over 50s Sum 
Male 30 (13.8%) 28 (12.8%) 20 (9.2%) 27 (12.4%) 105 (48.2%)
Female 31 (14.2%) 31 (14.2%) 22 (10.1%) 29 (13.3%) 113 (51.8%)
Sum 61 (28.0%) 59 (27.1%) 42 (19.3%) 56 (25.7%) 218 (100.0%)
 
Total (Tacloban + Palo + Tanauan) 
 20s 30s 40s Over 50s Sum 
Male 91 (14.2%) 78 (12.2%) 66 (10.3%) 76 (11.9%) 311 (48.5%)
Female 93 (14.5%) 91 (14.2%) 65 (10.1%) 81 (12.6%) 330 (51.5%)
Sum 184 (28.7%) 169 (26.4%) 131 (20.4%) 157 (24.5%) 641 (100.0%)
Note: One respondent did not answer his/her gender. The respondent lived in Tacloban and 68 
years old. The respondent is included in the analysis.  





6.3 Situation prior to Yolanda 
 
6.3.1 Estimation of damages by Haiyan and real damages caused by Haiyan 
 
It has not clearly been stated whether local people estimated that Haiyan gave such a devastating impacts. The 
authors prepared a question that aims at clarifying whether the respondents estimated damages of Haiyan would be 
severe. The question is “Before the typhoon Yolanda, how did you expect the possible damage to your family/house 
due to a typhoon?” The results state that the sum of the answers “Very high” and “High” is 27.0%, although the 
sum of “Very low” and “Low” is 55.6％. It indicates that many respondents underestimated the damages of Haiyan 
before its devastation. Comparing with each survey site, statistical significance was observed (χ2 (8, N=637) = 
21.696, p<.01). The respondents in Tanauan tended to underestimate the damages (see the left side of Fig.6-2). No 
statistical significance was detected in gender (χ2 (6, N=636) = 5.987, p<n.s.). The male and female respondents 
underestimated to the same degree. In the generation brackets, there was statistical significance (χ2 (12, N=637) = 
62.476, p<.01) and the bracket of 30s tended to have underestimation. 
Contrary to the estimation, real damages of the respondents house were that the answer “Swept away” was 
55.2％, and “Highly damaged” was 30.9％ (see the right side of Fig.6-2). The results clearly demonstrates that the 
respondents had severe damages against their initial estimation. Calculating relation with estimation of damages 
and real damages, no significance is shown (χ2 (16, N=634) = 15.971, p<n.s.) and it is obvious that the initial 
estimation was failed.  
 
 











































































































6.3.2 Trust for barangay captains and PAGASA 
 
Exploring early warnings in the case of Haiyan, the authors set questions clarifying how much degree barangay 
captains and PAGASA as sources of disaster related information were trusted by the respondents prior to Haiyan. 
The questions are “How much did you rely on Barangay captain (PAGASA) in order to get disaster related 
information such as typhoon warning?” 
In barangay captains, the sum of the answers “Very high” and “High” is 51.0％ and those of “Very low” and 
“Low” is 26.3％ (see the left side of Fig.6-3). Thus, it can be stated that trust for barangay captains was relatively 
higher. Comparing with each survey site, the respondents in Tanauan had tendency to rely higher on barangay 
captains (χ2 (8, N=635) = 22.235, p<.01). In gender, the male respondents tend to give reliance on barangay 
captains rather than the female (χ2 (4, N=634) = 11.542, p<.05). The sum of the answers “Very low” and “Low” are 
the almost same with the male and female, but the sum of the answer “Very high” and “High” in the male 
respondents is larger than those of the female. Analyzing difference of the generation brackets, the elder tends to 
rely on barangay captains (χ2 (12, N=635) = 31.500, p<.01). The sum of the answers “Very high” and “High” 
becomes gradually bigger in older generations, and the ratio of “Very low” decreases.  
In PAGASA, The sum of the answers “Very high” and “High” is 65.6%, although The sum of “Very low” and 
“Low” is 13.5% (see the right side of Fig.6-3). Comparing with the ratio of trust in barangay captains, PAGASA 
obtained higher reliance from the respondents. There is no statistical significance between the survey sites, in the 
case of PAGASA (χ2 (8, N=636) = 7.229, p<n.s.). In gender, the female respondents tended to rely on PAGASA 
higher (χ2 (4, N=635) = 19.394, p<.01). The sum of “Very low” and “Low” in the female answer is smaller than 
those of the male. In the generation brackets, the bracket of 40s gave bigger reliance on PAGASA (χ2 (12, N=636) = 
36.897, p<.01). In the age of 40s, the sum of the answers “Very low” and “Low” is smaller than others. 
 
Note: The right figure is the result of barangay captains and the left one is those of PAGASA. 
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6.3.3 Recognition of technical terms: Storm surge, the maximum instantaneous wind speed or peak gust, 
atmospheric pressure 
 
Early warning messages include technical terms. Once these terms are recognized by people, early warnings might 
be influential on human behaviors, although the terms are not the only factor to facilitate necessary actions. In this 
section, the authors aim at describing how much degree the respondents recognized technical terms in relation with 
typhoons. Three terms, storm surge, the maximum instantaneous wind speed or peak gust, atmospheric pressure, 
are investigated. 
The recognition rate of storm surge is 12.8% in average and it is the lowest among three terms (see the left in 
Fig.6-4). In the generation bracket of 20s, it has the largest recognition comparing with others (χ2 (3, N=642) = 
13.368, p<.01). No statistical significance was observed both in the survey sites (χ2 (2, N=642) = .049, p<n.s.) and 
gender (χ2 (1, N=641) = 2.163, p<n.s.). 
The maximum instantaneous wind speed or peak gust has the highest recognition among three terms (see the 
middle in Fig.6-4). The term has the 41.6% in average recognition. In the survey sites, the respondents in Tanauan 
tended to not recognize the term (χ2 (2, N=642) = 10.038, p<.01). In gender, the female respondents recognized the 
term higher than the males (χ2 (1, N=641) = 4.713, p<.05). The generation brackets of 30s and 40s have relatively 
larger recognition percentage (χ2 (3, N=642) = 23.439, p<.01). 
Atmospheric pressure was not recognized highly and its rate was about 20% (see the right in Fig.6-4). 
Comparing with each survey site, Tacloban had the lowest recognition (χ2 (2, N=642) = 13.167, p<.01). In the 
generation bracket of 20s had significantly the largest recognition, contrary to those of 40s (χ2 (3, N=642) = 74.198, 
p<.01). Gender did not show difference of the recognition (χ2 (1, N=641) = .594, p<n.s.). 
 
Note: The result of storm surge locates in the left, the maximum instantaneous wind speed or peak gust in the 
middle and atmospheric pressure in the right. 
















































6.3.4 Learning and evacuation training before Haiyan 
 
Studying the residents’ behavior in the case of Haiyan, the authors considered that it is important to investigate 
whether the respondents had been already prepared for typhoons, from the view point of educational and practical 
efforts. If they had rich experience on learning and evacuation training, these experience is expected to have 
positive effects on their actions. However, the survey illustrates that both of learning and training opportunities 
were not sufficiently organized before Haiyan. 
The 63.1% of the respondents answered that opportunities to learn the natural disasters (typhoon, earth quake, 
tsunami, fire) before the typhoon Yolanda were “Low” or “Very low” (see the left in Fig.6-5). The sum of “Very 
high” and “High” were 18.4%. In the survey sites, Tanauan had the largest opportunities among three sites (χ2 (10, 
N=640) = 26.687, p<.01). In gender, the female respondents had lower opportunities (χ2 (5, N=639) = 17.697, 
p<.01). It is very low in the generation bracket of over 50s (χ2 (15, N=640) = 111.488, p<.01). 
No attendance ratio of the evacuation training (typhoon, earthquake, tsunami, fire) before Haiyan was more 
than 60% (see the right side of Fig.6-5). No statistical significance was found in the survey sites (χ2 (6, N=640) = 
4.037, p<n.s.) and in gender (χ2 (3, N=639) = .728, p<n.s.). Calculating a tabulation in the generation bracket, the 
age of 20s tended to have more frequent opportunities for the evacuation training (χ2 (9, N=640) = 27.290, p<.01). 
However, 57.6% of the generation bracket of 20s had no opportunities for evacuation trainings before Haiyan, and 
the opportunities were quite limited. 
 
 
Note: The right figure is the result of learning opportunities and the left one is those of evacuation trainings. 




































































































































6.4 Results on evacuation and discussions 
 
6.4.1 Evacuation behavior 
 
The survey data demonstrates that around 70% of the respondents evacuated to some places except their house (see 
Fig.6-6.). About 30% of the respondents did not evacuate to anywhere outside of their houses. In other words, they 
remained at their houses.  
In the detail analysis, three types of cross tabulation were calculated. Regarding the cross calculation on the 
survey sites, a statistical difference is observed (χ2 (2, N=589) = 8.265, p<.10). The respondents in Tacloban tends 
to not evacuate to anywhere outside of their houses, comparing with those in Palo and Tanauan. In terms of gender, 
a statistical difference is also detected (χ2 (2, N=588) = 8.219, p<.05). The result indicates the male does not tend to 
evacuate to anywhere outside of their houses, in comparison of female. In the analysis between evacuation behavior 
and the age brackets, a statistical difference is observed (χ2 (2, N=589) = 15.447, p<.01). According to Fig.6-6, the 
ratio in 30s and “Not evacuated” is higher than those of others. And, the percentage in over 50s and “Not evacuated” 
is also bigger than those of 20s and 40s.  
These results implies that people in Tacloban has a different view on evacuation in the case of Haiyan, 
comparing with Palo and Tanauan. Thus, in further analysis, it seems important to examine the geographical 
uniqueness. Also, the statistical difference in gender and the age brackets, it can be interpreted that typical tendency 
might be observed in the case of Haiyan. Many cases in natural disasters, male hesitates in being absent from its 
house, and the elder has a comparatively greater difficulties in moving from its house to another places.  
 
6.4.2 Reasons for evacuation to outside of houses 
 
In the survey, the respondents, who answered that they evacuated to outside of houses, showed reasons for their 
behavior. The largest response is the recognition for the approach of super typhoon (37.7%). Next to that, the notion 
for the strong wind was high (30.0%). The role of barangay leaders (barangay captains) is the third largest (26.3%). 
It can be argued that the role of barangay leaders seems to be less significant rather than spontaneous evacuation by 
residents. 
Results of cross calculations between the reason and the survey sites might imply that decisions by people in 
Tanauan were quicker than those of Tacloban and Palo. Statistical differences are observed in three answers (see 
items highlighted by red boxes in Fig.6-7). It can be interpreted that people in Tanauan did not wait for other 
persons’ decisions, because the ratio in Tanauan is the lowest in “Whole Barangay member decided to do that.” 
Also, the least percentages in the answer 7 and 8 might indicate that people in Tanauan did not face with or tried to 
avoid crisis of their lives. On the contrary, people in Tacloban evacuated because their houses were getting flooded 
due to sea water, and it means they have already been inundated and surrounded by water. Regarding “I felt I might 





6.4.3 Reasons for not evacuated to outside of houses (remained at houses) 
 
In contrast to reasons for evacuation to outside of houses, the survey had a question for those who remained at their 
houses. The most common answer is “the wave should not be that large” (64.8%). The second largest percentage is 
“my house was strong enough” (31.8%). These results indicate that many people were not able to imagine how 
Haiyan was severe. Furthermore, it is questionable for adequateness for contents of information including warnings 
and news programs which was disseminated prior to Haiyan’s landfall. 
Cross tabulation analysis demonstrates four reasons have statistical significance with the difference of the 
survey sites (see items highlighted by red boxes in Fig.6-8). It can be considered that people in Tacloban and in 
Tanauan had a different point. Based on Tacloban response, people had sufficient knowledge about behavior in the 
emergency (in answer 1 of Fig.6-8, Tacloban has 0.0%), but they were unable to estimate Haiyan’s influence (see 
answer 2 in Fig.6-8). On the other hand, people in Tanauan were aware that their land was not high enough against 
Haiyan (see answer 2 in Fig.6-8), but they had no idea how to behave in face of disasters (see answer 1 in Fig.6-8). 
These difference seems to mention the importance to disseminate information and evacuation instructions taking 
into account of local contexts.  
 
Note 1: Since one respondents did not answer its gender and was not able to include the calculation, the 
sum of the number of male and female is different from those of sites and age brackets.  
Note 2: No answers and wrong answers are excluded in the analysis. 
Source: This figure is made by the authors. 
















































Note: Answers highlighted by red boxes have statistical difference among the survey sites. 
Source: This figure is made by the authors. 
Fig.6-7. Reasons for evacuation to outside of houses (Multiple answer). 
 
Note: Answers highlighted by red boxes have statistical difference among the survey sites. 
Source: This figure is made by the authors. 
Fig. 6-8. Reasons for not evacuated to outside of houses (remained at houses) (Multiple answer). 
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This survey indicates that it is not reasonable to understand that local residents were fully prepared for the super 
typhoon Haiyan. It is very obvious that the respondents of the survey underestimated the impacts of Haiyan. 
Technical terms of typhoons were not shared among the respondents. Learning and evacuation training 
opportunities were quite limited prior to Haiyan. In terms of information source, barangay captains and PAGASA 
were trusted relatively highly. Especially, PAGASA enjoyed higher trustiness from the respondents. However, 
considering the poor knowledge of technical terms in the respondents, it could hardly work that relevant 
information caused the local people’s evacuation behavior adequately, even though PAGASA’s information reached 
the local residents. 
This survey shows that the ratio of evacuation to the outside of houses is relatively high. However, evacuation 
in detail differs with sites, gender and age. Reasons and clues for evacuation to outside of houses and reasons for 
remaining at houses are also depend on the difference of sites. Although the survey sites locate in the same island 
and share the same coastal line, local characteristics are observed in the preliminary analysis. The finding is 
considered to be utilized in further inquiries.  
It is required to clearly state that the research has two limitation. Just as a great problem which was occurred in 
Great East Japan Earthquake, a social survey by the team is able to contribute for revealing only survivors’ 
behaviors. In other words, the analysis is lack of viewpoints from those who could not be survivors. Critical 
questions for identifying factors which differentiate survivors or not are complemented by qualitative interviews by 
survivors partially. Regarding the method in the survey, it cannot be said that the sampling covered the all affected 
area. Not only in Leyte Island, but also in Samar, Cebu and other islands, the large number of population was 
damaged by Haiyan. The results of the survey are required to be compared with other efforts. 
   In addition with the quantitative survey, the team conducted interviews in Samar Island (Samar Island is next to 
Leyte Island). Interviews were conducted in western parts of Samar. The team visited Basay and Marabut. Costal 
Barangays in Basay were severely affected by the storm surge. Contrary, damages in Marabut were due to the 
strong wind rather than the surge. The city of Calbayog was selected for complementary analysis. The city had 
relatively smaller damages by the typhoon, and supported affected local governments in Leyte Island. The 
interviewees are varied from the city mayor to Barangay captains and affected residents. These interviewees 
responded to questions about early warning, disaster information dissemination and public awareness for the 











6.6 Situation after Yolanda 
 
In addition to the previous questionnaire survey for local people in the Tacloban, Palo and Tanauan cities, another 
questionnaire survey was conducted for each barangay captain in the barangay in order to understand the barangay 
captains’ disaster-related information transfer system, their considerations for the evacuation facility selection and 
the current situation to prepare for the next typhoons. Also, evacuation situations, against Typhoon Hagupit and 
Tropical Storm Jangmi that landed around the Visayas region in December 2014, are discussed in this section. 
 
6.6.1 Target barangays 
 
The questionnaire survey for barangay captains in the Tacloban, Palo and Tanauan cities in Leyte Island was 
conducted from 20th November to 23rd November 2014. As many as 31 barangays, shown in Fig. 6-9, are selected 
for this survey. The barangays are located in the coastal area highly affected by the storm surges induced by Haiyan. 
It should be noted that the number of samples, 31, might be insufficient to identify the statistical differences, so that 
the results presented below should be considered as those of initial assessment and reference information. It should 
be also noted that some barangay captains did not join this survey due to their own duties during the survey period. 
In that case, barangay council members answered the barangay situations instead of the captains. 
 
 
Fig.6-9. Target barangays (Blue zones) in Tacloban, Palo and Tanauan for the survey. 
 
6.6.2 Information transfer system and considerations for the selection of evacuation places 
 
From the questionnaire survey results, it was found that many barangay captains transferred the evacuation order by 
themselves by walking to their barangay and talking to the people individually (Fig. 6-10 [upper left]). Regarding 
68 
 
evacuation places, many barangay captains answered that they would tell the barangay people to evacuate to 
schools in the barangay, rather than high elevation areas or tall and strong buildings in the barangay (Fig. 6-10 
[upper right]). On the other hand, many barangay captains considered that the evacuation places should withstand 
strong winds and have no possibility to be flooded by a sea water or river flooding (Fig.6-10 [lower left]). From 
those, it would be possible to consider that basically, the barangay captains might want the barangay people to 
evacuate to such safer places. However, they selected the schools because that was the most appropriate place they 
could choose under the circumstances. This fact may imply that there is no appropriate evacuation facility such as 




Fig.6-10 Barangay captains’ actions and considerations for evacuation (Multiple Answer). 
 
The important point is about 30% of barangay captains answered that they would leave him/her there by respecting 
his/her decision and do nothing when there is a person who does not want to evacuate to somewhere (Fig. 6-10 
[lower right]). In order to save lives of local people, it is highly recommended for barangay captains to persuade or 
force them to evacuate to somewhere against super typhoons like Haiyan. In order for that, it is essential that the 
barangay captains have knowledge and leadership to judge the magnitude and route of typhoons and transfer the 
information properly and understandably to the local people. However, even a year after Haiyan event, almost 50% 
of barangay captains do not understand the meaning of Storm Surge (Fig. 6-11). The word “storm surge” is not 
widely understood compared to other natural disaster words generally used such as Tsunami, Earthquake, and 
Typhoon. This kind of situation should be improved through disaster education and trainings provided by the 
Philippines government, international organizations, etc. IRIDeS conducted a disaster education program (See 




Fig.6-11 Questions if the natural disaster terminologies (Multiple Answer) are understood.  
    
For the above questions, we set multiple answer options, so that the relationship between barangay captains’ 
answers and the fatalities of the Haiyan event at each barangay could be found. Table 6-4 shows the representative 
questions and answers in which the difference between the areas with high fatalities and the areas with low 
fatalities might be identified. From this table, it might be inferred that barangay captains’ knowledge and leadership 
affect the evacuation behavior and fatality of the local people during the Haiyan event. It should be noted, however, 
that this is an initial assessment and due to the small number of samples, it is difficult to identify any statistical 
differences to lead to this conclusion. Thus, these results should be analyzed more carefully and further surveys are 
definitely required. 
 








How do you deliver the
evacuation order from
you to other barangay
people and houses?
If there is a person






















no possibility to be
flooded by a sea water
or river flooding
Leave him/her alone
and do nothing to
respect his/her
decision
2.7 1 Included 〇 〇
1.7 1 Included 〇 〇
3.5 2 Included 〇 〇 〇 〇 〇
1.1 mora than 10 Included 〇 〇 〇 〇 〇
5 mora than 10 Included 〇 〇 〇 〇 〇 〇
2.3 2 Included 〇 〇 〇 〇 〇 〇
9.9 1 Included 〇 〇 〇 〇
12.2 1 Included 〇
13.3 1 Included 〇 〇 〇
8.4 1 Included 〇 〇
8.3 more than 10 Included 〇 〇 〇
12.2 3 Included 〇 〇 〇 〇 〇
9.01 1 Included 〇 〇
16.7 1 Included 〇 〇
16.3 1 Included 〇 〇 〇
Where will you make the
barangay people to evacuate?
What kind of considerations do you do





6.6.3 Evacuation response to Typhoon Ruby 
 
A year later from the Haiyan event, another powerful tropical cyclone, named as Typhoon Ruby called Hagupit in 
the Philippines, struck the Visayas region at 11:00 pm on December 6, 2014 with maximum sustained winds of 175 
kph near the center and gustiness of up to 210 kph (PAGASA, 2014a). The Severe Weather Bulletin #8 with the 
Public Storm Warning Signal no.3 on the Visayas region (Northern Samar, Eastern Samar, and Samar) was issued at 
11:00 pm on December 5, 2014. The warning included the message “those living along the coast are warned on the 
occurrence of big waves associated with Storm Surge which may reach up 4 meters.” The track of Typhoon Ruby is 
shown in Fig.6-12 (PAGASA, Severe Weather Bulletin #8, 2014b). According to NDRRMC (2014a), 18 deaths 
were reported in Regions VI-A, IV-B, VII, and VIII but only one death was reported in Leyte (Capoocan barangay). 
 
Fig.6-12. Track of Typhoon Ruby presented in the Severe Weather Bulletin #8 issued by PAGASA (PAGASA, 
2014b) 
 
The initial forecast for Ruby was that it would take a similar route and magnitude of Haiyan, so that many people in 
Tacloban felt fears and in panic. Therefore, Tacloban City and people were well prepared for Ruby and more than 
50,000 people in the city evacuated before and during the event. Also, Ruby took a more northward route compared 
to Haiyan, so there was no causality in Tacloban City. 
   After the Ruby event, we conducted a questionnaire survey for barangay captains in Tacloban, Palo and 
Tanauan in order to understand the evacuation situations and problems during the Ruby event. The target barangays 
and captains are the same as those discussed in the previous section.  
   It can be seen from Fig.6-13 (upper left) that many people evacuated during the Ruby event, and before its 
landing many barangay people thought Ruby would have almost the same magnitude as Haiyan (Fig.6-13 [upper 
right]). Also, Fig.6-13 (lower) shows barangay captains’ attitudes toward people who did not want to evacuate to 
somewhere. The answers are slightly different from the ones obtained from the questionnaires (Fig.6-10 [lower 
right]) conducted before the Ruby event. Some barangay captains changed their responses from “Leave him/her 
alone and do nothing” and “Force him/her to evacuate” to “Persuade him/her to evacuate”. This may imply that the 
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Ruby related information made barangay captains more serious but not as much as forcing the people to evacuate. 
What they could do was to persuade them to evacuate under the actual situation.  
  
 
Fig.6-13. Evacuation situation against Typhoon Ruby (Multiple Answer).  
 
Several problems occurred during and after evacuation (Fig. 6-14 [upper]). There were many cases of power 
outage in the evacuation facilities due to the damage of the electric facilities induced by strong wind of Ruby. 
It should be noted that some people claimed that the evacuation was meaningless because there was no big damage 
or causality. Thus, it would be needed for the local government and barangay captains to carefully explain the 
situation and importance of the evacuation even there was no damage. Otherwise some people might not evacuate 
in the future typhoon events. It should be emphasized that only 30% of barangay captains realized that the Ruby’s 
track, taking a more northward route compared to the Haiyan’s track, was related to the reason that no severe storm 
surge occurred in the San Pedro bay in this event (Fig.6-14 [lower]). Not only typhoon’s strength and wind speed 
but also typhoon’s routes are important factors to generate storm surges and large waves. According to Mori et al. 
(2014), Haiyan took the worst path and speed to generate the severe storm surge in the San Pedro bay. These 
scientific views and mechanism of the storm surge should be explained simply and understandably to the barangay 







Fig.6-14 Problems during and after evacuation (upper) and the reasons why there was no severe storm surges in the 
Ruby event (lower).  
 
 
6.6.4 Damage from Tropical Storm Jangmi 
 
After the landfall of the typhoon Ruby, a tropical storm, named as Jangmi called Seniang in the Philippines, struck 
the Mindanao region at 6:00 am on December 29, 2014 with maximum sustained winds of 65 kph near the center 
and gustiness of up to 80 kph (PAGASA, 2014c). The Weather Bulletin #6 with the Public Storm Warning Signal 
no.1 on Leyte was issued at 11:00 am on December 19, 2014. The warning included the message “Residents in low 
lying and mountainous areas are alerted against possible flashfloods and landslides.” The track of Tropical Storm 
Jangmi is shown in Fig.6-15 (PAGASA, Weather Bulletin #6, 2014c). According to NDRRMC (2014b), a total of 
66 deaths were reported in Regions VI, VII, VIII, X, XI, and CARAGA, mainly due to flooding/flashflood and 
landslide. Twelve deaths were reported in Leyte and 20 deaths were reported in Samar. Five individuals were dead 
in the Cabuynan barangay of Tanauan City in Leyte because of landslide (Fig.6-16) induced by a heavy rainfall 
during the event. It should be emphasized that even lower wind speeds compared to Ruby with the signal no.3, 










Fig.6-16. Landslides occurred in the Cabuynan barangay of the Tanauan city in Leyte (Pictures taken by Dr. S. 
Kure on January 29, 2015). 
 
The two events, Typhoon Ruby and Tropical Storm Jangmi, raise several important issues, and we must learn from 
those events that the successful evacuation can save many lives even in cases of strong typhoons. Also, not only 
wind speeds but also heavy rainfalls should be considered for evacuation. PAGASA’s warning signal (#1 - 4) is 
based on the wind speed, and many barangay captains judge whether to evacuate or not based on the warning signal 
number (Fig.6-17).  
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A year after Haiyan, the precious lives of 84 people were lost in these two events, which has given us many lessons 
for future disaster mitigations and preparations. 
 




The results discussed in this section are from our initial assessment, and data analysis is still ongoing. Also, it 
should be noted that the number of samples of this survey might be insufficient to identify the statistical differences 
and thus further surveys are required for conclusions. However, the initial assessment of the survey result leads to 
the following recommendations: 
 The leadership and knowledge of barangay captains play an important role to make the barangay people to 
evacuate properly. The disaster educations and trainings should be provided at the barangay level. It was found 
out through our survey that the barangay captains and people are willing to take those trainings and they are 
waiting to be given those opportunities. 
 Based on the disaster-related educations, trainings, evacuation drills, etc., a Community Based Disaster Risk 
Reduction (CBDRR) should be developed in the city and barangay levels. The CBDRR may be one of the 
suitable options for future disaster mitigations of the Philippines because Philippine’s disaster information 
transfer system (Fig.2-10 of Chapter 2) is based on the house to house transfer system at the local barangay 
level. 
 Even a year after Typhoon Haiyan, many people do not understand the meaning and mechanism of the storm 
surge. The scientific view of the storm surge should be explained simply and understandably in order for 
people to make a decision to evacuate and to receive the PAGASA’s warnings properly. 
 Tropical Storm Jangmi reminded us that a small tropical storm may bring a heavy rainfall and causalities 
because of flooding and landslides induced by the heavy rainfall. Not only PAGASA’s warning level (# 1 - 4), 
but also the messages included in the weather bulletins issued by PAGASA should be carefully checked. 
 
One basic and important recommendation is to check the hazard map provided by JICA (JICA, 2014). JICA 
developed the detailed storm surge hazard map based on a numerical simulation after Haiyan, and conducted a 
location and capacity assessment of evacuation centers based on the hazard map. This kind of project should be 
75 
 
announced widely and the hazard map developed by JICA is strongly encouraged to introduce and explain to local 
people so that they can understand the situation and find an appropriate evacuation facility. Also, it should be 
emphasized that so many damaged evacuation facilities due to Haiyan still remain damaged and have not been 
reconstructed. Those evacuation facilities should be rebuilt as soon as possible before the landfall of the next super 
typhoon in the near future. 
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In order to establish the international standards for effective medical and public health response, Division of 
Disaster Medical Research has missions to investigate the acute and chronic phase of the response and recovery 
together with preparedness. In this Typhoon Haiyan disaster, we investigated the immediate medical and public 
health response, domestic and international medical aids, outbreak of infectious diseases, psychosocial problems 
and mental health of the affected people. Since it is not easy to grasp the whole figure of a disaster by short term 
visit at the phase of chaos after huge calamity, we revisited the affected area one-year later and investigated the 
damage of disaster and how the local healthcare providers are “building back better”. 
We collaborated with the medical and public health practitioners and researchers in Philippines, Department of 
Health (DOH), World Health Organization (WHO) and others to promote collaborative research and publicizing of 
the results. Basic concept and strategy of psychosocial interventions at post-disaster settings has been shared 
between Japanese and Phillipino mental health workers, and cultural and social differences in mental health 
between two countries and perspectives in international collaboration on disaster mental health has been depicted. 
 
Disaster Medical Research Team 
1.  Prof. Shinichi Egawa (Team Leader, International Cooperation for Disaster Medicines) 
2.  Prof. Toshio Hattori (Disaster-related Infectious Disease)  
3.  Prof. Hiroaki Tomita (Disaster Psychiatry) 
4.  Assist. Prof. Haorile Chagan-Yasutan (Disaster-related Infectious Disease) 




Disaster Medical Research Teams were dispatched in the 1st, 2nd, 4th and 6th investigations. One year later, we 
re-visited the Tacloban and Palo area to investigate the long-term recovery and reconstruction process of the 
affected area.  
1.  Common themes 
a. Investigations on health damage by Typhoon Haiyan from various perspectives at relatively short term 
(three months) and long term (one year and three months). 
b. Interview at Japanese Embassy about their response and health problems of Japanese residents. 
c. Establishment of educational system in collaboration with the medical and health related universities about 
Disaster Medicine 
d. Establishment of collaboration with University of Philippines Manila (UP Manila) and Angeles University 
through MOAs 




2.  Division of International Cooperation for Disaster Medicine (Prof. Egawa and Assist. Prof. Sasaki) 
a. Investigation of structural, non-structural and functional damage of hospitals, Rural Healthcare Unit, 
Barangay Health System and other related facilities by direct visit and interview. 
b. Post disaster change of the medical and public health needs of the affected people and areas. 
c. Elucidation of the obstacles to recovery and reconstruction of the damaged health related facilities at three 
months and one-year later. 
d. Observation of health and sanitary condition of the affected people together with some interviews 
e. Investigation of damage and reconstruction plan of medical educational institutions such as UPM-SHS, 
RTR foundation and Bethany Hospital. 
f. Discussion and recommendation in the DOH about the “Safe Hospital” concept. Structural, non-structural 
and functional strengthening of the hospitals including hospital BCP, network promotion and systemic 
disaster medical response preparedness. 
g. Investigation of domestic and international medical aids in collaboration with DOH and WHO.  
h. Interview with JICA about their concept and role in the reconstruction of health related facilities. 
 
3.  Division of Disaster Related Infectious Disease (Prof. Hattori and Assist. Prof. Chagan-Yasutan) 
a. The sanitary condition of affected area and the occurrence of Dengue, Leptospirosis, Tetanus, Measles, 
Tuberculosis, HIV, Melioidosis and others. 
b. Establishment of early detection system and pathological analysis of the infectious diseases in collaboration 
with San Lazaro Hospital. 
c. A questionnaire survey health personnel in the Philippines to investigate a) awareness of the international 
frameworks related to disaster medicine and humanitarian response and b) risk perception of natural 
disasters and disaster-related infectious diseases. 
 
4.  Division of Disaster Psychiatry (Prof. Tomita) 
a. Investigation of mental health care of Japanese residents. 
b. Establishment of collaborative mental health research with researchers in Philippines. 
c. Investigation of the current situation and future perspectives of psychological primary care in the medical 
system in the Philippines. 




1. Geographical mapping of the possible hospitals and health related facilities in the affected area in collaboration 
with remote sensing team (Dr. Carine Yi). Based on the prepared map, individual visit of the facilities and 
interviews with the medical directors of the hospitals together with architect from University of Philippines (Mr. 
Karl Taberdo).  
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2. Visiting the tent and temporary housing areas to observe the sanitary and health condition of the affected 
people with some interviews.  
3. Visiting the international agents for humanitarian assistance including Red Cross, MSF and others. 
4. Based on the MOA and collaborative history with San Lazaro Hospital (Dr. Elizabeth Telan), extended 
collaboration with DOH (Drs. Marilyn Go, Winston Go, Carmencita Banatin and Alex Dimapilis), WHO (Drs. 
Arturo Pesigan, Lester Geroy, Alice Ruth Foxwell and Jonathan Abrahams) and WPRO (Dr. Nevio Zagaria) 
to get the information about health cluster approach and humanitarian assistance. 
5. Visiting Japanese Embassy (Drs. Junichi Nitta, Yasuyuki Matsumoto and Akira Yokoyama) and JICA (Ms. 
Atsuko ltsuki) to interview their health related response and reconstruction plan. 
6. Attending the annual congress of Philippines Psychological Association and DOH to get connected with the 
mental health stakeholders (Drs. Lourdes L. Ignacio and Benjamin V. Marte). 
7. Re-visiting the hospitals one year later and interview systematically according to the prepared format as below 
about the real damage to the in-patients, lifelines and hospital functions. Interviews about their preparedness to 
the future disasters. 
 
Hospital Investigation Sheet 
I. Basic information of your hospital 
a. Name of the hospital 
                           
b. Public or private 
                           
c. Mailing address 
                           
d. Phone number 
                           
e. Number of beds 
                           
f. Number of inpatients at the Typhoon Haiyan 
                           
g. Number of daily out patients before Typhoon Haiyan 
                           
II. Person to contact 
a. Name 
                           
b. Official Position 
                           
c. E-mail address 
                           
 
III. What was the actual human damage of your hospital in Typhoon Haiyan? 
a. Inpatients 
1. Number of lost  
                           
2. Number of injured 
                           
3. Number of get wet (estimation) 
                           
 
b. Did you send the inpatients who can walk to their own home before the Typhoon? 
1. Yes    , then why? 
a. To decrease the workload of the staff to prepare for the Typhoon 
b. Other, please specify                                                
2. No     , then why? 
a. It was too dangerous to send them home. 




c. Medical Staff 
1. Number of lost 
                           
2. Number of injured 
                           
3. Number of get wet (estimation) 
                           
4. Number of staff who lost their own family 
                           
 
IV. What was the structural and non-structural damage of your hospital? 
a. Structural (building) damage (check multiple that apply) 
1. Yes      
a. Roof damage 
b. Wall damage 
c. Whole building damage 
2. Cause of damage 
a. Damage by the wind 
b. Damage by the storm-surge 
c. Both 
3. No      
4. Time to recover to the basic level 
a. Several days 
b. Several weeks 
c. Several months 
d. Not yet 
 
b. Non-structural damage  (check multiple that apply) 
1. Yes      
a. Window damage 
b. Door damage 
c. Ceiling damage 
d. Bed damage 
e. Laboratory equipment damage 
f. Radiological equipment damage 
g. Computer damage 
h. Medical record damage 
i. Air conditioner damage 
j. Elevator damage (If there is no elevator, check here       ) 
k. Ramp damage 
l. Other (please specify)                  
2. Cause of damage 
a. Damage by the wind 
b. Damage by the storm-surge 
c. Both 
d. Other (please specify)                  
3. No      
4. Time to recover to the basic level 
a. Several days 
b. Several weeks 
c. Several months 
d. Not yet 
 
c. Functional damage 
1. Patient care 
a. Fully available throughout the disaster 
b. Closed for less than a week 
c. Closed for more than a week 









g. What was the wanted human resource? (check multiple that may apply) 





C) Emergency care specialist 
D) Pediatrician 
E) Psychiatrist 




v. Laboratory technician 





xi. Social worker 
xii. Other (please specify                ) 
 
h. Who gave you medical relief after disaster (check multiple that may apply) 
i. Local team (please specify) 
                           
                           
                           
ii. Domestic team (please specify) 
                           
                           
                           
iii. Foreign team (please specify) 
                            
                                              
                           
i. What was the type of relief? (check multiple that may apply) 
i. Out-patient clinic 
ii. Inpatient care 
iii. Substitution of the affected medical doctors 
iv. Substitution of the affected staff 
v. Coordination 
vi. Drug transportation 
vii. Laboratory assist 
viii. Radiological assist 
ix. Dietary assist 
x. Other (please specify) 
j. Time to recover to the basic level 
i. Several days 
ii. Several weeks 
iii. Several months 
iv. Not yet 
 
2. Electricity 
a. Availability after the disaster 
i. Full 
ii. Partial 
iii. Completely lost 
b. Time to recover to the basic level 
i. Several days 
ii. Several weeks 
iii. Several months 
iv. Not yet 
3. Tap water 
a. Availability after the disaster 
i. Full 
ii. Partial 
iii. Completely lost 
b. Time to recover to the basic level 
i. Several days 
ii. Several weeks 
iii. Several months 




4. Bottled water 
a. Availability after the disaster 
i. Full 
ii. Partial 
iii. Completely lost 
b. Time to recover to the basic level 
i. Several days 
ii. Several weeks 
iii. Several months 
iv. Not yet 
 
5. Gas for cooking 
a. Type of gas 
i. Propane 
ii. City gas 
b. Availability after the disaster 
i. Full 
ii. Partial 
iii. Completely lost 
c. Time to recover to the basic level 
i. Several days 
ii. Several weeks 
iii. Several months 
iv. Not yet 
 
6. Communication tool 
a. Availability after the disaster 
i. Full 
ii. Partial 
iii. Completely lost 
b. Which was useful? (check multiple that may apply) 
i. Phone line 
ii. Cell phone 
iii. Satellite phone 
iv. FAX 
v. E-mail 
vi. SNS (social network system) 
c. Time to recover to the basic level 
i. Several days 
ii. Several weeks 
iii. Several months 
iv. Not yet 
 
7. Laboratory 
a. Availability after the disaster 
i. Full 
ii. Partial 
iii. Completely lost the function 
b. What was the most wanted function in disaster? 






vii. Other                
c. Time to recover to the basic level 
i. Several days 
ii. Several weeks 
iii. Several months 
iv. Not yet 
 
8. Radiological equipment (check multiple that apply) 
a. Availability after the disaster 
i. Full 
ii. Partial 
iii. Completely lost the function 
b. What was the most wanted function in the disaster? 
i. Simple X-ray 
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vi. Other                
c. Time to recover to the basic level 
i. Several days 
ii. Several weeks 
iii. Several months 
iv. Not yet 
 
9. Medical record (check multiple that apply) 
a. Availability after the disaster 
i. Full 
ii. Partial 
iii. Completely lost the function 
b. What was the most wanted function in the disaster? 
i. Electric record 
ii. Paper record 
iii. Medical record personnel 
iv. Other                
c. Time to recover to the basic level 
i. Several days 
ii. Several weeks 
iii. Several months 
iv. Not yet 
 
10. Pharmacy inside the hospital (check multiple that apply) 
a. Availability after the disaster 
i. Full 
ii. Partial 
iii. Completely lost the function 
b. What was the most wanted function in the disaster? 
i. Oral drugs 
ii. Injections 
iii. Crystal fluids 
iv. Pharmacist 
v. Other                
c. Time to recover to the basic level 
i. Several days 
ii. Several weeks 
iii. Several months 
iv. Not yet 
 
11. Inpatient’s diet (check multiple that apply) 
a. Availability after the disaster 
i. Full 
ii. Partial 
iii. Completely lost the function 
b. What was the most wanted function in the disaster? 
i. Gas for cooking 
ii. Cooking devices 
iii. Food stock 
iv. Dietician 
v. Other                
c. Time to recover to the basic level 
i. Several days 
ii. Several weeks 
iii. Several months 
iv. Not yet 
 
 
V. Preparedness of the hospital (check multiple that may apply) 
a. Before Typhoon Haiyan (Yolanda) 
1. Structural 
a. Regular building cord 
b. Strengthened building (please specify the strengthened part) 
                           
2. Non structural 
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a. Strengthening of the window 
b. Relocation of the medical record 
c. Relocation of the laboratory equipment 
d. Relocation of the radiological equipment 
e. Other (please specify) 
3. Functional 
a. Early warning and evacuation training 
b. Designation of evacuation center 
c. Training as a response base 
d. Assignment of disaster manager 
e. Regular training with DOH-HEMS 
f. Training of SPEED system 
g. Pre-disaster help relief network formation 
h. Contraction with suppliers 
i. Establishment of Business continuity plan 
b. After Typhoon Haiyan (Yolanda) what has been done in one year? 
1. Structural 
a. Regular building cord 
b. Strengthened building (please specify the strengthened part) 
                           
2. Non structural 
a. Strengthening of the window 
b. Relocation of the medical record 
c. Relocation of the laboratory equipment 
d. Relocation of the radiological equipment 
e. Other (please specify) 
3. Functional 
a. Early warning and evacuation training 
b. Designation of evacuation center 
c. Training as a response base 
d. Assignment of disaster manager 
e. Regular training with DOH-HEMS 
f. Training of SPEED system 
g. Pre-disaster help relief network formation 
h. Contraction with suppliers 
i. Establishment of Business continuity plan 
c. What is to be done for the next hazard? 
1. Structural 
a. Regular building cord 
b. Strengthened building (please specify the strengthened part) 
                           
2. Non structural 
a. Strengthening of the window 
b. Relocation of the medical record 
c. Relocation of the laboratory equipment 
d. Relocation of the radiological equipment 
e. Other (please specify) 
3. Functional 
a. Early warning and evacuation training 
b. Designation of evacuation center 
c. Training as a response base 
d. Assignment of disaster manager 
e. Regular training with DOH-HEMS 
f. Training of SPEED system 
g. Pre-disaster help relief network formation 
h. Contraction with suppliers 
i. Establishment of Business continuity plan 
j. Relocation of the hospital 
k. Other (please specify                             ) 
 
7.4 Results 
7.4.1 Hospital Damages 
 We visited the pre-searched hospitals and health related facilities as shown in Table 7-1 except one private 
image-diagnostic facility (#2). The mapping of hospitals and health related facilities through satellite images was 
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quite useful for the comprehensive investigations. It is strongly recommended for the local governments and all 
clusters share such multi-information-layered maps at the time of disaster. Strong wind, heavy rain and storm surge 
devastated many hospitals and health related facilities not only in the coastal areas but also in the inlands (Fig.7-1 
left panels). The damage to the roofs and windows and following heavy rain paralyzed the function of the hospitals 
including X-rays, CT, MRI and laboratory instruments. There remained only one CT in Tacloban and Palo area 
(Fig.7-1, #5 left). The only psychological ward in that area was also devastated (Fig.7-1, #13 left). Most of the 
hospital rooms were too damaged to accept patients. Many hospitals accommodated small number of in-patients 
and kept the out-patient department partially functional (ex. Fig.7-1, #10 left). The hospitals should deal with 
the surge of medical and public health needs of the affected people even though the employees 
themselves were affected by Typhoon Haiyan. The main cause of deaths was drowning by the storm 
surge as vigorous as Tsunami. The medical and public health needs after Typhoon Haiyan was, 
however,  relatively small number of injuries, but mostly the non-communicable disease and the 
preventative effort for the outbreaks of infectious disease. The out-patient department of each 
hospital were congested with people who need medication. There were almost daily deliveries in the 
maternity hospitals during the disaster. Nurses and midwiferies took care of the deliveries. The 
students also helped as much as possible to treat the patients. 
Most of the hospitals saved the lives of in-patients as much as possible and among the facilities we visited only 
one patient in ICU lost his life due to the power outage of the ventilator as summarized in Table 7-2. The workers 
in the hospitals were also saved. There is the possibility that patients who can go home in preparation to the 
Typhoon might have lost their lives. Most of the hospitals utilized the limited resources to keep running the 
out-patient departments to accept the surge of medical needs. Two hospitals had to completely shut down due to the 
complete outage of the resources (Fig.7-1, #7 and #6 left) at the time of our first visit. One of these was taken over 
by Doctors Without Borders (MSF) to use the ward as the outpatient clinic and was planned to reopen the hospital 
in May, 2014 (Fig.7-1, #6 left). One year late, it was revealed that this reopen was suspended due to financial and 
internal problems (Fig.7-1, #6 right). On the contrary, one closed the oldest maternity hospital in Tacloban managed 
to reopen with strong demand and support by Tacloban Women’s Association (Fig.7-1, #7 right).  
The buildings of the hospitals were built according to the latest building code to endure 200 km/h wind, but the 
real strength of the Typhoon exceeded the expectations (Fig.7-1, #5 left). Most of the hospitals had emergency 
power generator and water stock for daily use (not potable). Fortunately, there was no lack of fuel supply for cars 
and emergency generators. Potable water for the patients and staffs was provided by the city authority and 
international aids. Propane gas was used for cooking the meals in the hospital. Small number of the hospital had a 
contraction with the food vendors. Thus the outage of the lifelines of the hospital was limited, though the 
rehabilitation of the building was still on-going two months and even one-year after disaster. 
The preparedness of medical and health related facilities had been strengthened by the governance of 
DOH/HEMS (Health Emergency Management Staff) before the Typhoon. Every hospital should have disaster 
manager to be licensed and “Safe Hospital Campaign” was promoted by DOH in collaboration with WHO from 
2008 to 2010. EVRMC owned by DOH (Fig.7-1, #1 left), the biggest tertiary center in the region, was inundated by 
the similar storm surge in 1898, but was not relocated. This time, the government decided to relocate the hospital to 
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the safer place. JICA was planning to assist the reconstruction of EVRMC out-patient department, and was also 
intending to effectively assist the reconstruction of Rural Health Unit (RHU) that is important for the primary 
health care. 
The information sharing at the onset of disaster still had problems, even the Typhoon developed very rapidly. 
Some hospital (Fig.7-1, #4 left) protected its glass wall by temporally shielding structures and had less damage to 
the wards. This hospital also relocated the medical records to the third floor and protected the record from storm 
surge inundation (Fig.7-1, #4 left). The remained CT scan in the region was located deep inside of the hospital to 
avoid the rain fall from the damaged roof (Fig.7-1, #5 left). This hospital also located the laboratory instruments at 
the deep inside and protected from the rain damage, though its ICU was totally devastated by the strong wind and 
rain though the broken glass window (Fig.7-1, #5 left). 
One year later, we revisited the hospitals and investigated the details of the damage by Haiyan. Similar strength 
Super-Typhoon Hagupit (Local name: Ruby) attacked the same area on Dec. 6, 2014. The memory of Typhoon 
Haiyan evoked the people and health professionals to prepare to Hagupit. Many hospitals protected their glass 
windows by strengthened boards (Fig. 7-1, #8 right) and carried all the equipment to the upper floor. Fortunately 
Hagupit landfall was more North-bound compared to Haiyan, resulted in far-less storm surge and human damage. 
Strong wind and heavy rainfall, however, destroyed roofs, windows of some hospitals again (Fig. 7-1, #8 #9 right).  
Consecutive investigations in 2014 and 2015 made it possible to measure the recovery and reconstruction 
process of the hospitals and the difference between the relatively acute phase (three months after disaster) and 
long-term phase (one year and three months after disaster). Typhoon Hagupit attack became the real situation to test 
the preparedness of the hospitals. In 2014, the affected area still had debris and the people’s life was totally 
compromised. The hospitals were also severely damaged and in the process to recover to the basic level. One year 
later, most of the hospitals became fully functional even though some of the damage was not completely fixed. 
Public hospitals recovered relatively quickly by the governmental support, while the private hospital faced severe 
financial problem. DOH decided to relocate EVRMC in accordance with the partial relocation of the Tacloban 
downtown to the Northern part of Leyte Island. Other hospital remains in its current location but faces the basic 
surge of the medical and public health needs of the area. Most of the hospital-beds are full and they are considering 
expansion the number of beds. The area seems to be facing to serious shortage of the physicians especially for the 
mental and psychiatric care. The role of public health nurse and midwives are also very important resource since 
the population is growing and the public health education is needed. The life of the people are getting better than 
the immediate situation, but number of people are living in the temporary houses and even in tents without 
appropriate sanitary and nutritional condition. 
In Angeles City, Pampanga, Luzon Island the people were resettled by the governmental coordination after Mt. 
Pinatubo eruption. At that time, people were provided a fixed size of land and a house as a personal property in 
Angeles City. Twenty three years later, the resettled area formed an active community with fundamental 
educational and health facilities (Fig. 7-2). The policy and player of the national government changes, but the 





Table 7-1. Hospitals and health related facilities in the affected area 
ID Name Address 
1 Eastern Visayas Regional Medical Center (EVRMC) Tacloban 
2 Ultrascan Diagnostic Center & Healthcare Services Tacloban 
3 Philippine National Red Cross Tacloban 
4 Divine World Hospital Tacloban 
5 Tacloban Doctors Medical Center Tacloban 
6 Bethany Hospital Tacloban 
7 Tacloban Maternity Hospital Tacloban 
8 Mother of Mercy Hospital Tacloban 
9 Remedios Trinidad Romualdez Medical Foundation (RTR) Tacloban 
10 Tacloban City Hospital Tacloban 
11 Leyte Provincial Hospital Tacloban 
12 U. of the Philippines Manila School of Health Sciences (UPM-SHS) Palo 








#8 Mother of Mercy Hospital was not visited in Jan 
2014. 
Fig.7-1. Hospital damages in Tacloban and Palo area (Left side: as of Jan 2014, Right side: as of Jan 2015) 
 
Table 7-2-1. Summary of the hospitals and health related facilities damaged by Typhoon Haiyan 






Jan 2014 Jan 2015 
1 Eastern Visayas 
Regional Medical Center 





Active Fully functional 
2 Ultrascan Diagnostic 
Center & Healthcare 
Services 
0    Not visited Not visited 
3 Philippine National Red 
Cross (operation center)
0   Surge & 
Wind 
Active Not visited 




Active Fully functional, 
rehabilitation 
on-going 
5 Tacloban Doctors 
Medical Center 
35 0 0 medical 
staff 
0 patient 
Wind Active (CT) Functional, but 
partial building 
damage remains 
6 Bethany Hospital (with 
Schools) 











7 Tacloban Maternity 
Hospital 





Closed Functional, some 




8 Mother of Mercy 
Hospital 
50 0 0 medical 
staff 
0 patient 
Wind Not visited Fully functional 
9 RTR Medical 
Foundation (with 
Schools) 
50 0 0 medical 
staff 
0 patient 
Wind Active Fully functional 
10 Tacloban City Hospital 50 0 0 medical 
staff 
0 patient 
Wind Active Fully functional 
11 Leyte Provincial 
Hospital 







Active Fully functional 
12 UPM-SHS (School with 
delivery clinic) 
0 0 3 students 
0 patient 
Wind Active Students are 
temporary 




Fig. 7-2 Resettled areas in Angeles City 23 years after Mt. Pinatubo eruption  
Upper left: Rural health unit providing primary health care, delivery and public health service including 
vaccinations and sanitation. Upper right: Elementary school, Lower left: Typical house built and given by the 
national government to the residents of resettlement area. Resident owned this house and can expand it as a home 




7.4.2 Health-related needs of the affected people and the medical aids. 
As a matter of fact, 6,300 people were killed by the typhoon and storm surge and more than one million houses 
were damaged (NDRRMC, 2014). When we visited three months later, some of the affected people were already 
living in the restricted zone of within the 40 m from the coastal line and getting the food and water supply, partly 
working or finding any type of livelihoods. 
Many international medical teams came in to provide medical relief and found that the number of injured 
patients was small, but that the medical needs including diarrhea, pneumonia, bronchial asthma and their 
prevention were remarkable. Middle to long-term lack of food and lifelines deteriorated the health condition of the 
affected people and increased the risks of malnutrition and epidemic outbreaks (Fig.7-3). Water and food was 
supplied by the local government and humanitarian agencies, but the information where and when it will be 
supplied was insufficient. There are thousands of evacuation tents along with the coastal line but the tent did not 
have floor other than a simple sheet, and two to three families were living in one tent (Fig.7-3). The sanitary 
condition of the affected people was also very insufficient, cooking foods by burning the wrecks and debris, 
washing close without proper sewage, running with sandals in the muddy water, toilet on the sea. People were 
educated not to drink the water from the well, but there are increased symptoms of the abdomen especially in the 
malnutritional areas. 
The elementary school was opened but no lunch is provided. Thus, the children should bring their own lunch or 
had to go back home to eat lunch. This could cause malnutrition of the children and increase the vulnerability 
especially for poor people. 
The international agencies provided the town clinic and visiting medical cares. JICA provided three terms of JDR 
as medical relief. These were coordinated by the health cluster meetings led by DOH and WHO. One private 
hospital (RTR, Fig.7-1, #9) provided medical care and relief goods to the Tacloban and Palo vicinities as a hub of 





Fig.7-3. The life of the affected people 
 
Philippines had incorporated the Surveillance in Post Extreme Emergencies and Disasters (SPEED) system since 
2010 (http://healthmarketinnovations.org/program/surveillance-post-extreme-emergencies-and-disasters-speed). 
This SPEED system collected the number of infectious and common disease occurrence and was effective to assist 
the preventative medical response such as mass vaccination campaign against measles and tetanus, preventative 
drug administrations and the improvement of sanitary conditions.  
San Lazaro Hospital dispatched the special team to provide educations to early detection and treatment of tetanus 
(Dr. Alex Dimapilis). The medical teams through this education successfully saved all patients with tetanus. Most 
of the affected people were living in the coastal area and kids were playing with bare feet where the rusted nails 
from wrecks and debris could cause infection of tetanus. Prevention and the early detection is the only way to save 
the patients with tetanus. 
 
7.4.3 The role of central and local governments and humanitarian agencies 
The domestic and international medical and humanitarian aids were coordinated by the Health Cluster. There was 
little confusion within more than 150 foreign teams from more than 100 countries and 1,200 delegates from 
international aids through DOH/WHO coordination with back-up from WPRO. Even so, the aids tend to 
concentrate on the Tacloban area which was most damaged and therefore the most frequently appear in media. It 
might have created the unreached area where the relief and aids were truly needed. Thus, the multilayered mapping 
of the affected area based on the demographical data is vital to provide effective relief.  
The International and Philippine Red Cross had also cluster approach to provide the relief goods and help 
effectively (Fig.7-4, left). Philippine Red Cross does not have any its own hospital, but is trained to act as 
emergency and disaster relief. The relief goods and the blood for transfusion was stocked and provided at the 
operation center (Fig.7-4, left). They provided the town clinic using 7-8 ambulance cars with two medical 
doctors and two nurses. This mobile clinic stayed in one place for five hours and cared 80-90 
patients/day. They made briefings every day to reorganize the plans for effective relief. If the mobile 
clinic does not have a doctor, even the trained surgical nurse felt the frustration of treating the 
patients without supervising doctor. 
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The communication was made through satellite phones and the relief goods were provided from 
the health and welfare sector in the airport. Public health nurses performed the assessment of the 
evacuation shelters and reported to DOH using SPEED system every day. The sanitary condition of 
the people were monitored and helped in collaboration with water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH) 
sector. Preventative administration of doxycycline was provided for the people who walked in the 
muddy water to prevent Leptospirosis. Mass vaccination for the pneumonia, polio, measles and 
tetanus were performed by DOH and international humanitarian agencies using “cold chain”. Cold 
chain is the networking of the refrigerators to stock heat-fragile vaccines. The national government 
declared national calamity and freeze the price of medicines immediately after the disaster. 
Educational gathering of the community people were frequently hosted by the humanitarian agents 
about the nutrition, hygiene and possible diseases in the current situation. Breast feeding was 
recommended to mothers to avoid contamination of milk for the babies. 
We visited the base camp of the International Association of Red Cross and Red Crescent (Fig. 7-4 
right). The concept of base camp was first developed by the Danish Red Cross to provide the 
comfortable work place for the delegates. About 20 big tents with individual small tent inside were 
built as the residential areas. There were showers and toilets. They had the water purification 
system and clean kitchen to provide safe water and foods. They first bring all the materials with 
them but gradually utilized the local resources as much as possible to prevent the suppression to the 
local industries. They had Sunday off so that the delegates could appropriately take rests and 
provided the mental and physical supports.  
 
Fig.7-4. Humanitarian agencies in Tacloban 
Left: Philippine Red Cross operation center in Tacloban. This building was inundated by storm surge. Right: 
Base camp of International Association of Red Cross and Red Crescent. 
 
In Manila, we shared the experience and the lessons from Great East Japan Earthquake in the technical discussion 
on making our hospitals/health facilities safer in emergencies “My Hospital: Last Building Standing in Disasters” 
in the presence of Secretary Dr. Enrique Ona and Undersecretary Dr. Teodoro J. Herbosa in DOH (Table 7-3). The 
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systematic medical response in Japan was presented including Disaster Base Hospital, DMAT, wide area 
transportation, disaster emergency medical information system and medical-public health coordinators. 
 
Table 7-3. My Hospital: Last Building Standing in Disasters: A technical discussion on making our hospitals/health 
facilities safer in emergencies at DOH 
Opening remarks Hon Secretary Dr. Enrique Ona 
Introduction and 
opening 
Dr Roland Cortes, Assistant Secretary of Health 
Dr Julie Hall, WHO Representative in the Philippines 
Technical presentations Overview: Dr Arturo Pesigan, WHO  
Philippines:  Safe Hospitals Programme: Assessment of Hospitals Dr Marilyn Go, 
Preparedness Div. Chief, HEMS 
Disaster Base Hospitals and Business Continuity Management:  Lessons from the 
Great East Japan Earthquake: Prof Shinichi Egawa, Tohoku University, IRIDeS 
Panel of reactors Representative, Bureau of Design, DPWH 
Atty Violeta Seva, Earthquakes and Megacities, Inc (EMI) 
Professor Ruel Ramirez, UP Diliman 
Technical inputs from 
participants and 
recommendations 
Guided discussion on recommendations for Post Haiyan Recovery and safe hospitals 
Moderator: Dr Sandra Tempongko 
Deputy Director, SEAMEO-TROPMED Network 
 
The Philippine Government worries about the delayed restarting of the schools due to the evacuated people and is 
planning to use hospitals and RHU as evacuation shelters. Further discussion will be necessary to reconstruct the 
health care plans. DOH is emphasizing the safe hospital concept with business continuity plans. The structural, 
non-structural and functional strengthening will be required.  
The health insurance system in Philippines makes the difference between public hospitals where patient with low 
income can access to the medical service for cheaper expense and private hospitals where people who can afford 
the cost. This made the difference in the financial and temporal difference in the recovery and reconstruction 
process. One year later, most of the public hospitals were fully functional, while some private hospitals remained 
partially destructed and even closed. In Japan, where the health care system is totally different, the private hospital 
cares the patient at the same price with public hospitals due to the national health insurance system and most of the 
tertiary centers are expected to serve as a disaster base hospital regardless of public or private administration. At 
Typhoon Hagupit, the national government was also on alert and prepared to the disaster. Thaks to the early 
warning and evacuation, the number of human damage was small, but the people living in the temporary houses 
and tents found their living place again in the ruins. Reducing the vulnerability before disaster and increasing the 
capacity of health in every measure is important to decrease the risk. Ironically, smaller typhoon after Hagupit 
killed more than 10 people in the area because of land slides. Reconsideration of the role of hospitals as a “building 
last standing in disaster” and safety net of the society could lead to the prioritization of health as a disaster risk 
reduction. 
Embassy of Japan in the Philippines contacted all of the Japanese residents in the affected area to make sure the 
safety and physical and mental health conditions, and found out that there seems to be no serious health problems, 




7.4.4 Infectious disease 
 Mass vaccination campaign and the extermination of mosquitos prevented the remarkable outbreak of infectious 
diseases. But, there was a tendency of measles outbreaks and the situations such as deteriorated sanitary condition, 
malnutrition and crowded populations especially in the coastal and relocated areas where people cook by burning 
the wrecks suggested the probability of respiratory and digestive disease outbreaks at any time. The difficulties of 
medical access for the affected people will lead to the spontaneous termination of drug treatment of HIV or 
Tuberculosis resulting in the increased frequency of drug-resistance. The demographic analyses of the patients are 
urgently needed. The future flooding and mosquito activities will also increase the chance of Dengue and 
Leptospirosis. In collaboration with Dr. Elizabeth Telan from San Lazaro Hospital, we studied various bio-markers 
using ELISA and Luminex and found that Gal-9 could serve as an important novel biomarker of acute DENV 
infection and disease severity and potential target to control DENV pathogenesis (1). In addition, we initiated new 
investigation of Melioidosis and Chikungunya in Philippines.  
 We also performed a questionnaire survey that showed the awareness of international frameworks for disaster 
preparedness and response were not so high. Risk perception of natural disaster could be locally rather than 
globally influenced by the profile of natural disaster (2). 
 Professor Hattori promoted the establishment of collaborative relationship between UP Manila and Angeles 
University. The long collaborative history with San Lazaro hospital made fruitful results not only with infectious 
disease but also the whole activities of Disaster Medical Research Team. 
 
7.4.4.1 Melioidosis  
 Melioidosis is a severe tropical disease caused by Burkholderia pseudomallei, a Gram-negative, aerobic bacterium 
that is present mostly in soils and water in tropical regions. It is endemic in Southeast Asia and northern Australia. 
It is believed that melioidosis is underreported in the Philippines and it is also a one of disaster-related infectious 
diseases (especially after Tsunami). The incubation period preceding melioidosis may be 2-3 days or many years. 
Fever, productive cough, weight loss, chest pain, and hemoptysis are frequently present in more severe and 
disseminated disease. It was frequently misdiagnosed as other pathogens such as Burkholderia cepacia, 
Pseudomonas spp., and Mycobacterium tuberculosis. There were only 4 B. pseudomallei strains from the 
Philippines collected since 1969 that have been genotyped by the CDC. These genotypes are sequence types (ST) 
57, 62, 98, and 99; three of which were collected from monkeys, while only one strain was isolated from human. 
With limited genetics data of B. pseudomallei in the Philippines, we are interested in obtaining more information 
about this disease in the Philippines. B. pseudomallei strains collected in this study are subjected to genotypic 
characterization and molecular epidemiological investigation. 
 This study is attempted to identify the presence of melioidosis using culture or genetic diagnosis and characterize 
their features by biomarkers among patients with pneumonia, sputum-negative tuberculosis and leptospirosis, and 
help local doctors to recognize the disease in Philippines especially in Manila and Tacloban. The study title of 
[Investigation of melioidosis in the Philippines] is submitting to ethical committee of San Lazaro Hospital (SLH) 
and will be conduct the research both in San Lazaro Hospital and Eastern Visayas Regional Medical Center 
(EVRMC) upon acceptance of research proposal. In EVRMC, Aileen T. Riel-Espina the new Chief of Hospital and 
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Dr. Jane Borrinaga the head of Internal Medicine showed interest to collaborate on this project. Dr. Espina said that 
Melioidosis research is a good way to start involving the clinicians in EVRMC to do research. Upon reading the 
contents of the proposal Dr. Espina wanted to clarify what will be the role of EVRMC in Melioidosis research, will 
they be a co-investigator, or just a site for sample procurement. Dr. Espina wanted to know the staffing procedure if 
Tohoku University will hire their own Research Assistant or EVRMC will provide a research assistant and a doctor 
to work on this research. For the sample population, she suggested that the Institute of Pediatrics should be 
included since the proposed target age group is from 16-21. Informed consent written in their native language shall 
also be done. She also informed that their Ethics Review Board is not yet accredited thus they will follow the 
procedure and the requirements of SLH. Dr. Espina and Dr. Borrinaga gave us a hospital tour after the meeting 
particularly the laboratory of the hospital. Ms. Susan Leano from SLH was able to talk to the medical technologist 
in-charge of the Microbiology laboratory and discussed the protocols for Melioidosis detection and isolation.  
 
   
Microbiology Lab at SLH            With director Go and Dr. Telan in SLH       Microbiology Lab at EVRMC 
 
7.4.4.2 Chikungunya 
After typhoon Yolanda, there were potential new cases of chikungunya outbreak according to local doctors from 
EVRMC in Tacloban. However, it was difficult to confirm since it was the first exposure of this diseases in 
Tacloban and no any diagnostic tool was available at that time. Therefore, we have been starting a new project at 
Research and Biotechnology Division (RBD) of St. Luke’s Medical Center, Manila, Philippines to understand the 
epidemiology and pathogenesis of this mosquito-borne disease. RBD was established under the leadership of Vice 
President for research, Filipinas F. Natividad, Ph.D. (Ma’am Pi). RBD is the one of the few research center that can 
diagnosis and treat chikungunya virus infection in Philippines. The center could bring together both basic scientists 
and clinicians to promise challenge of pioneering biomedical research on a wide variety of medical research. RBD 
is fully equipped for advanced biomedical research such as facilities for DNA isolation and analysis, protein 
isolation, purification and quantitation, gene sequencing, cell culture and cryopreservation, advanced microscopy, 
darkroom facilities and animal studies (3). RBD is the only institution in the Philippines that has the capability to 
detect chikungunya virus (CHIKV) using Reverse Transcription Polymerase Chain Reaction targeting E1, NSP1 
and NS1 regions, other research facilities use serological methods such as ELISA and ICT in detecting CHIKV. 
RBD was able to isolate and perform a whole gene sequencing on CHIKV of which the whole sequence analysis is 
now published in Genome announcement. Several researches are also in the works for publication together with the 
partnership of the clinicians in St. Luke’s Hospital and Medical Center.  
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Our team visited RBD at Dec. 2014 to start collaboration on chikungunya research. We introduced Disaster-related 
Infectious Diseases Laboratory, IRIDeS, Tohoku University and the institution’s goals and objectives. Ma’am Pi 
and Ms. Maria Luisa G. Daroy (Ma’am Chuchi) also gave a brief background as to what type of research RBD has 
been working on. Tohoku University and RBD is interconnected due to the existing collaboration of the two 
Institutes. Ma’am Pi raised several points regarding the future CHIKV collaboration, such as defining and 
completing the requirements for Ethical Clearance, writing an Informed consent, the timetable for the research 
study, the target sample size and patient criteria of the research as well as the activities of the research study to be 
done in Japan and Philippines. The timetable to finish all the documents for ethical clearance of CHIKV research 
was set for 3 months. Since this will be a new collaboration, Ma’am Pi requested if some of the laboratory activities 
will be done in RBD such as Cytokine Panel analysis, since the laboratory has already a MagPix (Luminex) set-up 
as well as sending some research staff in the Philippines to Japan and vice versa for the exchange of technology and 
education. They will be including these requests in their justification for the creation of this new collaboration. 
According to Ma’am Chuchi, one of the clinicians in St. Luke’s hospital, Dr. Evan Glenn Vista, a rheumatologist is 
interested on CHIKV research and he welcomes Tohoku University as a partner in this study, furthermore he is 
willing to share his patient samples and medical data. Before the end of the meeting the Materials and Transfer 
Agreement (MTA) contract were signed by Ma’am Pi, Ma’am Chuchi and Professor Hattori. The research proposal 
title [Detection of Inflammatory Markers: MMP-9, Interleukin-6, Osteopontin and Galectin-9 among initial 
Chikungunya Patients and Post Chikungunya Patients with Arthritis] is now submitting to Ethical Committee of 
RBD at St. Luke’s Medical Center. 
 
   
Signing of MTA for CHIKV research Lab Tour at RBD With Drs. Chuchi, and Evan  
 
7.4.4.3 Tuberculosis 
Mycobacterium tuberculosis (MTB) is the causative agent of tuberculosis (TB), the sixth leading cause of death and 
illness in the Philippines. Despite global trends towards decreasing incidence, prevalence, and mortality associated 
with MTB infection, approximately 230,000 cases were found in the Philippines alone in 2012. Developing a rapid, 
simple, and accurate test for TB diagnosis is a main focus of many investigators. In the present study, we evaluated 
the reliability of LAMP for detecting MTB infection and used spoligotyping to identify the most prevalent MTB 
genotype in Metro Manila. We also analyzed a broad spectrum of biomarkers, which reflect both cellular and 
humoral immune response to MTB infection. The study population consisted of 37 HIV negative TB patients 
randomly selected from the out-patient department of San Lazaro Hospital before the initiation of their anti-TB 
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treatment. The controls were healthy volunteers lacking signs of TB. The study was approved by the ethics 
committee of SLH and the Tohoku University Hospital, and written informed consent was obtained from each 
participant. Basic anthropometric and clinical characteristics of study participants are shown in Table 1. We 
confirmed MTB infection in all TB patients’ samples by LAMP method. All DNA samples were subjected to 
spoligotyping and we found that all patients were infected with a Manila type MTB. This finding of a uniform 
genotype of MTB was rather surprising. The arrival of Chinese, Japanese, and Spanish groups may have influenced 
the acquisition of various MTB genotypes in the region; however, little information is available regarding prevalent 
MTB genotypes circulating in the Philippines. Using a multiplex immunoassay, we assessed the concentrations of 
29 soluble plasma biomarkers in TB and health control (HC) individuals. Biomarker levels and their comparisons 
between groups are shown in Table 2. The role of matricellular proteins supporting TB infection is not well studied. 
We found high plasma levels of two matricellular proteins, osteopontin (OPN), and, for the first time, gal-9 in 
treatment-naive TB patients. Matricellular proteins are secreted into the extracellular matrix environment but do not 
play a primary structural role in this location and regulate an unusually diverse array of cellular functions, including 
cell adhesion, shape, migration, differentiation, proliferation, and inflammatory responses. It has been proposed that 
matricellular proteins enter inflamed tissue and become immobilized at that site to generate signals for 





 OPN is highly expressed in tuberculous granuloma and supports granuloma formation via its functions as a 
chemoattractant cytokine. OPN and gal-9 may be produced by activated circulating immune cells, but a more 
plausible explanation is that they are released into the circulation from tissue sites. Our unpublished data showed 
elevated pleural fluid/plasma ratios of gal-9 and OPN in a TB patient, and Inomata et al. showed that OPN levels 
increase proportionally with the extent of lung lesions. We evaluate differences between patients with and without 
granuloma formation, factoring in the extent of lesions and other clinical parameters; however, we did not observe 
any statistical correlations, probably because radiological findings with most patients were not suggestive of 
granulomas. 
 Neutrophils, one of the most predictive markers of active TB infection, were found to have the largest influence 
on WBC elevation in TB patients. Neutrophils are generally thought to have strong activity against infectious 
agents. Higher neutrophil counts were observed in TB patients and were associated with poorer prognosis. 
Neutrophils are attracted by various cytokines and chemokines, including IL-8, and quickly accumulate at sites of 
mycobacterial infection. We also observed IL-8 elevation in TB patients, which may be due to hyperproduction by 
stimulated macrophages, by epithelial cells in lungs, or even by neutrophils themselves, although no correlation 
with neutrophils was observed. Previous study showed that low lymphocyte count is suggestive of extension of the 
disease by new tubercle formation, but switch to lymphocytosis shows tendency to healing. Therefore, careful 
evaluation of hematological changes may have diagnostic value. We performed correlation analyses of the three 
most predictive TB markers with other measured parameters. IP-10 expression levels positively correlated with loss 
of appetite, IL-1, IL-6, IL-8, OPN, and gal-9 expression and negatively correlated with anti-TBGL IgG antibody 
titer. In contrast with low circulating levels of IFN-, the high levels of IP-10 in the blood produced by antigen 
stimulated cells make this chemokine a promising candidate biomarker for MTB infection, even in HIV-infected 
individuals. We found that patients with high plasma IP-10 reported loss of appetite, but such a tendency was not 
observed with other biomarkers. Juffermans et al. had similar observations, where IP-10 but not IL-8, MIP-1b, or 
MCP-1 was associated with loss of appetite and fever. We found that the OPN and gal-9 correlated with IL-8 and 
IP-10 and we hypothesize that OPN and gal-9 activate the expression of chemokines and cytokines like IP-10, 
TNF-, IL-6, and IL-8 in macrophages, helping to recruit immune cells to the site of MTB infection. TB patients’ 
neutrophilia was associated with increased WBC counts, IFN-, and decreased hemoglobin levels, hematocrits, 
plasma IgG titers, and lymphocytopenia.  
 Finally, we studied the relationship of gal-9 to biomarkers and other laboratory parameters. High gal-9 levels 
correlated with higher TNF-, IL-6, IL-5, IL-3, EGF, IL-8, and IP-10 expression and lower levels of GM-CSF. 
Biomarkers that differentiated HC and TB were analyzed by ROC analysis and cut-off values were determined 
based on the best proportion between sensitivity, specificity, and likelihood ratio (Table 3). The highest 
discriminatory property had IP-10 and OPN, followed by neutrophils, platelets, TNF-, MCP-1, WBC counts, 
gal-9, and IL-8. Next, we performed analysis, which is a multivariate discrimination method to characterize the 
most discriminatory variables among groups. OPN was identified as having the highest discriminatory capacity, 
followed by IP-10, neutrophils, IL-6, IL-8, TNF-, MCP-1, platelets, gal-9, and WBC (4).  
 Using a combination of these markers, all healthy individuals and 96.3% of TB patients were correctly classified. 
In conclusion, LAMP is a simple and low-cost method for the direct detection of MTB in patients’ sputa. Moreover, 
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the LAMP method together with spoligotyping method serves as sensitive, accurate tools for TB diagnosis and for 
monitoring prevalent lineages of TB in certain regions. Increased IP-10, OPN, and neutrophils levels best reflect 
the acute stage of TB infection, and measuring their fluctuations may provide a reasonable basis for determining 
TB severity and prognosis. 
 
7.4.4.4 Leptospirosis 
 Leptospirosis is an emerging infectious disease caused by a pathogenic spirochete of the genus Leptospira. 
Leptospirosis has become a global public health problem, especially in developing countries including Philippines 
and it often cause outbreaks after flood. Severe leptospirosis is associated with a high rate of mortality due to renal 
damage, cardiopulmonary failure, widespread hemorrhage, liver failure, and meningitis, if antibiotic treatment is 
not initiated within five days after the onset of symptoms, the period during which antibiotics are most effective. 
However, clinical diagnosis is difficult because patients present various non-specific symptoms that are also 
associated with other endemic and epidemic diseases such as dengue, rickettsiosis, malaria, and enteric fevers. 
Therefore, clinical diagnosis alone is inadequate and early laboratory confirmation is essential for disease control 
and patient management. 
 Anti-leptospira antibody can be identified by serological testing. The gold standard assay for leptospirosis is the 
microscopic agglutination test (MAT), in which live antigens representing different serogroups of leptospiras are 
reacted with serum samples and then examined by dark-field microscopy for agglutination. MAT is more specific 
than other serological tests, but it is time consuming, requires specialized facilities for culture and maintenance of 
live antigen panels, and requires technical expertise. Alternatives to MAT are the enzyme-linked immunosorbent 
assay (ELISA) and immunochromatography (ICT), which require less time to perform and provide high sensitivity 
and specificity. Therefore, it is important to evaluate the diagnostic efficacy of ELISA and ICT in comparison to 
MAT. PCR methods provide efficient early diagnosis of leptospirosis, as it can detect leptospiral DNA in serum and 
urine before and after the appearance of anti-leptospira antibody. Several studies have described real-time PCR as a 
rapid and sensitive tool for leptospiral DNA detection. Loop-mediated isothermal amplification (LAMP) is an 
alternative method for rapid DNA amplification. Unlike PCR, LAMP amplifies target DNA under isothermal 
conditions, usually between 60°C and 65°C, with high specificity, efficiency, and speed, and the results can be 
evaluated by the naked eye. LAMP requires low-cost, simple equipment, and is thus a useful diagnostic method in 
resource-limited countries. In study with San Lazaro Hospital, we investigated the diagnostic efficacy of combined 
anti-Leptospira antibody and leptospiral DNA detection. MAT, ELISA, and ICT detected leptospira antibody in 
68%, 76%, and 60% of 113 leptospirosis cases. The sensitivity and specificity of ELISA were 87.01% and 72.22%, 
whereas these values for ICT were 79.22% and 80.56%, respectively. LAMP detected four positive patients, three 
of which were confirmed by real-time PCR. Urine pellet samples enabled detection of leptospiral DNA for a longer 
period after the onset of symptoms. Of the patients for whom diagnosis was not confirmed by antibody detection, 
10% were identified as leptospirosis positive by DNA detection; thus, 83% of 135 patients with suspected 
leptospirosis were confirmed as positive by using combined antibody and DNA detection techniques (5). In 
addition, the inflammatory markers in leptospirosis patients are under analyzing to understand the complicated 





Dengue virus (DENV) is transmitted by the mosquito vector, and causes a wide range of symptoms that lead to 
dengue fever (DF) or life-threatening dengue hemorrhagic fever (DHF). Philippines is one of dengue endemic area. 
The host and viral relationships that contribute to DF and DHF are complex and poorly understood, but appear to 
be linked to inflammation and impaired coagulation. Full-length osteopontin (FL-OPN), a glycoprotein, and its 
activated thrombin-cleaved product, trOPN, integrate multiple immunological signals through the induction of 
pro-inflammatory cytokines. To understand the role of OPN in DENV-infection, we collaborated on dengue 
infection samples from San Lazaro Hospital and assessed circulating levels of FL-OPN, trOPN, and several 
coagulation markers (D-dimer, thrombin-antithrombin complex [TAT], thrombomodulin [TM], and ferritin in blood 
obtained from 65 DENV infected patients in the critical and recovery phases of DF and DHF during a dengue virus 
epidemic in the Philippines. Levels of FL-OPN, trOPN, D-dimer, TAT, and TM were significantly elevated in the 
critical phase in both the DF and DHF groups, as compared with healthy controls. During the recovery phase, 
FL-OPN levels declined while trOPN levels increased dramatically in both the DF and DHF groups. FL-OPN 
levels were directly correlated with D-dimer and ferritin levels, while the generation of trOPN was associated with 
TAT levels, platelet counts, and viral RNA load. Therefore, the study demonstrated the marked elevation of plasma 
levels of FL-OPN and thrombin-cleaved OPN product, trOPN, in DENV-infection for the first time (6). Further 
studies on the biological functions of these matricellular proteins in DENV-infection would clarify its pathogenesis. 
 
7.4.4.6 Other issues related to infectious disease 
Current situation of Tacloban city: 
The effect of typhoon Haiyan in the community is still noticeable. There are a lot of Settlement areas in Tacloban 
that serves as refuge for the residents who lost their houses during the disaster. Most of the residents living in this 
so-called “bank houses” lived in the Novel Zone (40 meters from the sea wall- the place that was heavily hit by 
typhoon Haiyan). One settlement area has about 500 families. According to one of the residents, initially the 
government told them that they will only live in the area for 3 months, but until now they were not able to move to 
a more stable house since the housing projects have not started yet. The resident didn’t elaborate further on the 
reason or the cause of the delay of the project. There are two types of bank houses, categorized according to the 
number of family members. There are (1) for families with five members and below and (2) for families with six 
family members and above. Bank houses for five family members and below have an area of 8x16 feet and the 
bank houses for 6 family members and above measures 16x32 feet. Six families share a communal restroom facility, 
each of the family take turns in taking care of this facility. Each family set-up their on bathroom in front of their 
house. The local government only allow each house to have one lighting equipment and 1 ceiling fan, they were not 
allowed to have a television set even the portable one. According to them this is to help the government save with 
the electricity, and since probably not all of the electricity plants have been restored to its full potential. One of the 
main problems of the residents in the area is that they don’t have enough water supply, which is provided by 
MILWASA, a government owned water facility. The residents have to save and store water for them to be able to 
do their normal household chores and hygienic routines. He further told us the each settlement areas is different 
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from each other and facing different challenges every day. NGO’s are still working hand in hand with the locals and 
the local and national government. We saw a lot of schools and houses that were built by NGO’s from Taiwan 
(Tsuchi) and Korea. The NGO’s mostly care the residents that live away from the Novel zone since most of the 
government programs are centered in the “Novel zone”. The government also instructed the residents that they can 
only ask assistance from either NGO or government; this is to ensure that all the residents will get the assistance 
they need to get back to their normal routine. 
 
   
Temporary house at Tacloban        Living space of temporary house       Talking with resident  
 
Eastern Visayas Regional Medical Center (EVRMC): 
In EVRMC we were able to meet with Dr. Aileen T. Riel-Espina the new Chief of Hospital and Dr. Jane Borrinaga 
the head of Internal Medicine. Dr. Espina recently came back from Japan for a two-month training on hospital 
management. Dr. Espina gave us a summary of what have been the effect of Typhoon Haiyan epidemiologically 
speaking. She said there were a lot of suspected CHIKV cases though they were not able to confirm it due to lack 
of CHIKV detection kits, there were no increase in Leptospirosis cases since during and after the typhoon they 
were vigilant in distributing a lot of medicine packs for leptospirosis prophylaxis. They noticed in the evacuation 
sites that there was a budding increase of measles cases and right away the hospital alarmed DOH and WHO 
regarding this matter. Upon doing epidemiological investigation they came to a conclusion that these cases must be 
imported since they were keen on doing mass immunization for Measles after the typhoon. They noticed that 
patients primarily infected with measles came from Manila. These families seek refuge in Manila during the 
disaster crisis and then came back to Tacloban once the effect of the typhoon has already calm down. These patients 
were believed to be absent during the time local health officials had their anti-measles vaccination program. One of 
the most interesting stories that Dr. Espina shared to us was that they had two typhoon related cases that occurred 
during the patient’s preparation for typhoon Haiyan. One patient suffered from laceration and the other one suffered 
from punctured wound. Because of typhoon Haiyan, the local government officials and the hospital officials 
created a disaster response team. The new team was first put into action during typhoon Ruby, which happened 
days before our Tacloban visit. For the first time even before typhoon Ruby was expected to landfall in Tacloban, 
the residents of Tacloban asked the government officials to evacuate them right away. Dr. Espina was very 
interested on how Japan operates during disaster and she wanted to pattern some of the Japanese response 
procedures in case of disaster for EVRMC. Dr. Espina is also working on making a Typhoon Haiyan museum in 




Dr. Espina introduced renewed EVRMC Discussion with Drs. in EVRMC With Drs. Espina and Borrinaga 
 
Schistosomiasis Research and Training Center: 
Dr. Charlemagne N. Escape, the Chief of hospital, told us that the hospital has already fully recovered from the 
effect of Typhoon Haiyan. Though he felt bad that there are still a lot of residents in the area that were not 
accounted for during Typhoon Haiyan devastation. After the typhoon he said that there was no increase in 
Schistosomiasis and Psychiatric patients. The hospital usually has 5-6 cases of Schistosomiasis monthly. Originally 
the 38 bed capacity hospital was built to cater Schistosomiasis cases only but as time passed by there was a steady 
decline of Schistosomiasis cases thereby the hospital decided to add more services such a Psychiatric and 
Obstetrics and Gynecology to prevent the hospital from closing. Because of the increasing number of delivery cases 
that hospital has to build a building for Operating Room and Delivery Rooms, the building will be done in five 
months’ time. The research wing of the hospital is currently doing collaboration with Brown University, New York. 
The title of the study is determining the birth outcomes of Schistosomiasis infected expecting mothers taking 
placebo and medications (metronidazole, praziquantel) for Schistosomiasis. The birth outcomes that they are 
observing are: low birth weight, cognitive development and hematological effects of the diseases and the 
medication on infants. In this study they have a total of 370 patients and one of them had a case of vertical 
transmission. The research facility has also an ongoing research involving carabaos (water buffalos) as their main 
subject. These carabaos serve as a reservoir of Schistosomiasis organisms. They enrolled a total of 36 carabaos, 35 
of them were Schistosomiasis positive. These infected carabaos were asymptomatic but carabao perfusion and 
hepatic biopsy revealed that these carabaos were heavily infected with Schistosomiasis ova. The research center 
hopes to put an end if not decrease the cases of Schistosomiasis in Tacloban and nearby province. The medical 
technologist said then that an on-going war of existence is occurring between man, animals, environment and 
organisms causing harmful and deadly infectious diseases. The question is who is winning and who is losing? 
   
With Dr.Escape                          Discussion with the researchers about Schistosomiasis 
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7.4.5 Mental health 
The number of psychiatrists in Philippines is quite small as of several hundreds in the country the majority of 
whom work in urban area around Manila, whereas the Philippine archipelago comprises over 7,000 islands, of 
which about 2,000 are inhabited. These situation causes remarkable shortage of psychiatrists and mental health care 
givers especially in rural areas, including the areas severely affected by Typhoon Haiyan. To improve the situation, 
the Philippine Psychiatry Association had provided a Training of Trainers for a psychosocial Intervention Program 
in Disasters, in 2007 and 2008, to develop leaders in the provision of psychosocial program in their respective 
regions in the country.  
As for psychosocial support for the victims of Haiyan, a local mental health care giver who has taken the training 
course, along with the disaster mental health support teams lead by the National Center for Mental Health (NCMH) 
are the core of the mental health response and care for children in disaster, which are supplemented with private 
stakeholders. However, generally speaking, the middle- and long-term mental health supports are very insufficient. 
It is important to centralize the mental health as a framework to improve the primary care and reconstruction in 
collaboration with DOH, National Mental Health Center, Philippine Psychological Association, World Association 
for Psychological Rehabilitation, University of Philippines, and other relevant organizations (Fig.7-5). 
 
 
Fig.7-5. Establishment of collaborative relationship with Philippine Psychiatric Association by Prof. Tomita. 
 
 
7.5 Future Perspectives 
 
a.  Investigations of the pathogens of infectious disease in Tacloban and its vicinity in collaboration with EVRMC 
and San Lazaro Hospital 
b.  Investigation of hospital, RHU and BHS reconstruction in the affected area in collaboration with DOH, JICA, 
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WHO and others. 
c.  Analysis of medical needs in the affected area including mental health in collaboration with UPM and others. 
d.  The statistical analysis of international medical aids. 
e.  Promotion of education and research on Disaster Medicine in the collaborative health related universities. 
 
7.6 Establishment of Partnerships 
 
1.  Application of JST-RAPID emergency research project through Letter of Intent from UP Manila 
2.  MOA with San Lazaro Hospital was already concluded. 
3.  MOA with UPM was concluded on Jun. 2014 (Fig. 7-6 left) 
4.  MOA with Angeles University Foundation was concluded on Oct. 2014. (Fig. 7-6 right) 
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8. Simple Construction Practices for Health Facilities Safe from Typhoons and Storm Surges –  
Post Haiyan Recommendations 
 
Abstract 
To mitigate the effects of typhoons, flooding and storm surges on health facilities is an essential pursuit that every 
design professional and health professional should follow. For a country usually visited by strong winds and rains, 
it is their duty to think of ways to strengthen the hospitals, both physically and operationally, so that while a 
disaster is happening, the hospital is the last building standing. This paper aims to describe the most practical and 




On November 8, 2013, a category 5 (Saffir-Simpson scale) typhoon locally named Yolanda (International: Haiyan) 
made landfall in the Philippines, affecting many provinces. Straight out of the Pacific Ocean, the eye of the storm 
struck the island of Leyte which is located in Eastern Visayas. Despite warnings as early as six days before the 
typhoon pounded the island, no one was truly prepared for the side effect that ultimately took more than 6,000 lives 
in the country, the storm surge. 
While it is well known that a natural event such as this is unavoidable, its deadly effect on human life is surely 
preventable. Sadly, the Philippines is plagued with underdevelopment and poverty that can be blamed for the 
tremendous loss of lives. The most vulnerable to disasters are those who are not sheltered in well-made structures. 
A well-made structure is defined as any building that is technically designed to guard its users against harmful 
outdoor elements. Such structures, in general, supposedly have features like a tied foundation, an elevated floor, 
reinforced concrete columns and beams, slab roofs or tightly fastened sloped roofs. 
A health facility, especially a hospital, must be designed and built as a well-made structure safe from natural 
and man-made disasters. A hospital that is physically damaged cannot function properly. It is a well-known fact that 
the breakdown of any health facility during emergencies and disasters is a disaster in itself.  
Sometime January 17-23 2014, the International Research of Disaster Sciences (IRIDES) in Tohoku, Sendai, 
Japan, sent an investigative team of technical experts, through a project entitled “IRIDES Fact-Finding Mission”, in 
collaboration with various government agencies and research organizations in the Philippines.  
Part of this study team was the IRIDES Disaster Medical Science Team, assisted by representatives from the 
Philippines Department of Health (DOH), World Health Organization Western Pacific Region (WHO-WPRO), 
University of the Philippines Manila and Angeles University. To help the medical investigation, the M Arch 
Hospital Design Program of the College of Architecture, University of the Philippines, through Professor 
Cristopher S.P. Espina and Research Associate Karl Taberdo, assisted in the survey of damages of selected essential 
health facilities in areas which bore the brunt of the disaster. 
This report, therefore, aims to describe and investigate the physical damages and the subsequent breakdown of 
functional services of six (6) disabled health facilities, post Haiyan, and recommend methods of mitigating the bad 
effects of typhoons and storm surges in the future. 
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8.2 Post Haiyan Experiences and Damages to Health Facilities in Leyte 
 
A total of six (6) health facilities are studied in this report as follows: 
 
1) The Eastern Visayas Regional Medical Center (EVRMC) 
 
The EVRMC is the prime government hospital in Region VIII, where the Island of Leyte is a part of. The whole 
complex is located in Tacloban City, on the east side of the Island, beside the sea, close to the coastline, where the 
storm surge partly occurred. The sea waters inundated the site about 3 meters or more deep, reaching the rain 
gutters of the one-story structures in the complex. The hospital complex is composed of several buildings 1 to 3 
stories high spread out along the coast. 
According to the Medical Director, Dra. Riel-Espina, the sea water surge rushed in from a breach in the perimeter 
concrete hollow block fence facing the sea and flooded the ground floor of the hospital site, with such force, 
displacing furniture and equipment and damaging essential hospital equipment such as the x-ray units and the 
CT-scan. The main generator was not spared, rendering it inutile during the rest of its post Haiyan life. Electricity 
was partially restored in two weeks when the first of the smaller generators came. It is good that potable water was 
not a problem, since there were two main sources of water: the main source came from the Leyte Metropolitan 
Water District (LMWD) and a secondary source from a deep-well. The main damages to the hospital plant can be 
summarized as follows; 
a) Damage to the main generator, located in the power house on the portion of the hospital site close to the 
coastline; 
b) Damage to the desalination and the wastewater treatment plant also located in the service area near the 
coastline; 
c) Damage to the imaging equipment; x-ray units, CT-scan, etc. due to flooding; 
d) Cut-off of the main electrical service. Candles were used to go on with hospital operations for two weeks until 
a substitute generator of 10 KVA capacity was provided by the DOH; Incidentally, it was pointed out by one of the 
hospital maintenance personnel that smaller generators used during emergencies in a department in a hospital is 
much more convenient to handle for the following reasons: 
•It is small, light, easy to carry and manipulate. 
•It can be controlled locally within the department. 
•During emergencies, only the affected portions of the hospital will be cut-off from electrical service. 
e) Damaged roof of the Surgical Department. The Surgical Department had to be transferred to another area in 
the hospital to resume the necessary services. 
f) Blown-off roof, metal gutters and metal fascias in many parts of the various buildings; 
g) Broken glass windows and glass doors due to exposure to the winds; 
h) Windows and exterior units of air-conditioning systems were blown off by the wind or were washed away by 
waves and the action of water; 
i) Ceiling systems were blown-off due to strong internal wind pressure on open areas and on breaches on 
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broken windows and doors; 
j) Broken and pulled-off vitrified floor tile finish, slippery when wet. 
   
   
 
2) Philippine National Red Cross Building 
 
The Philippine National Red Cross is a referral center to the nearby East Visayas Regional Medical Center. 
Through private pharmaceutical companies, it distributes medicines to rural health units and deploys a mobile 
clinic and an ambulance in far-off barangays and municipalities in the region. The mobile clinic is manned by a 
doctor and 2-3 nurses and offers a “speed system” for diagnosis of disease in the various barangays. They also 
handle mass vaccinations for measles and dengue.  
The PNRC Building is housed in a one-story building with a metal roof exposed with no parapets. Also located 
near the coastline, it was fully inundated up to door head height. During the height of the incident, when the surge 
of sea waters rushed to the site, the staff climbed up and sought refuge on the roof of the one-story building. Help 
came on the fifth day after the incident. The Danish Red Cross camped on site 
The damages include the following: 
a) Damages to the laboratory equipment and the blood bank; 
b) Partially blown-off roof, ceiling, eaves, gutter and fascia. 
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3) Ultrascan Diagnostic Center 
 
The Ultrascan Diagnostic Center is privately owned by Dr. Ignacio Valeriano. It offers basic laboratory and imaging 
services and is housed in two-story rentable area in a tall building. It was made un-operational due to the following 
damages: 
a) The service entrance post toppled over cutting-off electric service to the Center; 
b) The Center’s roll-up metal door was blown off exposing the interior areas to wind and water; 
c) The Center’s medical equipment were damaged. 
  
4) Divine Word Hospital 
 
The Divine Word Hospital is a 3 and 4 story building with a metal roof covering the 3rd and 4th floors with metal 
cladded gutters. It has a glass curtain wall in the front façade and big glazed windows at the sides. The hospital is 
located beside a creek in the midst of an urban area. 
The hospital was inundated about 0.90 meter high. When the water rushed from the driveway to the hospital’s 
main lobby, the guard closed the front aluminum glazed doors and held it in place. However, because of the force of 
the water surging in, the glazing broke and unfortunately killed the guard.  
Because there were announcements and warnings of the impending large typhoon that would hit the province, 
the front façade curtain wall was purposely boarded up because of the foreseen vulnerability of the glass façade. 
However, the big windows at the side elevations and the main entrance door were left un-boarded thereby 
subjecting the building to nature’s pressure. A storm surge was totally not anticipated by the authorities. 
Operations on the ground floor were totally disrupted. Existing patients and services had to be transferred to the 
upper floors and no new patients were admitted. The hospital had to share what was left of their stock of food to 
patients, their relatives and staff. According to Sister Sarah Gocela, the hospital’s administrator, food should be 
stored on an upper floor so that they will be safe during emergencies. After a few days of temporary operations, the 
hospital had to let the patient’s relatives and watchers leave the hospital because food was running out. 
A summary of the damages include: 
a) Damaged medical equipment including the MRI, CT Scan, X-ray units and others. 
b) Third floor and fourth floor roofs were partially blown-off, especially the ones covering the open roof decks. 
c) The laboratory department was fully inundated. 
d) Blown-off window glazing destroying ceiling systems and partially damaging the interiors. It was noticed 
that end of corridor glazing was vulnerable to high winds.  
e) Although the main generator was saved, the hospital could not use it because the conduits and wires on the 
ground floor were wet. Ten KVA generators became available after about a week courtesy of the City of 
Davao, through Mayor Rodrigo Duterte. These small generators were used to efficiently energize individual 
departments such as surgery and delivery. 
f) Finally, the elevator was damaged making the ramp very useful during emergencies. 
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5) Tacloban Maternity Hospital 
 
The Tacloban Maternity Hospital is a two-story building with a metal roof. It was fully inundated up to the second 
floor level. This Hospital totally close down after the destructive event and is generating funds for full 
rehabilitation. 
The damages include: 
a) Blown off roof, ceiling, jalousie windows, interior partitions, equipment, furniture and supplies. 
b) Damaged laboratory equipment and X-ray unit. 
c) Damaged Operating/Delivery Room Complex rendering it unusable. 
d) All administrative records and files were lost. 
 
6) Tacloban Doctors Medical Center 
 
The Tacloban Doctors Medical Center is a modern building; four floors in front and five floors at the rear. Being 
the newest hospital built in the City of Tacloban, it has blue glass-cladding in the whole front facade, making it look 
like a state-of-the-art facility, similar to the latest buildings in Metro Manila. 
The hospital building was severely hit by high winds in the front façade, breaking the glass cladding and allowing 
the water to penetrate the areas in front. Since the emergency department was in front, there was slight flooding 
about an ankle deep in the area.  
The imaging equipment located deep inside the building remained intact, including the CT-scan, the MRI and 
the x-ray equipment. In fact immediately after the incident, the hospital’s CT-scan was the only one functioning in 
the whole of Tacloban City. Likewise the OR/DR Complex remained functioning together with the Dietary 
Department which were located in the rear second floor of the building. 
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The damages in the Tacloban Doctor’s Medical Center can be summarized as follows: 
a) Blown off front glazing and blown-off roof in the front building and the covered roof deck at the rear; 
b) Damaged ceiling from inward wind pressure and damaged second floor in front from rainwater penetration; 
c) Some ward rooms and ICU unusable due to blown-off ceiling and windows; 
d) Blown-off unit type air-con units in some ward rooms; 
e) Damaged administrative office located at the front; 
f) CSSR sterilizing equipment destroyed due to wind/rain penetration through broken window glazing; 
g) Wind through end-corridor broken windows damaged ceiling systems and doors; 
h) Elevator not functioning thereby making the ramp useful. 
   
   
 
 
8.3 General Strategies for Mitigating the Effects of Typhoons and Flooding on Hospitals Safe From Disasters 
 
In the book, “A Guide for the Planning and Design of Health Facilities Safe from Disasters” by Prof. Cristopher S. 
P. Espina and Arch Fiel Reventar, it is described that there are three levels of defence against natural hazards 
leading to disasters, tsunamis, typhoons and flooding included.  The storm surge should have the same effect as 
these. 
1) Level 1: Site proximity to hazard 
The first level of defence is locating the building as far as possible from the hazard.  Obviously, this entails many 
limitations but it cannot be denied that the best defense is through avoidance of danger. 
2) Level 2: Site design solutions 
The second level of defence is through site modification approaches.  If and when the site is limited to a location 
with identified hazards, architects and engineers must look for answers to make the site suitable for building. 
3) Level 3: Building design solutions 
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The final level of defence is by means of architectural and engineering solutions on the building itself.  The 
building must serve as man’s shield from hazards; therefore, everything in the building should protect its occupants 
from any strike. 
 
A. Strategy for Tsunami Design (and Storm Surge) 
 
1) Elevated Evacuation Refuge 
For coastal communities, FEMA suggests the importance of creating a vertical evacuation refuge.  This is a 
building or any elevated area in which the community can take refuge after tsunami warnings are given.  Taking 
on this concept, health facilities located within the tsunami hazard zone should have an elevated evacuation refuge 
solely for their occupants.  Logically, such facility should incorporate all design concepts to mitigate hazards that 
come with tsunami events such as floods, high winds and seismic activities. 
 
B. Strategies for Flood Design 
 
1) Flood Risk Prevention 
Designers must refer to hazard maps and be aware of flood-prone areas to prevent the building of essential facilities 
such as health facilities in such sites. 
2) Structural Site Filling 
Structural site filling is a concept that can be used to protect the building from rising levels of water.  This concept 
answers the depth and hydrostatic load factors of flood design.  When the site is elevated above a certain 
established flood level, the building is spared from flood loads and may be able to continue operations. 
With this concept, the Flood Emergency Management Agency/US Federal Insurance Administration (FEMA) 
defines the following sub-concepts for structural site filling that should guide designers: 
•Base flood - is also known as the “100-year flood” or a flood having a one in one hundred chance of 
being equaled or exceeded in any given year. 
•Base flood elevation (BFE) – is the computed elevation to which floodwater is expected to rise during the 
base flood. The BFE in moving floodwaters is adjusted and measured from the crest of the cascading 
waters. 
•Design flood elevation (DFE) – is the computed elevation set by the community usually 300 mm or more 
above the BFE. 
3) Flood Barriers 
Flood barriers are in the form of levees or floodwalls which are solutions to impact loads such as debris and wave 
loads.  A levee or floodwall is an embankment alongside a body of water which averts overflowing of water onto 
the site. 
4) Anchorage 
Like how an anchor holds the ship from sailing, the building must be properly anchored to the ground to prevent it 
from floating or lateral displacement when there is a flood and dislocation or collapse of its component parts. 
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5) Use of Flood-Proof Materials 
Building materials used in construction systems below the DFE must be resistant to flood damage. According to 
FEMA, “flood-resistant material” is defined as any building material capable of withstanding direct and prolonged 
contact with floodwaters without sustaining significant damage. The term “prolonged contact” means at least 72 
hours, and the term “significant damage” means any damage requiring more than low-cost cosmetic repair (such as 
painting).  
The US Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) has classified flood-resistant materials from Class 1, unacceptable 
and not resistant to water damage to Class 5, acceptable and highly resistant to floodwater damage. 
6) Flood-Proof Construction Details  
Health facility design details should show how to minimize flood damage by elevating above the base flood level 
or by designing dry flood-proofing measures which will seal the building from flood water penetration. 
7) Critical Systems  
Buildings shall be constructed with electrical, heating, ventilation, plumbing, and air conditioning equipment and 
other service facilities that are designed and/or located so as to prevent water from entering or accumulating within 
the components. 
 
C. Strategies for Wind Load (Effect of Typhoon) 
 
1) Equilibrium due to weight 
The concept of equilibrium due to weight pertains to the ability of the building to maintain balance between weight 
and wind forces.  In this concept, a person blowing a pencil off the table is no different from wind blowing on a 
building.  In other words, if the building weighs at least as much as the wind force, then equilibrium is obtained, 
hence, the building is safe from not getting blown off. 
2) Accurate shaping 
The concept of accurate shaping is the answer to the shape factor of wind load design.  The following are 
examples of wind being affected by shape: 
•Flat surface as opposed to curved surface - Buildings that have rounded wall surfaces are less resistant to 
wind loads. It is also important to note that a building’s surface which is plain offers less resistance or wind 
drag than that that is textured. 
•Tall and slender buildings – Buildings that are tall and thin have a tendency to overturn and produce 
horizontal deflection at the top. 
•Buildings whose windward and leeward walls have openings – These buildings catch the wind and produce 
unwanted pressures inside the building. 
•Building surrounding – Elements that surround the building, including the immediate topography, perimeter 
landscape and neighboring building heights also alter wind velocity.  For example, trees, some of which, 
collapse during typhoons, may topple on the building, causing windows to break.  Also, roofing materials, 
branches and other site debris may transform into dangerous projectiles when blown by wind.  Even in 
cities, fairly mild wind speed can modify into turbulence when congested between tall buildings. 
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3) Vibration absorption 
Following the concept of isolation for seismic design, the concept of vibration absorption is one that allows the 
building to receive vibration effects due to wind but reduces these effects with absorptive materials and mechanical 
devices. 
4) Building Protection and Shielding 
Since time immemorial, human activities sought the cover of natural terrain and trees to protect shelter against the 
forces of wind. Furthermore, indigenous architecture used ingenious techniques of cover and shielding for 
protection. Among the areas that have to be protected in a health facility are: 
•The roofing edge by the use of a concrete parapet 
•Door and window openings by the use operable shutters 
5) Less is more 
The concept of less is more goes along with the concept of minimalism for seismic design.  In this concept, less 
embellishments is safer because, more often than not, embellishments in the building, being nonstructural items, are 
lightweight and can, therefore, be blown away easily by strong winds. 
6) Uplift Chain 
Establish a reliable uplift chain generally from the foundation to the roof of the health facility but with particular 
attention to the roof structure as follows: 
•roof frame to building frame (roof truss to beam) 
•purlins to top chord or rafter 
•roof sheets to purlins 
7) Redundancy 
Redundancy is ensuring the integrity of the building’s cladding (roof, walls, doors and windows) to prevent the 




8.4 Post Haiyan Recommendations on Simple Design and Construction Practices for Hospitals Safe from 
Typhoons and Storm Surges 
 
These recommendations are covered by the general strategies as described in section 1.2 above but are commonly 
overlooked when constructing hospital buildings. The purpose of these recommendations therefore is to translate in 
layman’s terms simple design and construction practices which may mitigate the harmful effects of hospitals 
subjected to typhoons and storm surges. 
 
A. On Design Practices 
 
1) In general, on typhoon risk areas and areas subjected to flooding and close to shore, it is wise to raise the 
main floor level of the hospital such that the following are protected from water: 
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•Food – which is essential for the needs of patients and staff during and after an event. 
•Medicines and medical supplies – coming especially from the pharmacy, central supply, CSSR. 
•Imaging equipment – in the Radiology Department. 
•Laboratory equipment and supplies – for testing infections during epidemics. 
2) In the process of site planning, identify the risk areas and risk directions and provide barriers for cover: 
•Strong concrete fence on the side of the risk direction 
•Hurricane shutters for glass windows and doors 
•Avoid any uncovered opening on the side of the risk direction 
3) Ensure that the hospital can be fully enclosed with strong covers all throughout its peripheries during 
typhoons. No strong winds shall be able to penetrate inside the hospital plant and cause internal wind 
pressures. All vents, windows, doors and other openings shall be fully covered during typhoons. Double 
covering is recommended for door and window openings in risk areas and risk directions; the sashes itself 
and an additional cover such as window shutters and door shutters. 
4) Provide a ramp to connect the following departments – Surgical Department and Wards, Emergency, ICU, 
Radiology and Dietary Departments to ensure the following wheeled connections: 
•Emergency to Surgical  
•Emergency to and from Radiology 
•Surgical to and from Surgical Wards, ICU 
•Wards to and from Radiology 
•Dietary to and from Wards 
5) Distribute hand-washing facilities evenly throughout the hospital, especially in possible surge areas for 
hygiene-promotion and infection control during epidemics. 
6) Identify surge areas and locate provisions for hand-washing, toilet and bath facilities for possible surge of 
patients during and after a disaster. 
7) Design exterior concrete signages for hospital identification instead of metal, plastic or other flimsy 
materials. 
8) Use Big-V roofing sheets of adequate thickness rather than corrugated sheets of standard thicknesses for 
stronger resistance against strong winds. 
 
B. On Construction Practices 
 
1) Ascertain the BFE when establishing the building’s vertical dimensions. The ground floor elevation shall be 
at least 300 mm above the BFE.  
2) Ensure that doors and windows are well-anchored to the building structure, especially on the windward and 
leeward surfaces of the building. 
3) Ensure that door and window openings are double-covered on risk areas and risk directions --- from wind 
and water surge. 
4) Strengthen and fasten eave soffit to avoid a breach during wind uplift. Use adequate compressive vertical 
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frames as well as thick finishing material for the soffit.  
5) Cover the roof edge with a boxed gutter of concrete or wood rather than an open gutter. Securely fasten metal 
fascias with steel framing. 
6) Use bolts and/or metal anchors and plates to securely anchor the truss to the building frame.  
7) Use metal or wood cleats to fasten purlins to the top chord or rafter. 
8) Fasten roofing sheets to purlins by using U-bolts with rubber washers to augment tekscrews on roof areas. 
9) Securely fasten window-type as well as outdoor units of split-type air-conditioning units to the buildings 
structural frame. For window-type ACUs, anchor A/C cover as well as the A/C unit to the concrete edges. 
Raise outdoor condensing units above BFE and fasten securely to concrete platform.   
10) Avoid building exposed and flimsy metal roofs on the top floor. Protect the top floor roof with a strong roof, 
a strong ceiling and with exterior window walls completely enclosing the area. 
 
C. On Hospital Operations 
 
1) Institute operational systems that will decentralize the service functions to each department in terms of food 
supplies, medical supplies, equipment and utilities. 
2) Equip possible surge areas with electric power, lavatories, access to water and access to toilet and shower 
facilities. 





Today, construction practices are encompassed by the use of modern materials and systems.  Unfortunately, these 
new practices lack the practical side of traditional design features.  The principles of statics, dynamics, strength of 
materials and correct methods of construction are somehow lost in the way parts of modern buildings are made.  
Hopefully, this paper will lead to the recognition of the simple construction methods that are needed to mitigate the 
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9. Data Acquisition and Field Survey in Cebu and Basey 
 
9.1 Introduction 
Typhoon Yolanda (Haiyan) widely affected urban areas in Philippines.  It damaged 1,140,332 houses as of January 
14, 2014: heavily 550,928, and moderately 589,404 (NDRRMC, 2014). 
IRIDeS organized a team for research on the post-disaster recovery support and sent them to the areas affected by 
the typhoon and tidal wave three times in January, February, and December 2014. 
The purpose of the surveys is to obtain several data, materials, and useful information for long-term post-disaster 
recovery research in Philippines, and to clarify specific problems toward its urban recovery. 
 
9.2 Itinerary 
The authors, members of the post-disaster recovery research team, conducted three surveys in January, February, 
and December in 2014.  The following is the itinerary and a map showing the visited place (Fig.9-1). 
 
[Reconnaissance in January 2014] 
Sunday, January 19:  
21:30 Arrive in Manila 
Monday, January 20: 
-12:00 Interview, JICA Philippines Office 
-15:00 Survey of statistic data, International Statistics Office 
-18:00 Gathering materials and information 
Tuesday, January 21: 
-12:00 Gathering supportive information for field surveys 
-14:00 Meeting with travel agencies 
-16:00 Gathering materials and information 
-17:30 Survey of maps and geospatial data, National Mapping and Resource Information Authority 
Wednesday, January 22: 
09:45 Depart for Tokyo 
 
[Field Survey in February 2014] 
Sunday, February 16:  
21:30 Arrive in Manila 
Monday, February 17: 
-11:00 Purchase of statistic data, International Statistics Office 
-13:00 Meeting with Social Housing Finance Corporation 
-14:00 Purchase of maps and geospatial data, National Mapping and Resource Information 
Authority 
17:00 Depart for Cebu  
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18:15 Arrive in Cebu 
Tuesday, February 18: 
-15:30 Field survey in Medellin: Community-led Disaster Rehabilitation Project 
-16:00 Interview, Kawit Barangay Office 
-17:00 Interview, Municipality of Daanbantayan 
Wednesday, February 19: 
06:00 Depart for Tacloban 
06:40 Arrive in Tacloban 
-09:30 Visit to some damaged areas in Tacloban 
10:00 Arrive in Basey 
-17:00 Field Survey in Basey 
Thursday, February 20: 
-12:00 Interview, Municipality of Basey 
-15:30 Field Survey in Basey 
16:45 Depart for Manila 
18:00 Arrive in Manila 
19:30 Interview, JICA Philippines Office 
Friday, February 21: 
10:00 Depart for Tokyo 
 
[Additional Field Survey in December 2014] 
December 16: Arrive in Manila 
December 18-19: Field Survey in Cebu and in Basey 
December 20: Depart for Tokyo 
 
 




9.3 Data Acquisition and Statistical Analysis 
 
Spatial information and regional statistics are essential to understand the characteristics of affected areas and to 
conduct effective measures for recovery and reconstruction planning after calamities. Immediately after Typhoon 
Haiyan stroke the Philippines in November 2013, our team began to collect various spatial and statistical datasets 
available on the Internet. Thereafter, during our field surveys conducted in January and February 2014, we visited 
the National Statistics Office and the National Mapping and Resource Information Authority in Manila, the 
Philippines, to negotiate about data provision. In this section, we will first provide an outline of spatial and 
statistical database we obtained. We will then analyze characteristics of areas affected by Typhoon Haiyan based on 
the datasets. 
 
We obtained the following datasets:  
 
Online free sources: Due to the pervasiveness of the internet and systems like Google Earth and OpenStreetMap, 
international collaborations about mapmaking were easily achieved. Through the accumulation of such individual 
and research institutions’ efforts (so-called volunteered geographic information), numerous datasets were created 
and disseminated. For example, OpenStreetMap team started to prepare a map of Philippines before the typhoon 
made landfall (http://wiki.osm.org/wiki/Typhoon_Haiyan). It reported that, as crisis mapping response, over 4.5 
million objects were modified by over 1,600 volunteered mappers until 11th December 2013. The maps include 
polygons of buildings with damage assessments and post-disaster satellite imageries in the affected areas.  
 
At the same time, several portal sites gathered such information and provided them through their websites. Spatial 
datasets ranging from administrative boundaries, roads, background imagery etc. to Typhoon Haiyan path, building 
footprints, damage assessment etc. were obtained. A homepage of Philippine GIS Data Clearinghouse 
(http://philgis.org/) exits before the typhoon disaster and it aims to provide GIS datasets for education and 
non-profit use on volunteered basis. It distributes a wide range of thematic maps in vector and raster formats such 
as municipality boundaries, population counts, roads, rainfalls, elevation, vegetation etc. GIS companies such as 
ESRI (GIS company) not only collects various information on Typhoon Haiyan but also distribute them via their 
ArcGIS Online System. Some of them are downloadable as a shapefile format. In public domain, Project NOAH 
operated by DOST (Department of Science and Technology, Republic of the Philippines) set up Yolanda Special 
Site. This site converted the number of death and injured in a report of NDRRMC and provided in KML format. 
Currently, those maps are viewable but no longer downloadable. 
 
A list of useful web sites is presented below: 
 






URL http://www.arcgis.com/home/item.html?id=b5226c1f85954be0891b07ba43 b6e952 
 
・Project NOAH(Nationwide Operational Assessment of Hazards) 
URL http://noah.dost.gov.ph/ 
 
・Typhoon Yolanda Geonode 
URL http://www.yolandadata.org/ 
 
・PhilGIS (Philippine GIS Data Clearinghouse) 
URL http://www.philgis.org/freegisdata.htm 
 




Situation Report on the Effects of Typhoon Yolanda: The National Disaster Risk Reduction Management Council 
(NDRRMC) published a situation report about Typhoon Haiyan every day. Over 100 reports were put on the 
website (URL: http://ndrrmc.gov.ph/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1125%3Asituational 
-report-re-preparations-for-typhoon-qyolandaq&catid=1%3Andrrmc-update&Itemid=1). While contents of the 
reports differ slightly, they usually contain an updated list of victims and their characteristics such as age, sex, 
municipality and cause of death/injury. They also have statistical tables about human and housing damage and,and 
humanitarian assistance. We converted the list of victims and selected statistical tables to Excel format to link with 
our spatial databases in ArcGIS. 
 
Census of Population and Housing 2000 and 2010 (CPH2000, CPH2010): The National Statistics Office (NSO) 
conducts the Census of Population and Housing every five years. The latest survey was conducted in May 2010 and 
already published. CPH 2010 consists of several forms. Of them, CPH Form 2 was distributed to all persons and 
households in the Philippines (i.e. a complete survey). We contacted the NSO about data provision in January and 
February 2014 and they appreciated the purposes of our data use and kindly provided CPH 2000 and 2010. 
Specialized software (CS Pro) for census operation was used to assist data manipulation, tabulation and export. 
 
CPH Form 2 contains questions about both demographic attributes such as age, sex, and education level of 
household members and housing attributes such as type of building and construction materials of houses in which 
people reside. Since a large number of houses along the coast were washed away by the storm surge, we cannot 
survey construction materials from fieldwork and satellite imagery in same detail as from the census. CPH 2010 is 
the only data source to understand housing characteristics of affected areas before Typhoon Haiyan. We therefore 




Datakit of Official Philippine Statistics (DATOS): DATOS is a collection of various statistics at barangay and 
municipality level. It contains information of (1) the number of facilities (hall, hospital, school, telephone, electric 
power etc.) at barangay level, (2) the number of establishments by types at the municipality level and (3) official 
population counts for 1980, 1990, 1995 and 2000. DATOS also includes ESRI Shapefiles of provincial and 
municipality, barangay boundaries for mapping datasets in DATOS as well as tables tabulated from CPH 2010. 
 
Large scale urban maps of Tacloban and Ormoc (Fig.9-2): The National Mapping and Resource Information 
Authority (NAMRIA) published different types of maps. Large scale maps are however limited to large cities and 
they have not been updated frequently. CAD maps for Tacloban and Ormoc cities were fortunately available 
although they were last updated in the late 1990s. These CAD maps were converted to ESRI Shapefiles to overlay 
them with other maps. The maps contain shapes of buildings, elevation, roads, vegetation, etc. These large scale 
maps are useful for base maps for damage assessment and urban expansion analysis. 
 
 
Fig.9-2. A large scale urban GIS map of Tacloban. 
 
Analysis based on datasets we obtained: 
 
By using situation reports on the effects of Typhoon Haiyan by NDDRMC, spatial distributions of housing and 





Fig.9-3. The number of death (Source: NDDRMC Situation Report). 
 
Fig.9-4. The number of houses damaged by Typhoon Haiyan (Source: NDRRMC Situation Report). 
 
According to Fig.9-3, a large number of the dead were mainly concentrated in municipalities around Tacloban City 
where an extremely high storm surge and strong wind speed were recorded. On the other hand, the number of 
houses damaged is larger not only around Tacloban City but also in municipalities along the storm track. Inland 
municipalities also had housing damages possibly because strong wind destroyed rural houses constructed by light 
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weight natural materials (Fig.9-5).  
 
 
Fig.9-5. Proportion of houses with cogon/nipa/anahaw roof (Source: CPH2000). 
 
In order to understand characteristics of the dead, we first tabulated counts by sex or age categories of victims and 
then estimated the total counts of the dead and injured per 10,000 people (Fig.9-6) based on population in CPH 
2010. Our initial survey revealed males and the elderly are more likely to have suffered from Typhoon Haiyan. In 
particular, people aged 70 years old and over are ten times more likely to be killed. 
 
Fig.9-6. The number of the dead and injured by sex and age category (adjusted). 
 
We experimentally applied text mining to words used to describe causes of death or injury in the list of victims for 
estimating possible causalities. Fig.9-7 presents co-occurrence of words after excluding “previously reported 

















first group relates to “drown” (including “drowning”) which suggests that people were killed by storm surge. The 
second group includes words like “cardiac” and “arrest”, which also suggest an association with “drown” to some 
extent. The third group contains “tree”, “debris”, “hit”, “fallen” and “toppled”. Since these words were used 
concurrently, many people were possibly killed by collision caused by strong wind. On the other hand, “wound” 
(including “wounded”), “punctured” and “lacerated” appeared often with words relating to human body parts. 
These co-occurrences imply that people became injured during their evacuation.  
          
            causes of death     causes of injuries 
*Size of circle represents the number of times a word appeared in the list. 
Fig.9-7. Co-occurrences of words used for describing causes of death and injuries in the list of victims.  
 
To understand relationships between the number of death or damaged houses and regional vulnerability at the 
municipality level, we further conducted a statistical analysis based on a negative binomial regression model. The 
259 municipalities highly affected by the Typhoon Haiyan were included as a study area. Our major findings are as 
follows: 
 
(1) The number of death and damaged houses are determined by not only physical characteristics such as distance 
from the Typhoon Haiyan and structure of buildings but also social characteristics such as regional poverty and 
education level. Such social vulnerabilities lead to expanding and exacerbating damages by the typhoon because 
poverty deprives of educational opportunity and it results in living in makeshift houses in coastal area and having 
less preparation and ability against disasters. 
 
(2) In the study area, the degree of urbanization negatively relates to the number of damaged houses. However, 
urbanized municipalities with high poverty rate increased risk of the damages. This result indicates that since rapid 
urbanization is often accompanied by expansion of poor neighborhoods along the coast where vacant land is only 
available near the city center, deprived people have to build houses on high-risk areas without appropriate disaster 
protection such as sea walls. 
 
(3) We estimated that, in the study area, to increase a proportion of concrete houses by 10 percent will save over 
180,000 houses. In addition, to reduce poverty rate by 5 percent or to increase a proportion of high school graduates 
will save over 1000 people and 2000 people respectively. In the long run, it is necessary for the Philippine 
126 
 
government to continue comprehensive efforts to improve both housing qualities and human capitals to reduce 
disaster damages overall. 
 
9.4 Field Survey in Basey 
(1) Outline of the survey 
Municipality of Basey is located in Samar Island, the northeast of Tacloban.  According to a material obtained in 
the field survey, Typhoon Yolanda caused 235 casualties including missing people, and 714 injured people, and 
affected 15,583 families and 50,423 people in the municipality.  The number of heavily damaged buildings is 
7,175 and moderately damaged is 5,048. 
The post-disaster recovery research team carried out field surveys to record the building damage conditions in 
Basey (Fig.9-8) in February for long-term post-disaster urban recovery monitoring.  The team visited the 
Municipality Office to get information on the regional damage in order to understand the data obtained by the 











(2) Record of building damage conditions 
The building damage recording method the team applied in the survey was as follows. 
At first, we defined the boundary of objective areas that were affected by the typhoon and determined the driving 
route based on the map (Fig.9-8).  Then we took a record of all buildings in the area with GPS driving recorder on 
a car.  Fig.9-9 is a building distribution map in terms of building materials in Basey.  The building damage 
conditions are classified into four categories: completely damaged, heavily damaged, moderately damaged, and 
slightly damaged (Fig.9-10).   
These obtained dataset will be useful for building damage analysis. 
 
 
Fig.9-9. Building distribution map in terms of building materials in Basey 
 
   




(3) Recovery conditions as of February 2014 
As well as the recording of damage condition, the team visited Municipality of Basey and interviewed Municipal 
Mayor, a staff in City Planning Department, and victims to understand recovery conditions and problems they were 
facing (Fig.9-10). 
One of the significant problems for affected residents living in coastal areas was landownership.  The government 
would adopt building regulation in the coastal zone within 40m from the coastline.  It would influence their 
recovery situation and resettlement. 
Another problem for the victims was a criterion to live in a temporary house such as the number of children they 
have.  There is a temporary housing place on the outskirts of the town (Fig.9-8) and each household area of the 
house is about 6m2.  Some people who lost their houses had to keep living in a damaged area because they did not 
meet the criterion. 
The recovery plan was under consideration when the survey was conducted. 
 
   
Fig.9-10. Gathering information in the Municipality Office and temporary housing 
 
9.5 Field Survey in Cebu 
(1) Outline of the survey and building damage conditions 
The north of Cebu is non-tourism development zone as compared with other areas in Cebu island. According to 
NDRRMC report (2014), the number of damaged houses remained at 24,373 houses (18,752 completely / 5,621 
slightly) and 8 persons were killed in the north of Cebu (Total amount of Municipality Daanbantayan and Medellin) 
by typhoon Haiyan. When we conducted a field survey in February 2014, we found collapsed buildings everywhere 
(Fig.9-11, 9-12). Our team conducted interviews focusing on how to provide recovery support for victims by NGO 





Fig. 9-13. Field survey area in Cebu 
Fig. 9-12.  Slightly damaged buildings (roof and windows) in Medellin, Cebu 
Fig.9-11.  Completely damaged buildings in Barangay Kawit, Cebu (before and after repairing) 
Basketball gymnasium (left) and private concern (Right) 
130 
 
(2) Recovery conditions as of February and December 2014 
As of February 2014, the affected area in Cebu conducted self-reconstruction by victims. In addition, NGO 
provided temporary employment and housing reconstruction support, and local governments of Cebu provided the 
food supply assistance. However, we could not confirm financial assistance, localized recovery, or reconstruction 
plans for the affected areas in Cebu by the governments. 
After 10 months (As of December 2014), we could be confirmed the progress of some completely damaged 
buildings repaired like Fig.9-11. However, some of public facilities were recovered half of the total due to luck or 
fund. 
 
(3) Support activity by NGO 
In Barangay Kawit in Cebu, we contacted NGO staffs (Joint team of Lihok Filipina Foundation, Pagtambayayong 
Foundation and PhilDHRRA) to inquire about support for the victims. They were providing temporary employment 
support (Clean up the shack, Php300.00/day), housing support (Construction of starter houses, Php8,000.00/unit 
and repair of housing units, Php4,000.00/unit) and others (Fig. 9-14) for the victims. In addition, the standard of 
support should be made for the victims was determined by DSWD (Department of Social Welfare and 
Development) based on damage level of housing etc.   
 
Temporary houses (Starter houses provided by NGO) were located in the area 200m away from the coast.  The 
houses were composed of simple structures such as wooden frameworks, tin roof and walls, and the material used 
were blue tarpaulin, wooden board and bamboo fence etc (Fig.9-15). To conduct this project, NGO faced two 
problems: how to provide clean water, and how to collect the fund and materials since Philippine Government 
didn’t establish a housing support system. 
As of December 2014, we could be fined the start of constructing Permanent houses in Daanbantayan and Bogo 
city. In case of Daanbantayan, permanent houses are provided by UN-Habitat and constructing the method of 
lightweight steel-frame building (Fig. 9-16).  
In another case of Bogo city, there are constructed new residential area called the “Yolanda Village”. 
Community-Led Disaster Rehabilitation Project (Barangay Kawit, Medellin, Cebu) 
Project Duration: December 2013 – April 2014 
 
Project Components 
Employment Generation & Livelihood (Cash for Work) 
Php 300.00/day inclusive of 3 months SSS and 1 year Insurance 
Construction of Starter Houses @Php8,000.00/unit 
Repair of Housing Units @Php4,000.00/unit 
Construction of Communal Toilet & Bath @Php60,000.00/unit 
Provision of Hygiene Kit @Php50,000.00/Toilet 
Information and Education Inputs/Activities 
Psychosocial activities and support 
Fig. 9-14.  Support for victims by NGO in Barangay Kawit, Cebu 
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Fig 9-15. Temporary houses (Starter houses provided by NGO) in Barangay Kawit, Cebu 






(4) Support activity by Government 
According to Barangay officers in Kawit, they provided food support for the victims, but they did not establish 
housing support system by government. Therefore, they needed to depend on NGO for the main part of housing 
reconstruction assistance.  
 To start recovery process, Philippine Government decided to set “no-build zone” by Recovery Plan (2014) in 
order to prohibit housing constructions within 40m from the coast and ensure the safety for residents. However, the 
residential area has already existed in the coastal area in Kawit before Typhoon Haiyan. Barangay Captain tried to 
encourage residences to move inland, but it was not so effective for them. Therefore, barangay officers think it is 




National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council (NDRRMC) (2014): Effects of Typhoon “Yolanda” 













Fig. 9-17. Permanent houses located in Bogo city, Cebu 
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10. The Post-Disaster Phase of Transitional Settlement: A Perspective from Typhoon Haiyan in 
the Eastern Philippines 
 
Group members 
1.  Prof. David Alexander (UCL-IRDR) 
2.  Dr. Joanna Faure Walker (UCL-IRDR) 
3.  Mr. Joshua Macabuag (UCL-EPICentre) 
4.  Assoc. Prof. Anawat Suppasri (Earthquake induced Tsunami Risk Evaluation, IRIDeS) 
 
10.1 Collaboration between UCL-IRDR and Tohoku University IRIDeS 
 
The field mission to the Philippines to assess post-disaster recovery was part of an ongoing collaboration between 
University College London Institute for Risk and Disaster Reduction (UCL-IRDR) and Tohoku University 
International Research Institute of Disaster Science (IRIDeS). It was planned following a symposium on disasters 
held by UCL-IRDR and IRIDeS in London during November 2013. Prior to that, a UK-Japan workshop on disaster 
risk reduction entitled “Learning from the 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake” took place in Tokyo during October 
2012 (Faure Walker et al. 2013). UCL-IRDR, UCL EPICentre, and IRIDeS members also collaborated as part of 
the EEFIT team which assessed the recovery process two years after the 2011 Great Eastern Japan Earthquake and 
Tsunami (EEFIT 2013). The text in this chapter is included within the IRDR Special Report 2014-01 “The 
post-disaster phase of transitional settlement: A perspective from typhoon Yolanda (Haiyan) in eastern Philippines”. 
 
10.2 Mission Aim 
 
The aim of this field mission was to compare the effects of domestic and imported aid and assistance on the quality 
and speed of recovery. Another aim was to assess vulnerability during the transitional phase between the initial 
emergency and long-term recovery and reconstruction. The mission focused on households and the physical 
structures in which they live. It also considered socio-economic influences upon resilience and the role of insurance 
in reducing the impact or increasing the rate of recovery. Specifically, the team carried out systematic surveys of the 
quality of building repairs and reconstruction processes in conjunction with questionnaire surveys of the 
householders who inhabited the structures. In addition, key professional personnel were interviewed. 
 
10.3 Survey Methods 
 
A brief fieldwork campaign was conducted during March 2014, four months after the typhoon. Some 160 
households were surveyed in 12 coastal Barangays (districts) of Tacloban, Palo and Tanauan in the province of 
Leyte, a part of the Philippine region of Eastern Visayas. According to 2010 census data, the survey covered about 
2, 5 and 5 per cent of the population of these municipalities, respectively. The questionnaires were accompanied by 
a structural engineering survey of respondents’ living quarters, which helped verify statements made about the 
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processes of building shelter and established the quality of the shelters in terms of resistance to future typhoons. 
 
 
Fig.10-1. Prof. David Alexander and Dr. Joanna Faure Walker interviewing a resident in Tanauan. 
 
 




10.4 Need for Research on the Post-Disaster Transitional Phase 
 
Research into risk and disaster reduction and post-disaster recovery is often focused on either the immediate 
emergency response phase or the long-term permanent recovery phase. Much less studied is the transitional phase, 
which begins when immediate relief winds down and continues into the start of permanent reconstruction. Some 
authors (e.g. Omidvar and Binesh 2012) have argued that there should be a direct passage from early recovery to 
final reconstruction, with the elimination of the transitional phase. Others (e.g. Alexander 2013) have probed the 
ways in which transition can become consolidated and institutionalised such that it reduces the impetus for full 
reconstruction. Meanwhile, evidence is mounting that attempts to shorten the duration of the transition between 
emergency response and full-scale reconstruction may involve skimping on design and consultation processes. As a 




Regarding the emergency phase of the typhoon disaster, we were interested in assessing the effectiveness of 
warning messages and evacuation procedures, as well as that of aid and assistance. With regard to the families that 
lived in the path of the storm, we examined how socio-economic status affected recovery, and the extent to which 
employment suffered. We enquired into the means by which shelter was provided and constructed, and evaluated its 
effectiveness and safety in the face of continuing natural hazards. We were particularly interested to find out 
whether families had received expert help when shelter was reconstructed, and, if so, what impact this may have 
had on the safety of transitional dwellings. We also looked into the security and tenure of families, especially in the 
light of the Philippine Government's declaration of a 'no-build' (i.e. set-back) zone that will stretch 40 metres inland 
from the shore. Finally, we asked what future prospects families envisaged after their homes had been severely 
damaged or destroyed by the typhoon. 
Various secondary questions arose from our survey work in the barangays. Was expertise on natural hazard 
resistance being utilised in the construction industry in order to make temporary shelters safe against wind and 
water damage during typhoons? What was the level of uptake of hazard insurance and what was the degree of 
interest in insurance (or possibly micro-insurance) schemes that cover typhoon damage? As judged by the 
recipients of aid, did the Government and NGO relief agencies perform well during the early stages of the disaster? 
How well did they succeed in providing assistance to the needy and stabilizing the situation at the local level? 
What is the relationship between transitional settlement (in particular, transitional shelter), long-term 
reconstruction and overall economic and human development? Did the transitional situation offer any clues 
regarding the outcomes in the longer term? In the areas we studied, are opportunities for development and 
vulnerability reduction being taken or ignored? In other words, does the ongoing process of recovery in the 






10.6 Key Findings and Recommendations 
 
Our findings relate to a variety of elements of the situation. The first of these is evacuation prior to the arrival of 
Typhoon Haiyan. The standard practice was for evacuation warnings to be disseminated to individual households 
by Barangay leaders. Almost two thirds of households that participated in the survey evacuated either the whole 
family or most of its members before the typhoon arrived, while 8 per cent evacuated during the typhoon and 28 
per cent remained in situ. Fewer of the families that remained suffered major damage to their properties that did 
those who evacuated, which suggests that the former anticipated lower risks by not evacuating. Of the families that 
evacuated, 55 per cent evacuated all members, 32 per cent left some men behind, 1 per cent evacuated children 
while leaving the parents behind and 12 per cent did not specify exactly who in the household left. Where men 
remained, the principal reason appears to have been the desire to guard property. Of 37 families in which men 
remained behind but women did not, we were able to verify that 13 (more than one third) suffered fatalities as a 
result. Overall, warnings successfully reached the majority of the people we interviewed. However, in many cases 
families underestimated the severity of the storm surge. Hence, the dissemination of warnings was effective, but the 
content less so. 
The distribution of money and basic goods is one crucial aspect of the bridge between the emergency phase, in 
which mere survival is the objective, and the transitional phase, in which families must start to consider how they 
are going to recover in the long term. Studies show (Middleton and O'Keefe 1998) that the assistance people 
receive must help them recover rather than destroying local coping mechanisms (including local markets and 
businesses) and inducing aid-dependency. We found that almost all agencies working in the Tacloban area had 
furnished only minimal aid to the respondents of our survey. The Philippine Government provided basic foodstuffs, 
while INGOs gave hygiene kits and cooking utensils. Limited cash-for-work schemes were operated over a brief 
period. Over a period of two months, one INGO, acting independently of the others and of the Government, 
distributed cash to families. The grant varied from US$175-350 according to family size. Many of our respondents 
received it. Cash distributions are the subject of varied opinions in the literature (cf. Mattinen and Ogden 2006, 
Willibald 2006). Cash hand-outs may encourage corruption and heighten security risks. We found no evidence of 
these problems and instead that cash was highly beneficial in enabling people to buy building materials, subsistence 
foods, goods to sell in a small business or items such as fishing boats or rickshaws. However, like Mattinen and 
Ogden (2006), we also found that the influx of cash stimulated inflation in the price of building materials, which 
increased by between 20 and 100 per cent with respect to what it was before the typhoon. However, some of the 
increase can be attributed to a shortage of sawmill capacity. It would have helped if the Philippine Government and 
local authorities have endeavoured to control prices. 
As mentioned in chapter 9, even though the idea of prohibiting development along the shore existed before 
typhoon Haiyan with the PD 1067 of 1976, the Philippine Government has again decreed that an area that stretches 
40 metres inland from the current coastline will be designated as a no-build zone (known in other parts of the 
world as a ‘set-back line’), in which reconstruction will be prohibited and from which existing settlement will 
eventually be relocated. Local governments have been given the option to adopt or reject this measure. We found 
that 94 per cent of interviewees knew where the no-build zones were, and hence we conclude that the system of 
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using large signs to indicate the no-build zones has been effective. However, despite its ease of communication, we 
question whether the 40m no-build zone policy is unreasonably simplistic. It does not reflect variations in hazard 
level with topography and may therefore lead to the underestimation of the risk in some places and its 
overestimation, leading to unnecessary relocation, in others. 
The survey found that 99 per cent of householders interviewed did not have property insurance, which is 
consistent with national penetration rates of barely 1 per cent (de la Cruz Tendero 2013). Of those interviewees who 
lacked insurance, 34 per cent stated they would like it in the future, 20 per cent said it was too expensive and 38 per 
cent were unable to decide because they lacked basic information on the topic. Hence, we recommend that 
insurance companies and local government work to educate the population of high-hazard areas about whichever 
insurance options are available. Furthermore, we encourage those who are investigating alternative low-cost 
insurance options (possibly micro-insurance) to continue their work. 
We were interested in the pace of temporary and permanent reconstruction. At the time of the survey, March 
2014 (four months after the typhoon), 99 per cent of respondents had started temporary reconstruction, but 87 per 
cent had not begun the process of reconstructing their accommodation permanently. Half of the latter cited lack of 
money as the reason. Given the choice, 79 per cent of interviewees would reconstruct in situ, and this proportion 
rises to 90 per cent when one considers only households located outside the ‘no-build zones.’ More than half of the 
dwellings that we examined were built without the aid of professional advice or help. In very many cases, 
householders built their own transitional shelter, possibly with the aid of a local carpenter, whose qualifications and 
skills were probably minimal. 
Those respondents who were awaiting relocation had little or no idea about to where they would be relocating or 
when it would happen. In terms of the demand for housing, the production of temporary shelters and the inability to 
start permanent reconstruction made the transitional phase of recovery inevitable, whether or not it was desirable in 
terms of the pathway to a stable, permanent reconstruction. It would have been helpful if local governments could 
have given householders more information about their plans for relocating them. 
 





The survey was particularly concerned with the quality of reconstruction. We found that shelter built by 
householders without the aid of training or expert advice led to the proliferation of structures that are vulnerable to 
typhoons and storm surges, possibly also tsunamis, which could happen during the life of such structures. 
Philippine and international NGOs had formulated advice on good construction practice, but we found that it did 
not reach the householders that we interviewed. Even those dwellings that were built by carpenters with some 
experience in the construction industry lacked basic measures to ensure safety and robustness. Hence, in relation to 
the risk of future natural hazards, communities did not appear to be “building back better.” 
In general, the dwellings we surveyed lacked bracing to ensure lateral stability and tended to have foundations 
that were too shallow. Connections between roofs and frames were inadequate and steel sheets used as roofing 
material had little to restrain them against high winds. Regarding timber frames, structural members had inadequate 
connections, and the sizes of timber used tended to be inadequate and inconsistent, especially where the lumber was 
salvaged from the post-typhoon wreckage. 
Reinforced concrete suffered from poor compaction, over-sized aggregate, inadequate rebar cover, the use of 
smooth steel bars (however, mainly in older constructions) and an excessively sparing use of reinforcement. Where 
cinder-blocks were used as a construction material, they tended to be low quality and hence weak. Walls were too 
thin and few ties existed between blocks and vertical posts. 
As structures that were near to each other tended to be built using similar construction techniques, it seems that 
both defects and strengths were disseminated locally in either active or passive mode. The Philippine Technical 
Education and Skills Development Authority (TESDA) runs training schemes in the form of short courses on key 
skills. It is intended that those who attend the courses will pass the knowledge on to others in their barangays. 
Unfortunately, the householders we interviewed did not seem to be aware of these programmes. 
Training programmes are needed in the early stages of the transitional recovery phase. In this respect, the 
TESDA programmes are promising, but they need to be more numerous and more widely accessible to 
beneficiaries. Community-level awareness programmes involving posters and local talks can be used to 
demonstrate basic principles and essential details of construction. They should be used to ensure that householders 
understand bracing for stability, frame connections (e.g. using more one nail per connection) and roof connections 
(abundant use of hurricane straps and better securing of the elements of roofs). Those authorities who commission 
reconstruction programmes need to be given presentations and other forms of awareness programmes. They include 
councillors and other community representatives, municipal staff and NGO operatives who are responsible for 
recovery and reconstruction processes. 
More detailed training is needed for those people who are professionals in the construction trade, as they can be 
expected to put the lessons directly into practice and retain the knowledge in their future work. Training for all 
professional people in the construction trades is an unrealistic goal because it would be too expensive. However, 
with careful management, a ‘cascade system’ can be used in conjunction with a construction programme that uses 
the “supervised self-build” model. “Training of trainers” can include mentoring processes, transfer of skills and the 
consequent dissemination of expertise. Examples of appropriate schemes are given in Macabuag (2010) and 
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The transition between emergency assistance and permanent recovery is a critical phase (Leon et al. 2009). It can 
determine the course of reconstruction and recovery, and contribute much to its eventual success or failure. During 
this period, survivors can be either lifted out of poverty and destitution, and protected against further hazard 
impacts, or left to languish in a state of perennial vulnerability. 
Our survey showed some positive aspects of the emergency phase, particularly in the dissemination of warnings 
and decision to evacuate. Not all evacuation ended in success, in that the storm surge was high enough to 
overwhelm places such as the Tacloban Convention Centre, in which many families were sheltering. Transitional 
shelter was mostly erected over a period of three months, during which many people lived in precarious, makeshift 
conditions. Some continued to live in tents four months after the event, but repair of local infrastructure and 
provision of basic housing were moving ahead. 
Our main finding is that, among the people and families we interviewed, natural hazard vulnerability was 
reproduced during the transitional phase, while employment stagnated and long-term prospects were, for many 
interviewees, unfathomable. Hence, an opportunity to create safety and the conditions for a “bounce-forward” 
recovery essentially lost, or at least deferred until an unpredictable future. 
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11. Path to “Build Back Better”: involvement of local stakeholders in future disaster risk 
reduction and planning recovery and implementation 
 
Group members 
1. Assoc. Prof. Kanako Iuchi (International Resilience)  
2. Assoc. Prof. Takako Izumi (International Regional Cooperation Office) 
3.  Assoc. Prof. Michimasa Matsumoto (International Regional Cooperation Office) 
4.  Assist. Prof. Elizabeth Maly (International Resilience) 
 
Objective  
The main research interests of the participating researchers in this mission are community resilience, post-disaster 
planning and policies as well as role of local stakeholders in disaster risk reduction (DRR). Field mission aims were 
to learn: i) how are governments (both national and locals), Civil Society Organizations (CSOs), private sectors and 
communities had prepared against disasters in the past, responded as well as been recovered after Typhoon Haiyan; 
and ii) what are the emerging issues in recovery, in particular on resettlement and livelihood rebuilding practices.  
 
Activities 
The team visit to Manila, Tacloban and Ormoc took place 4-13 March 2014, with a follow up trip to Manila and 
Tacloban in February 2015. The research was primarily based on interviews with government officers, CSOs, 
private sector representatives, and community leaders. The list of interviewees include: the Center for Disaster 
Preparedness (CDP), Corporate Network for Disaster Response (CNDR), Asian Disaster Reduction and Response 
Network (ADRRN), the Eastern Visayas Network, Help Direct Initiative, the National Disaster Risk Reduction and 
Management Council (NDRRMC), Office of Civil Defense (OCD), Department of Public Works and Highways 
(DPWH), Philippine Institute of Volcanology and Seismology (PHIVOLCS), SRDP, Oriental Consultants, United 
Nations Development Programme (UNDP), UN-Habitat, Office of the Presidential Assistant for Recovery and 
Rehabilitation (PARR), City Government of Tacloban, City Government of Ormoc, Tacloban City Councilor, 
Barangay leaders from Barangay Uban, Barangay 68, Barangay 64, Barangay 59-B, Barangay 88, Barangay 31, 
Barangay 61, and Barangay 56-A in Tacloban, and the Barangay Luna, Guintigui-an, Quezon. Jr, Linac, Valencia, 
Bagong, San Antonio, and Canuntog in Ormoc. Interviews on landownership, evacuation and resettlement process, 
and future prospects on resettlement to the coastal residents in Tacloban City were also conducted in the second 
trip. 
11.1 Challenges and opportunities in involvement and contribution of local stakeholders (LGUs, civil society 
organizations, private sectors etc.) in disaster response and recovery 
11.1.1 Future disaster risk reduction (DRR) strategy in the Philippines: strengthening the DRR capacity of 
local government units (LGUs) 
The Philippines Disaster Risk Reduction and Management (DRRM) Act or the Republic Act No. 10121 was 
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enacted in 2010 in order to strengthen the country’s institutional capacity for DRR and management and to build 
the resilience of local communities to disasters including climate change impacts. Under this Act, provinces, cities 
and municipalities have a greater responsibility in building disaster resilience of communities, and in 
institutionalizing DRR within their functions and operations (EMI, 2010). The Act made a paradigm shift possible 
in the disaster management strategy in the Philippines from the focus on emergency relief (post-disaster) to DRR 
(pre-disaster). This puts more emphasis on strengthening people’s capacity to absorb stress, maintain basic 
functions during a disaster and bounce back better from disasters (DRRNetPhils, 2010).   
The major characteristics of the Act are highlighted as a policy that emphasizes the needs and importance of: 
 promoting involvement and participation of all sectors and all stakeholders concerned at all levels especially 
the local community,  
 strengthening the capacity of the national government as well as the local government units (LGUs),  
 mainstreaming DRR and climate change in development processes,  
 recognizing and strengthening the capacity of LGUs and communities in DRR, response and recovery, and  
 engaging the participation of civil society organizations (CSOs) and the private sector..   
In addition, the Act transformed the then National Disaster Coordinating Council to the National Disaster Risk 
Reduction and Management Council (NDRRMC) and included representatives from CSOs and the private sector in 
the Council. Under the NDRRMC, the Regional Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council (RDRRMCs) 
and the Local Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council (LDRRMCs) were established in order to monitor 
and implement the action plans and ensure the integration of DRR and climate change adaptation into local 
development plans, programs, and budgets. Concerning the fund allocation for DRR and management, not less than 
5% of the estimated revenue from regular sources is set aside as the Local Disaster Risk Reduction and 
Management Fund (LDRRMF) to support disaster risk management activities including post-disaster activities. Of 
the amount for LDRRMF, 30% is allocated as the quick response fund and 70% is allocated for DRR purposes. 
Furthermore, the Act encourages integrating DRR and management education in the school curricula for public and 
private secondary and tertiary levels of education, including formal and non-formal, technical–vocational, 
indigenous learning and out-of-school youth courses and programs.  
While the enactment of the Act became an important chapter of the disaster management history of the 
Philippines and demonstrated that the Philippines has fully committed to the enhancement of DRR capacity and 
implementation both at national and local levels, the question of the progress and extent of the implementation of 
the Act still remains 3 years after its enactment. In the interview with municipalities of Tacloban and Ormoc as well 
as a national CSO in the Philippines, gaps were addressed in the preparedness and response capacity of cities and 
barangays.  
City Disaster Risk Reduction Management Offices (CDRRMO) were established in both Tacloban and Ormoc 
and played an important role in emergency relief when typhoon Haiyan struck these cities. In Tacloban, according 
to the CDRRMO officer, the hazard maps to prepare for tsunamis and storm hazards were distributed and the 
stockpile of relief items was prepared prior to typhoon Haiyan. The contingency and disaster response plan existed. 
However, the resources that the city possessed, such as equipment needed for search and rescue activities were not 
sufficient, and in addition, most of them were washed away. A certain time was required for assistance from the 
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national and international levels to arrive. Furthermore, in the interview of the Barangay leaders, all of them 
emphasized that they did not have sufficient knowledge to understand what the storm surge was and the fact that 
they needed to evacuate immediately.  
In Ormoc, due to their former experience of the flash flood in 1991, their understanding and knowledge on 
disaster preparedness was high. The direct damage and impacts were also less severe compared to Tacloban. 
Response activities were undertaken in close collaboration with the LGUs, the private sector, and the communities. 
Even at the Barangay level, preparedness training and evacuation drills were provided prior to the typhoon Haiyan. 
It showed that the past experience of disasters can be a crucial element of awareness raising on DRR.  
In the Act, the CDRRMO is provided three staff for 1) administrative and training, 2) research and planning, 
and 3) operations and warning. One of the national CSOs in the Philippines commented that the current capacity of 
the CDRRMOs was not sufficient to conduct thorough programs and tasks for disaster preparedness. Therefore, 
while 90% of the municipalities established CDRRMOs, most of them are not yet fully operational. Further support 
to the LGUs for their capacity development of DRR is urgently needed. The collaboration and joint 
activities/programs with CSOs and LGUs may be one of the possibilities to explore in the future. 
11.1.2 Involvement and participation of new local stakeholders in disaster response and DRR 
National and Local Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) 
A number of international organizations were actively involved in disaster response activities after Typhoon Haiyan. 
In addition, the roles of the national and local CSOs in the Philippines in the disaster response should not be 
overlooked. In most cases of disaster response to a large-scale disaster, international organizations and agencies 
from outside the affected countries play a key role in the disaster response, however, the coordination and 
collaboration with national and local CSOs are often neglected although national and local CSOs have long-term 
experience working with the community for many years and understand the risks, issues and conditions at the local 
level. In many cases, the internationally provided assistance does not take into consideration the local culture and 
practices and does not have a long-term perspective and emphasis on sustainability. In addition it leads to a disaster 
response that does not reflect the actual needs of the communities and causes the delay of the overall response and 
recovery efforts. The participatory approach is crucial in the effective disaster response and recovery by 
encouraging the involvement of various local stakeholders. 
In order to reduce the gaps in the needs of the communities and the assistance provided internationally, a CSO 
network in the Philippines took the lead for coordination between international organizations and national/local 
organizations during the response to typhoon Haiyan. The Eastern Visayas Network is a CSO network that includes 
various groups of women, farmers, elderly, youth organizations and multi-sectoral organization and consists of 
more than 30 organizations. The major objective of the network is capacity development of the member 
organizations regarding law, human rights, local development planning, project monitoring, budget management etc. 
In case of the Haiyan response, the Network played a role especially in information sharing about community needs 
and logistical conditions and in providing suggestions for the ways of assistance based on local culture and tradition 
according to the Executive Director of the Eastern Visayas Network. In addition, the Network shared the 
information and contacts of the national and local organizations with specific focuses and encouraged international 
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organizations to work and collaborate with them.  
Such national and local CSOs network was also supported by a regional CSO network called the Asian Disaster 
Reduction and Response Network (ADRRN). ADRRN consists of nearly 50 CSOs from 20 countries in the 
Asia-Pacific region. ADRRN has an experience of providing coordination between international organizations and 
national and local CSOs in other countries. ADRRN sent the assessment team to the Philippines after Typhoon 
Haiyan to conduct a needs assessment and analysis in coordination with national and local CSOs, governments and 
international organizations. The result of the assessment shared by the ADRRN Program Officer who joined the 
assessment team addressed the gaps in limited cultural sensitivity, lack of information sharing, fragmentation of 
coordination mechanism, and weak participation of local stakeholders in the coordination mechanism. Based on 
these findings, ADRRN proposed to establish a resource/coordination center for the national and local NGOs. 
These resource centers were temporally established in Cebu, Ormoc, Tacloban, Roxas and Guiuan. The Eastern 
Visayas Network managed the resource center in Tacloban. The major contributions of the resource centers include 
information sharing, capacity development of CSOs, and strengthening horizontal coordination between 
international, national and local organizations. They also contributed to establishing an effective coordination 
system for emergency response and recovery based on local leadership. In case of the disaster response to the 
typhoon Haiyan, these centers can be identified as an attempt at a new type of collaboration in the Philippines 
between the international organizations and the national and local CSOs, and it encouraged the implementation of 
disaster response and recovery based on a participatory approach.                       
 
Private sector 
The private sector has also been actively involved in disaster response to Typhoon Haiyan. In Ormoc, the local 
business sector played a crucial role to distribute relief items and provide volunteers, and their contributions were 
acknowledged by the Mayor and Municipality. The positive aspects of the involvement of the local business sector 
are that they could respond to the disaster very quickly and distribute relief items that were most needed as they are 
also a part of the community and easily understand the actual needs. If the relief goods are mobilized locally, there 
is no need to wait to receive any assistance from outside. This type of preparation and contribution by the local 
business sector can be a good practice especially in case of a small and medium scale disasters.   
In the Philippines, the initiatives of the private sector in disaster response have been seen from the 1990’s. The 
Corporate Network for Disaster Response (CNDR) is a network of corporations, business associations and 
corporate foundations, whose objective is to help improve disaster management efforts of the business sector before, 
during and after disasters. CNDR has more than 50 members in the corporate sector and many of them contributed 
to the emergency response in the case of Typhoon Haiyan by distributing relief items. The disaster response has 
been their key activity so far, however, the situation is slightly changing gradually from disaster response oriented 
to disaster risk management. According to the Program Officer, CNDR has initiated community-based disaster risk 
management projects and the business continuity management programs as well as capacity development projects 
for the local governments. The CNDR secretariat provides corporate sector members with the necessary technical 
assistance for project planning and implementation. CNDR launched the capacity development program for the 
local government in Cebu in March 2014 with the funding support from the CNDR members. The way of support 
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by the private sectors is also becoming diverse not only for the disaster response.  
11.1.3 Importance of capacity development of local stakeholders 
CSOs, LGUs, and private sectors 
The implementation of the DRRM Act is a key for DRR and disaster risk management in the Philippines. Mainly 
two things need to be considered: a) how to develop the capacity of LGUs as well as other local stakeholders and b) 
how to motivate local stakeholders such as those from the private sector and CSOs to be involved in disaster 
management issues more actively, preferably DRR efforts. This is not an issue only in the Philippines. Other 
disaster prone countries in Asia such as Indonesia have also been facing the same challenges. In this research, the 
initiatives to assist the CSOs and the LGUs have been already identified. ADRRN and other CSOs network from 
the Philippines such as the Eastern Visayas Network initiated a project of capacity development of national and 
local CSOs in DRR. CNDR, which is a network in the corporate sector conducted workshops in Cebu to train the 
LGUs in DRR especially on project planning and implementation of community based programs. More importantly, 
these collaboration and joint activities among various stakeholders need to be systematic and sustainable. However, 
the sustainability can be one of the most challenging factors for the local stakeholders as their resources are often 
limited. Ideally, the assistance from the international community and the national government should be spent for 
these capacity development programs to build the community resilience. Once the LGUs and the CSOs developed 
their capacity in DRR, the knowledge can cascade down to the communities, and the communities themselves are 
equipped by the knowledge and skills to take action by themselves in case of a future disaster.    
 
Communities 
In an interview, one Barangay leader in Tacloban (Fig. 11-1) emphasized the importance of DRR training 
opportunities for Barangay leaders. He attended the training seminar on DRR that targeted the LGU officials and 
the Barangay (village) leaders prior to Typhoon Haiyan. 25 Barangay/municipal leaders were invited to this 
seminar, and 17 Barangay and municipalities sent participants. The training was planned and organized by the 
LGUs and they requested support from the national government for sending the trainers who had the knowledge 
and skills of DRR strategy to the program. The LGUs also mobilized the funding for the training by themselves. 
According to one of the Barangay leaders who participated in the training, due to the knowledge that he gained 
from the workshop, he was able to issue an evacuation order immediately after the warning to the communities as 
he deeply understood what the storm surge was, its risk, and the importance of the evacuation. At the result, there 
were no casualties from the village, although 167 out of 267 houses were damaged. It proved how important 
capacity development is, especially in the leaders as they also have the responsibility for the safety and security of 




Fig. 11-1. Interview with one of the village leaders in Tacloban. 
 
The village also had another DRR initiative by planting mangroves near the coast after Typhoon Haiyan. It was 
their local knowledge that the mangrove plantation could reduce the potential risks caused by a tsunami and storm 
surge. This time, although most of the mangrove was damaged by Typhoon Haiyan (Fig. 11-2), the impact on the 
community was minimum since the mangroves became a buffer against the typhoon. The community members 
replanted the mangrove with the purpose of disaster preparedness after the typhoon, to mitigate damage from a 
future disaster (Fig. 11-3).  
 
 
Fig. 11-2. Damaged mangroves by the typhoon in the Barangay Uban (left)  
Fig. 11-3. The mangroves were replanted by the community members (right) 
 
However, there is a challenge to maintain the capacity of the LGUs and the Barangay leaders in DRR. The 
turnover of the LGU staff is very high and even the Barangay leaders have fixed terms, therefore, the capacity of 
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the LGU staff cannot be stable and sustainable. In order to overcome this particular challenge, regular trainings for 
the LGUs and the Barangay leaders need to be organized systematically with the funding support by the national 
government. CSOs also will be able to provide the technical support to such a program. In order to implement the 
DRRMN Act, the close collaboration and cooperative framework between governments, CSOs, the private sector, 
and communities needs to be established in the Philippines, and further assistance from the international and 
national levels need to be shared with the local stakeholders for their capacity development beyond the response 
stage. 
11.2 Planning recovery and implementation 
The typhoon washed away buildings and the infrastructure of coastal cities with the main damage caused by the 
storm surge, and caused tremendous damage and loss to communities along the shore. In response, the Government 
of the Philippines is undertaking rebuilding with an emphasis on “building back better”. The National Economic 
and Development Authority (NEDA) published an initial recovery vision in “Reconstruction Assistance on 
Yolanda: Build back better (RAY)” on December 16 2014. With RAY in effect, Office of Presidential Assistance on 
Rehabilitation and Reconstruction (PARR) was established and mandated to coordinate the rebuilding from 
Typhoon Haiyan. In this vision, a “no-build-zone” policy was suggested to minimize future vulnerabilities of the 
affected coastal communities. This led to a long and ongoing debate at both national and local levels about how to 
rebuild in high-risk areas. 
11.2.1 Principles for implementing reconstruction: Evolution of national discussions  
11.2.1.1 National rebuilding vision 
Reconstruction principles 
The “Reconstruction Assistance on Yolanda: 
Build back better (RAY)” by the National 
Economic and Development Authority (NEDA) 
has set the stage to implement reconstruction of 
the typhoon affected regions. There are three 
principles in this recovery vision. First, it calls 
for efficient coordination, which combines 
strong central coordination and flexible 
implementation at the local level. At the same 
time, local governments are mandated with the 
responsibility of implementing reconstruction. 
Second, in order to address pre-existing 
poverty issues in the region, inclusiveness and sustainable livelihoods are emphasized in the reconstruction 
processes. Finally, the third principle includes the need to incorporate gender perspectives in reconstruction, as the 
starting point is already different between males and females in reconstruction, and thus, empowerment of women 
Fig. 11-4. Office of PARR 
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in the rebuilding processes is needed for a more equitable society in the future. 
There are two other key aspects in this reconstruction strategy. First is partnership with the private sector. The 
national government is pushing further for a partnership with the private sector upon implementing this RAY, 
beyond emergency relief and response that has already been successfully implemented. As partial evidence for the 
effectiveness of this strategy, some private foundations have already pledged to donate permanent houses for 
relocation sites to be developed by the government. Second is the institutional arrangement for implementing this 
reconstruction strategy, that the Office of the Presidential Assistant for Rehabilitation and Recovery (PARR) is 
designated as the coordinating body for implementing RAY. The PARR was appointed by President Benigno S. 
Aquino III in memorandum order No. 62 of December 6, 2013, to integrate efforts of all governments and agencies 
that are involved in this reconstruction as a manager and a coordinator. Their responsibility includes consultation 
with local governments in formulating recovery plans and programs that are required to submit the President, 
develop funding support for local implementation of the plans and programs, and oversee overall coordination 
between national agencies and departments as well as various non-governmental, private, and any entities engaged 
in rebuilding. The office has been set up since early January of 2014 in Bonifacio City of Taguig City, where 
Secretary Panfilo Lacson has been elected to be the head and rehabilitation czar. The duration of this office is 
confirmed until June 2016, when the six-year term of the current President Aquino III will terminate. In August 
2014, the PARR finalized their initial task to finalize the “Yolanda Comprehensive Rehabilitation and Recovery 
Plan (CRRP)”. In February 2015, the PARR have therefore decided to have their office in NEDA to collaborate 
with them to monitor and manage the programs and activities listed in the plan. Regional PARR offices continue to 
monitor the ongoing reconstruction projects in their respective regions.  
 
Yolanda Comprehensive Rehabilitation and Recovery Plan (CRRP) 
In August 2014, the PARR published the 8,000 page 8 volume, “Yolanda Comprehensive Rehabilitation and 
Recovery Plan (CRRP)”. PARR organized this plan incorporating the recovery plans prepared by the 14 affected 
local governments. The CRRP was then approved for implementation by President Aquino III on October 29. The 
CRRP contains four cluster plans – resettlement, infrastructure, livelihood, and social services – which then include 
detailed projects, programs and activities for realization (Table 11-1). The budget for implementation is calculated 
at P167.86 billion ($3.8 billion2), to be allocated primarily from the national budget. The 14 targeted provinces are: 
Palawan, Masbate, Aklan, Antique, Capiz, Iloilo, Negros Occidental, Cebu, Leyte, Biliran, Eastern Samar, Western 
Samar, Southern Leyte and Dinagat Islands. 
The private sector’s participation is also crucial for implementation, and 1,289 private organizations have 
already pledged to contribute a total of P26.3 Billion (0.59 billion). In February 2015, the PARR considers that their 
role has shifted from plan development to management and monitoring. To this end, an “electronic management 
platform: accountability and transparency hub for Yolanda” is currently under construction to be publicly accessible 
online. 
                                                  
2 1.00 PHP=0.0226040 USD as of February 20th, 2015 and is calculated throughout this section with this rate. 
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Table 11-1. Four cluster plans in the CRRP 
Cluster Plans Goals Budget Leading Agency 
Infrastructure  “To build back better by rehabilitation 
and improving infrastructure to support 
recovery and rehabilitation as well as 
the enhancement of disaster resiliency 
of affected communities” 
P13.14 Billion 
(20.9%) 
Department of Public 
Works and Highways 
(DPWH) 
 
Social Services “To facilitate delivery of basic services 
such as education, health, and social 
protection services to affected 
communities as well as provide healthy 
environment and strengthen capacity to 
cope future hazards and disasters” 
P20.40 Billion 
(15.7%) 




Resettlement “To relocate affected families living in 
hazard prone areas to safe areas and to 






Livelihood “To achieve inclusive, sustainable 




Department of Trade & 
Industry (DTI) 
Source: Developed from the Yolanda Comprehensive Rehabilitation and Recovery Plan (2014) 
 
11.2.1.2 Regulating the use of coastal land 
In December 2013, NEDA published a document titled “Reconstruction Assistance on Yolanda: Build Back Better 
(RAY) 1”, which includes an overview of the typhoon disaster, economic loss, and rebuilding plan that guides basic 
rebuilding procedure. The section on planning for recovery and reconstruction states: “(iii) streamline operational 
enforcement of ‘no build zones’” 1. Although the reasons for adopting this concept in RAY is not explained in the 
document, the idea to strictly control the use of land between the coastline and 40 meters inland to prohibit any 
development was discussed immediately after the typhoon. This concept has its root in PD 1067 (Presidential 
Decree 1067: The Water Code of the Philippines) that governs “the ownership, appropriation, utilization, 
exploitation, development, conservation and protection of water resources” enacted in 1976 2. 
Article 51 of this Decree states: 
The banks or rivers and streams and the shores of the seas and lakes throughout their entire 
length and within a zone of three (3) meters in urban areas, twenty (20) meters in agricultural 
areas and forty (40) meters in forest areas, along their margins, are subject to the easement of 
public use in the interest of recreation, navigation, float age, fishing and salvage. No person 
shall be allowed to stay in this zone longer than what is necessary for recreation, navigation, 
floatage, fishing or salvage or to build structures of any kind. 
In practice however, this regulation was not fully implemented prior to the typhoon for two reasons. First, the 
zone was not based on clear guidance on ways to interpret coastal lines – whether the zone should be defined as an 
easement from the high or low tide marks. Second, there were many informal settlements along the coast that had 
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ignored this decree. With many informal settlements occupying the land along the coast3, local governments could 
not force existing settlements to move out of the easement zone. Because of these reasons, after the disaster the 
national government had a strong intention to enforce land use control of the affected coastal areas through 
rebuilding, by adopting a maximum setback width of the easement cited in Article 51, so that future loss and 
damage from the typhoon will be minimized (See messages in Fig.11-5 describing different types of no build zone 
prepared by the local governments). 
 
 
Fig. 11-5. Different messages in the “no build zone” 
 
After the idea of a 40-meter setback was released, various responses were raised; including objections that 
enforcing this land use policy will disrupt economic activities of coastal communities. For these reasons, the 
national government is currently facing a need to develop a policy based on scientific reasoning that will help lead 
the affected local governments and citizens in understanding and following the setback in rebuilding. The 
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) and the Department of Science and Technology 
(DOST) at the national level have been mandated to lead this assessment, by distinguishing between “safe” and 
                                                  
3 As an example, the landownership of our field visit Barangay Uban is composed 60 percent informal and 40 percent 
formal. Similarly, some Barangays in Tacloban City also have majority of residents who are informal settlers.  
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“unsafe” zones with a modeling exercise that considers inundation and landslide occurrence. In addition, climate 
change aspects are being included, as there are ongoing efforts by the Climate Change Commission to mainstream 
risk reduction related to climate change. 
   As debates proceeded in the first four months after the typhoon, the tone on land use has softened from “no 
building” to “no dwelling”. Although the national government initially sought to have no construction of any 
structure in the 40-meter zone, they have shifted their thoughts to only prohibit residential use in the designated 
zone, as this will be a more practical solution for minimizing future risk. It is important to realize that there has not 
yet been any revision regarding the land use of coastal zones after the typhoon, and the legal/regulatory basis for 
the coastal land use still relies on PD 1067 of 1976. On March 14 2014, the PARR stated that the “No Build Zone” 
policy in the affected area is not supported 3. In November 2014, a joint memorandum by the DENR, Dept. of the 
Interior and Local Government (DILG), Dept. of National Defense (DND), DPWH and DOST with the subject 
“Adoption of hazard zone classification in areas affected by typhoon Yolanda (Haiyan) and providing the 
guidelines for activities therein” was circulated among the local governments of the affected areas to serve as a 
basis for rebuilding with disaster reduction principles. As of February 2015, interpretation of no-build zones 
depends on the LGUs.  
11.2.2 Housing recovery process and situation  
11.2.2.1 Plan for permanent settlement of the disaster affected population 
Government support for permanent housing reconstruction in Tacloban City focuses exclusively on the construction 
of houses in resettlement areas, giving priority to residents of “no-building-zone” and informal settlements in 
coastal areas heavily damaged by Haiyan. The prioritization for residents from the most heavily damaged areas 
continues throughout the different phases in the process of housing recovery and settlement. The priority for 
residents is in order of vulnerability--the first priority if those residents with heavily damaged housing and informal 
settlements, then renters, and finally, land owners. 
Building damage was so severe that totally damaged buildings exceeded 29,000 and partially damaged 
buildings accounted for more than 18,000. Among the totally damaged houses, about 14,400 houses were built in 
prospective no-building zones. According the information office of Tacloban City, 2,142 families were still living in 
evacuation centers as of mid-March, 2014.  
Initial plans for rebuilding in early 2014 focused on the relocation of residents from informal settlements and 
those whose houses were damaged in the typhoon, and included the construction of 20,000 new permanent housing 
units in the northern part of Tacloban City, in the area of Eastern Visayas Regional Grown Center, (EVGRC), 
whose development was already part of the City’s master plan before Haiyan (Figure 11-6). This rationale behind 
the target of 20,000 new housing units is based on the number of informal settlement housing units in different 
locations throughout Tacloban City. According to City Housing and Community Development Office, the total 
number of housing units in informal settlements was 30,513 pre-Haiyan (see Table 11-2). The 20,000 total 
households targeted for relocation as of March 2014 was based on a detailed breakdown of 14,433 units identified 
as being in the prospective no building zone and about 5,500 units built in zones identified as dangerous and in 




Fig. 11-6. Map of Tacloban City, showing locations of downtown, relocation targets (heavily affected coastal areas 
and all of Barangay 88) and relocation site area in the north. Date from modified OSM map. 
 




No dwelling zone (along coastal zone)* 14,433
Subdivision 16,080 
Danger zone/ River basin* 5,567 




Nevertheless, in March 2014, the City’s short- and mid-term plan was to construct 10,000 rather than 20,000 
units. The reason for this is because the land that the City owned could only accommodates this number of units; as 
of March 2014, the City had 92 hectares in total4 for developing of which 85 hectares are prepared by the City and 
7 hectares were donated by the Archdiocese of Palo. As for the construction schedule from March 2014, the city 
was planning to develop 4,000 permanent housing units in 2014, and an additional 4,000 units in 2015, continuing 
until the number reaches 10,000.  
 
11.2.2.2. System of transitional phases toward permanent settlement 
In Tacloban City, the governmental scheme for housing recovery has three phases: emergency sheltering; temporary 
housing; and permanent housing provided in a resettlement area. Various efforts organized by NGOs and the private 
sector also contribute to housing support during these phases. During the first phase, emergency sheltering, typhoon 
affected populations are seeking to evacuate and temporary stay in a place away from home. Four months after the 
typhoon, in March 2014, most of the typhoon-affected population was still in this phase, with many staying in 
evacuation centers including schools and the Astrodome (a municipal sports facility), or in individual tents or in a 
larger tent city (such as those prepared in Barangay 88 near the airport). According to interviews with local city 
officials, everyone moved out of tents by November 2014, the 1-year anniversary of the typhoon. 
The second phase is the “temporary housing” phase, where aspects of livelihoods are being reestablished, 
although the housing structures and/or their locations are not considered permanent. In Tacloban, various types of 
temporary housing structures and support were provided by different sources: bunkhouses (see Box 11-1) provided 
by the national government; transitional housing provided by NGOS; cash and/or lightweight building materials 
provided by NGOs for residents to use to build makeshift shelters; and rental assistance provided by NGOs to be 
used instead of temporary housing. The bunkhouses (wooden barracks structure) were provided by the DPWH 
through DSWD of the national government. As of November 2014, there were 1,053 families living in three 
bunkhouse sites in the city center: IPI site in Maharlika (537 families), NHA site in Caiibann (316 families) and 
Abucay site (200 families). All are located in the central part of the City. As of our field visit in February 2015, 
(Figure 11-7) several hundred families had started to move out from bunkhouses in the IPI (also called Motocross) 
                                                  
4 This includes 10 hectares of land that has already been developed with NHA’s resettlement program 
 
Figure 11-7. Bunkhouses in use as temporary housing in Feb. 2015, in Abucay (left) and IPI site (right) 
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site into the first of the permanent  
housing (built by Global Media Alliance –GMA, a private sector initiative) in the New Cabalawan resettlement area 
in the north part of Tacloban City. In this case, residents had moved out of the IPI site, and no other residents 
moved into the vacated bunkhouses. In fact, since the private owner of this land (the IPI site) wanted to have it back, 
the goal was that it would be vacated by March 31, 2015, and the City was giving the priority to the remaining 
families to be transferred to permanent housing by that date.  
 
BOX 11-1. Bunkhouses in use 4 months after Haiyan 
By the end of 2013, the National Government had begun preparing temporary housing (locally called 
bunkhouses) in the Haiyan affected cities, and least-privileged of the affected population were beginning to move 
in. Cities were responsible for preparing land for this temporary use to place these bunkhouses. The Department 
of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) is responsible for constructing the bunkhouses, which are then turned 
over to the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) for distribution to beneficiaries. In total, 
DPWH had allocated 142 bunkhouse units* in December 2013, which were planned to accommodate some 3,336 
families affected by the typhoon. Targeted regions for the provision include: Tacloban City; Palo, Leyte; Ormoc 
City; Basey, Samar; and Eastern Samar 4. By mid-February 2014, approximately 1,500 people had already 
moved into 60 bunkhouses prepared in the Eastern Visayas, in: Tacloban City (222 families); Palo, Leyte (429 
families); Ormoc City (429 families); Basey and Samar (222 families); and Eastern Samar (673 families) 5.  
During the first few months after the typhoon, the proposed strategies for the role of bunkhouses in the 
resettlement phases differed between Tacloban City and Ormoc City. Tacloban City had positioned the 
bunkhouses to function more as short-term shelters, aiming to house the vulnerable population – those having 
disabilities and financially disadvantaged – for about 6 months prior to their next settlement. On the other hand, 
Ormoc City was using the bunkhouses as a temporary housing for people to live for a fixed duration before 
moving into permanent homes. Thus, they prefer calling them “transitional shelter (houses)” rather than 
bunkhouses. During field reconnaissance in March 2014 other types of temporary houses were also being 
prepared by donors, including international and domestic NGOs as well as the private sector.  
  
Box 11-1 Fig. 1. Bunkhouses in Tacloban City (left) and Ormoc City (Right) in March 2014. 
*Each bunkhouse was initially designed to comprise approximately 24 units of dwellings, later modified to 12 units due to 
small size of each unit. Initially, a family with 3 to 4 members were planned to occupy 1 unit, where a unit has an area of 
8.64 square meters. 
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Another main type of temporary housing used in Tacloban City is transitional shelters, constructed with the 
support of NGOs. With the exception of one site in Utap are of central Tacloban City, these transitional shelters are 
located in the northern part of Tacloban City, near or adjacent to the same areas planned for resettlement sites, with 
the idea that residents will be able to transfer from the transitional housing to nearby permanent housing without 
traveling a long distance or being displaced again. Transitional shelters are designed and constructed by various 
NGOs, and built to be used for several years, either on private property provided for free by the owner for two 
years for this purpose or on land already owned by Tacloban City, the Local Governmental Unit (LGU). 
Transitional shelters are also sometimes referred to as Bahay Kubo, or Nipa huts, a vernacular typology of a simple 
elevated house built from natural plant materials, since the transitional shelters are also elevated and built using 
economical plant materials such as coco lumber and bamboo. Transitional shelters are currently being provided 
with support from various donors and NGOs (See Fig.11-8 and 11-9 for examples of transitional shelters) as shown 
in Table 11-3. According to data from the City Housing and Community Development Office, there were 436 
transitional shelters completed Nov. 2014, with plans to construct additional 1,095 units. As of Feb 2015, there 
were more than 500 families living in transitional shelters, and construction of additional units was still ongoing.  
  
Fig. 11-8. Transitional Shelters in New Kawayan, in the north part of Tacloban City, March 2014 
  








Table 11-3. Temporary Housing Settlements in North Tacloban City (already built, or under construction) 
Site Name Beneficiaries  Land ownership House Building  
New Kawayan (Site 1+2) 76 families Private 
Operation 
Compassion 
New Kawayan (Duplex) 100 families LGU Tacloban City  
New Kawayan 49 families LGU 
Operation 
Compassion- GAIN 
Sto. Niño 60 families Private Operation Blessing 
Tagpuro 86 families Private 
Operation Blessing- 
IOM/DSWD 
Badato 65 families  LGU 
Operation 
Compassion- PDRF 
Total 436 families  
Data Source: City Housing and Community Development Office data as of November 7, 2014 
 
In addition to transitional shelters, some NGOs are providing other forms of support during the temporary 
housing phase, including lightweight building materials (a "shelter kit") that residents can use to construct a 
temporary shelter for themselves. Many residents who are still living temporarily in their former barangays--and 
those whose houses are/were in the no-build zone--were recipients of this support, and others rebuilt their own 
makeshift shelters using materials they salvaged. Some NGOs required that residents have land, or permission to 
use land, outside the no-build zone in order to receive the shelter kits. Rental subsidies are another form of housing 
support provided by NGOs, specifically Catholic Relief Services (CRS), who are providing money for residents to 
rent private apartments for up to 2 years, which also requires proof of ownership from the owner and an agreement 
to lease the unit to the affected residents. 
The third and final phase of housing recovery is permanent housing, when the typhoon-affected population is 
settling into permanent houses. The construction of permanent housing is occurring through several types of 
combinations of support for the provision of land, land preparation, and housing construction. Some of the land 
used for the development of resettlement sites was already owned by Tacloban City, planned for future 
development, and some land was already owned by the National Housing Authority, planned for residential 
relocation (pre-Haiyan) projects. Almost all site development in the resettlement sites is done by contractors hired 
by NHA. For the construction of the houses, some are built by NGOs (Tables 11-4, 11-5, 11-6) or with private 
donations, such as the first houses to be finished in the resettlement area built by the Kapusa foundation, supported 
by Global Media Arts Network (GMA Network) (Fig. 11-10 and 11-11). The majority of houses will be built by the 
National Housing Authority, who use a standard row house design of 4 meters x 5.5 meters, with a total floor areas 
of 22.5 m.2  For houses built by other agencies or organizations, building designs must be approved by NHA. The 









Table 11-4. Donor Pledges as of March 2014 for houses and community facilities for permanent relocation sites. 
Partner/Donor Pledge Area/Location 
Philippines Red Cross 5,000 units New Kawayan 
GMA Foundation 400 units Sto. Nino 
Habitat for Humanity 852 units Sto. Nino 
SOS Children's Village Tacloban, Inc. 254 units Palanogl 2 
Zonta 20 units Tacloban North 
Kimse Yokmu 30 units Tacloban North 
DSWD 134 units undecided 
Habitat 2,500 units undecided 
Lions Club International 50 units undecided 
Philippines Institute of Civil Engineers 50 units undecided 
Unknown 871 units unknown 
Total 10,161 units   
Source: Tacloban City Information Office (March 2014) 
 
Table 11-5. Ongoing Permanent Housing Projects in Tacloban City as of Nov. 2014 (on City property) 
Partner/Donor Pledge Area/Location 
GMA Foundation 400 units Sto. Nino, Brgy 106 
Habitat for Humanity 177 units New Kawayan, Brgy 101 
Lions Club International 200 units Sto. Nino, Brgy 106 
Philippines Institute of Civil Engineers 50 units New Kawayan, Brgy 101 
Total 827 units   
Source: Tacloban City Housing and Community Development Office 
 
Table 11-6. Future Permanent Housing Projects in Tacloban City as of Nov. 2014 (on City property) 
Partner/Donor Pledge Area/Location 
Habitat for Humanity 399 units 
New Kawayan, Brgy 101, and 
Sto. Nino, Brgy 106 
UNDP 55 units San Isidro, Brgy 105 
NHA 500 units New Kawayan, Brgy 101 
Total 954 units  
Source: Tacloban City Housing and Community Development Office  
 
In addition to the 1,781 houses (Tables 11-5 and 11-6) that have been built or are planned for land owned by 
Tacloban City, construction has also started on some of the 11,211 houses planned to be provided by the National 
Housing Authority on 106 ha in multiples sites, and the construction of 480 houses is also planned for land 
purchased by NGOs. As of February 2015, around 200 permanent houses have been completed, with the vast 
majority having been built by GMA, and approximately 100 families have moved into permanent housing in the 




Fig. 11-10. Land development in March 2014 for the construction of permanent housing in the North Tacloban 
resettlement site.  
 
Fig. 11-11. New Permanent housing built by Kapusa Foundation (support from GMA) in North Tacloban. 
 
Fig. 11-12. In the same North Tacloban resettlement site there are also houses built by Habitat for Humanity  
 
Fig. 11-13. Ridge View Park, one of the many resettlement sites with housing built by NHA. 
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11.2.3 Land use update and implementation status  
11.2.3.1 Plans and ordinances related to rebuilding and development 
Rebuilding Tacloban city more resiliently has been the one of the main points emphasized by the City after 
Typhoon Haiyan. Towards this aim, several plans/ordinances have been developed/adopted or are currently being 
prepared to meet this purpose. Three key ordinance and plans include: i) no-build zone ordinance, ii) Tacloban 
Recovery and Rehabilitation Plan, and iii) Tacloban City Comprehensive Land Use Plan. 
 An Ordinance Providing for a 40-Meter No-Build-Zone for Residential Housing within the Territorial 
Jurisdiction of the City of Tacloban (Ordinance No. 2013-12-15A) was adopted on March 12, 2014. The 
ordinance is called “No build zone” Ordinance of the City of Tacloban, and aims to “prevent repetition of large 
number of casualties that occurred after Super Typhoon Yolanda brought massive storm surges that flattened 
seaside communities (Tacloban City, 2014).” Practically, this ordinance prohibits the location of the residential 
buildings within 40 meters from the shoreline. 
 The Tacloban Recovery and Rehabilitation Plan (TRRP) was published on May 22, 2014 in partnership 
with UN Habitat. The recovery plan emphasizes five areas in rebuilding, including: i) shelter for affected 
families, ii) social services to improve residents' quality of life, iii) economic revitalization to support the 
affected population, iv) physical infrastructure to repair and rehabilitate damages, and v) and environmental 
protection of the coastal area. This plan also envisions strategic land use, which targets the northern part of 
Tacloban City as a new development area and the central part of the City, particularly the coastal areas 
devastated by the typhoon including the airport area, for industrial and environmental use. The cost proposed 
for the implementation of this recovery plan is P 25.6 billion (US 0.57 billion). The TRRP aligns with the RAY 
objectives and goals that are provided by the national PARR. 
 Tacloban City Comprehensive Land Use Plan (CLUP) 2013-2022 was adopted just before the typhoon. The 
plan is prepared in three (3) volumes, including the land use plan of the city, zoning ordinance, and 
development plans of four emphasized sectors (social, economic, infrastructure and utility, and institutional 
capacity) as the tool for a long-term development. The CLUP is currently under review to incorporate hazard 
consideration for the purpose of mainstreaming disaster risk reduction, and is led by the city in collaboration 
with UN Habitat and other key relevant organizations. The idea of mainstreaming hazard planning is reflected 
in a memorandum circular jointly published by the national departments of environment and natural resources 
(DENR), public works and highways (DPWH), interior and local government (DILG), and science and 
technology (DOST), in November 2014. It provides a general guideline for hazard zone classification, 
classification criteria and recommended activities in different zones.  
 
On the ground, the City government replaced the temporary “No building zone” signage to the permanent 
ones that state "no build zone" (Fig. 11-14). With this construction, residents are aware of whether or not their 
homes are in the designated zone. Some buildings are stranding on the line which defines the 40 m zone; these are 





Fig. 11-14. 40m No build zone marker in Barangay 56-A 
 
 
BOX 11-2. City’s different interpretation in incorporating future risks  
In March 2014, both cities of Tacloban and Ormoc were adopting assistance and programs prepared by the 
national departments and agencies as well as private sector as much as possible, aligning to the strategies stated 
in “Reconstruction Assistance on Yolanda (RAY)” for better outcomes. One of the key findings here was that 
there exists a significant difference between how each local government –Tacloban City and Ormoc City – are 
taking into consideration future risks in rebuilding; Tacloban City was seriously considering the 40 meter 
setback of the “no build zone” although it is not yet been decided legally, while Ormoc City is not emphasizing 
the incorporation of this zone in rebuilding, except for in regards to existing informal settlements along the 
riverbanks. The reasons for this clearly emerged from their different experiences; Tacloban City faced 
tremendous loss and damage caused by the storm surge, while Ormoc City’s loss and damage were mainly from 
the strong wind** in this typhoon. In addition, Ormoc has an experience of flash flood disaster back in 1991, 
which caused approximately 5,000 deaths and 3,000 missing, making flooding along the river a higher concern 
than storm surge. On a different note, although always challenging under compressed time in recovery, both 
city governments are investing efforts to reduce the stress of the affected population in transition. Some efforts 
include: putting the temporary housing sites and the permanent housing site adjacent to each other so that a big 
move will be unnecessary; and providing additional care about space and details about utilities when setting up 
the temporary housing. 
**Damage caused by typhoon Haiyan in Ormoc City was also devastating. Number of death was 38, population 
displaced reached 97 percent of the total households (total households: 43,729), and 96 percent (or 42,303) houses 





11.2.3.2 Local status: Interviews with coastal Barangay residents  
Although key planning documents and ordinances were developed in the first year after the typhoon, the actual 
status of Tacloban City 15 months after Haiyan, particular the situation for those residents targeted for resettlement, 
is understudied. A focus group interview of coastal barangay leaders, and a set of interviews to the coastal barangay 
residents were carried out to understand the current status of rebuilding and resettlement. The questions addressed 




Six coastal Barangays in the central part of the city were selected for interviews. These include: Barangays 68, 31, 
54, 56-A, 61 and 88 (Fig. 11-15). 
 
Methods 
Door to door interviews of 12 samples in each of the six barangays were conducted, totaling 72 responses. Targeted 
interviewees included households living in or near the “No build zone”, a zone of 40-meter setback from the shore. 
Respondents included both those who are in and outside the no-build zone. The 40-meter zone is identifiable with 
the permanent makers installed by the Tacloban City following the no build zone ordinance. To the extent possible, 
interviews targeted household heads while balancing a mix of Barangay residents including men, women, young 






Fig.11-15. Map showing Barangays interviewed. Note: Some barangay boundaries differ from boundaries shown in 
this map, particularly 54 and 56-A.  
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Table 11-7. Current situation of the targeted Barangays 
Brgy. 
No. 
Current status of the coastal households Buildings in the No-Build 
Zone 
68 Majority of the former residents returned to their original land in a 
month or two and are informally sited with light/temporary 
housing materials. Among these, 40% are in the no build zone. 
- Total households (current): 507 
- Households back in barangay: N/A 
- Households in temporary housing: 27 in bunkhouses 
- Households in no build zone: 200+  
 
31 Households are informally sited with light/temporary housing 
materials. Approximately 60% of the barangay members are 
currently in temporary shelters (bunkhouse). 
- Total households (current): 147 
- Households back in barangay: 61 
- Households in temporary housing: 86 in bunkhouses 
- Households in no build zone: 54 
 
54 The majority of the informally settled former residents returned to 
the original land after a month to three months. Current buildings 
are built with light materials.  
- Total households (current): N.A. 
- Households back in barangay: N.A. 
- Households in temporary housing: N.A. 
- Households in no build zone: N.A. 
 
56-A Almost all barangay members are informally settled back in houses 
build with light materials. They returned within a week. Some 
members are in temporary housing (using CRS apartment system).
- Total households (current): 178 
- Households back in barangay: 165 
- Households in temporary housing: Some in CRS apartments 
- Households in no build zone: 164 
 
61 Approximately 32% of the members are in temporary housing. 
Among those who returned, about 75% are in the no-build zone. 
- Total households (current): 397 
- Households back in barangay: 270 
- Households in temporary housing: 127 
- Households in no build zone: 200  
 
88 Approximately 34% of the members are in temporary housing or in  
permanent resettlement houses. Among those currently in the 
Barangay, about 40% of them are in the “danger” area. 
- Total households (current): 2,300 
- Households back in barangay: 1,520 
- Households in temporary housing: 580 
- Households in new permanent settlement: 200 







Current Barangay situations 
All targeted barangays are currently revising their profiles (a demographic and building summary that each 
barangay prepares) as of March 2014. Barangays' statuses as described in the interviews are summarized in Table 
11-7. Many barangay residents were not equipped to answer all the questions. The interviews also clarified that 
there are several different interpretations of post-Haiyan land use at the Barangay level. These include: No building 
zone, dwelling zone and no-dwelling zone, and danger area.  
 
Initial findings 
The interviews confirmed that the majority of residents currently residing in the original barangay are waiting for 
permanent housing to be provided by the government. Many are still hopeful about the provision of the permanent 
housing units. Coastal residents are aware of their informal residence status, and also about the no-build zone 
policy to be implemented. The following five key points suggest that the heavily-hit Tacloban coastal communities 
are willing to relocate and rebuild in a way in which there will be less future typhoon damage. 
 
 The majority of the residents in the no-build-zone are informal settlers. They are aware of their informal 
settlement status. At the same time, the majority of them are aware of the no-build zone policy, after learning 
about it from local government officials, barangay leaders, and signage that was posted after Haiyan. They are 
also aware of their eligibility for relocation to the north part of Tacloban City. Most of the eligible residents at 
this time are seeking to relocate if the government provides them the housing as promised. 
 Almost all residents who needed to returned to their original neighborhoods and lots in similar configurations 
as to their situation before Haiyan. The majority of the respondents did not have anywhere else to go besides 
returning to the original community. No shuffles of neighborhood members were observed pre- and post- 
Haiyan. 
 Evacuation and resettlement patterns vary by barangay. Earlier return to barangays begun within a week after 
the typhoon, and the longest took about a year. The majority of the returnees came back within three months. In 
addition, there are residents in some barangays who never returned, and are currently in temporary housing or 
permanent housing. 
 Within the barangays investigated, Barangay 31, 61, and 88 have a significant amount of residents participating 
in the resettlement scheme as of February 2015. These populations are in temporary housing, mainly in the 
bunkhouses provided at an earlier timing by the national DPWH and DWSD, and located in the city center. 
Some residents are in transitional shelters that were provided later. Some of the residents from Barangay 88 
have begun to move into permanent housing in the resettlement area in the north of Tacloban.  
 The majority of the residents are willing to relocate only if the government provides their permanent residences, 
and they are uncertain of their ability to pay the small monthly fee that will be required in the future for the 
majority of permanent housing (from NHA).  On the other hand, going through temporary housing solutions – 
as in the case of planned resettlement scheme by the city government – was not attractive to them, because it 




Field reconnaissance in March 2014 and February 2015 highlighted the seriousness for the disaster-affected areas 
to rebuild in a more resilient way. Although the national government became less persistent with the control of 
hazardous areas, Tacloban City for example, continued with their “no-build-zone” policy. At an initial stage of 
rebuilding, the City officials were themselves questioning the provision of permanent houses to those who are in 
need. The land available to the City government and the number of permanent units needed seemed way too large 
for their capacity. Nevertheless, the City has found better approaches and some solutions to these issues within a 
year. Support from and involvement of the national government, private sectors, and non-governmental 
organizations inside and outside the Philippines enabled Tacloban City to secure almost all land areas and housing 
units that are currently counted. Barangay members are also aware of the government efforts, and are still hope to 
benefit from this program. Many members are even willing to change their means of living, if that supports their 
long-term survival in new relocation area. To this end, some NGOs have begun conducting livelihood training 
programs for the relocating residents, some of whom used to be fishermen, pedicab drivers, or were jobless. As 
recovery continues, it is an ultimate hope that information on City rebuilding continues to be shared and the trust 
between the local government and barangay members continues to be nurtured toward the rebuilding of a stronger 
and more hazard resilient city. 
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12. Geological traces of the 2013 Typhoon Haiyan in the Southeast coast of Leyte Island 
 
12.1 Backgrounds and Aims 
Geological surveys are one of the key activities to study historical and prehistoric events prior to 2013, or to 
estimate the recurrence interval and the local size of the super typhoon. As shown in Fig. 12-1, a record of the 
previous super typhoon in 1897 can be found in the Catholic Church in Tanauan in Leyte Island mentioning that the 
church had “Withstood hurricane and tidal wave of 1897”. Soria et al. (2014) reported that the maximum heights of 
the storm surge by the 1897 event observed in Tacloban and Tanauan were approximately 4 m and 5 m respectively. 
Therefore, the objective of our geological survey was to investigate the possibility of sand deposits transported by 
the 1897 or older events and to clarify characteristics of the 2013 storm deposit. 
  
Fig. 12-1. Catholic Church in Tanauan and the record on the great typhoon in 1897. 
 
12.2 Guideline of the geological survey 
The survey was conducted during 8-11 May 2014, six months 
after the typhoon in order to 1) avoid the disturbance of activities 
related to the rescue and damage surveys and 2) collect high 
quality samples before the arrival of the next typhoon season as 
the precipitation amount increases yearly from June. We chose 
Tanauan and Tolosa in the Southeast coast of Leyte Island 
because there are non-populated plain areas which are suitable 
for the geological survey, rather than larger cities such as 
Tacloban and Palo. Locations of our transects are shown in Fig. 
12-2. However, from interviews with local residents and 
governmental officials, we learned that serious sandy beach 
erosion is occurring in the east coast of Leyte Island that might 
not allow us to find the sand deposit of the previous event which 
occurred in 1897. We observed the deposit at 27 sites along the 
Tanauan transect (Fig. 12-3) and 19 sites along the Tolosa 
transect (Fig. 12-4), respectively. Sandy beach and dune 
distributes near shore along 2 transects are shown in Fig. 12-5. As Fig.12-2. Tanauan and Tolosa transects. 
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expected, we could not find any sand deposits from the storm surge in 1897. We also surveyed the flow depth 
(height from the ground) and inundation limit on the basis of interviews with local people and field observations of 
watermarks. Along the Tanauan transect, the flow depth near the shoreline (330 m inland) was 3.6 m and the 
maximum inundation distance was 3.1 km. Along Tolosa transect, flow depth near the shoreline (120 m inland) was 
3.8 m (Fig. 12-6) and the inundation distance was 1.4 km. 
 
  
Fig. 12-3. Survey sites (circle) and flow depth (m) (cross) along the Tanauan transect. 
 Elevation data is 1 m mesh digital elevation data after the typhoon provide by JICA (2014). 






12.3 Results  
 
12.3.1 Tanauan transect 
The inundation extent was 3.1 km along this transect. The flow height was 
generally stable at 3.2 to 4.9 m from the shoreline to the inundation limit 
(Fig. 12-7). On the other hand, the flow depth decreased landward from 
3.6 m to 0 m. The thickness of storm sand (Fig. 12-8) ranged from 0.1 to 
80 cm and generally decreased inland (Fig. 12-9). Maximum extents of 
sand layer (more than 0.5 cm thick) and patchy sand (1 mm thick) were 
0.15 km and 0.18 km from the shoreline, respectively. Between 0.18 km 
and 3.1 km from the shoreline, no sand deposition was observed.  
 
  
Fig. 12-7. Elevation (m), flow height (m), and flow depth (m) along Tanauan transect. 
Fig. 12-8. 10 cm thick sand layer at 
50 m from the shoreline along 
Fig. 12-5. Sandy beach and dune near the 
shore along the Tanauan transect. 
Fig. 12-6. 3.8 m depth of inundation measured 
at 120 m inland along the Tolosa transect. 
















12.3.2 Tolosa transect 
The inundation distance was 1.4 km along this transect. The flow height 
decreased inland from 4.7 to 2.4 m (Fig. 12-10). The flow depth was 
decreased landward from 3.8 m to 0 m. The thickness of storm sand such as 
Fig. 12-11 ranged from 0.1 to 10 cm and generally decreased inland (Fig. 
12-12). Maximum extents of sand layer and patchy sand were 0.13 km and 
0.15 km from the shoreline, respectively. Between 0.15 km and 1.4 km from 





Fig. 12-10. Elevation (m), flow height (m), and flow depth (m) along Tolosa 
Fig. 12-11. 4 cm thick sand layer at 100 
m from the shoreline along Tolosa 
















12.4 Discussions and Conclusions 
 
Along the Tanauan and Tolosa transects, the sand thicknesses of the 2013 storm deposit varied ranging from 
0.1 cm to 80 cm becoming thinner inland. Inundation distances of the storm event ranged from 1.4 km to 3.1 
km, while maximum inland extents of the sand layer varied from 0.13 to 0.18 km (7-8% of inundation extents). 
This distribution trend is significantly different from that of tsunamis. For example, the 2011 Tohoku-oki 
tsunami inundated 0.6-4.0 km inland at Sendai Plain and the maximum inland extent of the sand layer 
distributed up to 0.6 to 3.0 km (57-76% of inundation distances, Abe et al., 2012).  
Wave period and flow speed relate to the ability to transport sediments for a long distance and duration. In fact, 
short wave periods (around 10 seconds) and low flow speeds (less than 1.0 m/s) were estimated along the 
Southeast coast of the Leyte Island during the 2013 storm wave event (Bricker et al., 2014). Based on these 
observations, we infer that the 2013 storm surge and waves, unlike tsunami waves, did not have sufficient 
energy to transport sediments over a long distance. Therefore, the maximum inland extent of sand layer as a 
proportion of inundation extent may be key evidence to differentiate deposits formed by tsunami and storm 
waves.  
In this survey, we could not find deposits by the 1897 event or older events. This is because severe coastal 
erosion has occurred in the survey area, and hence possible deposits of previous storm events may have 
disappeared due to the erosion. Future research is required at a location where coastal landform is stable in 
order to find the paleo-storm deposits.  
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Typhoon Haiyan, known in the Philippines as Typhoon Yolanda, struck in 2013, causing a considerable amount of 
damage. Based on the fact, reduction and avoidance of potential losses from disasters have received much attention. 
Disaster education for children is a main disaster-prevention topic in the education 
(http://www.mext.go.jp/component/a_menu/education/detail/__icsFiles/afieldfile/2013/05/15/1334780_04.pdf). 
Disaster education is defined simply as disaster risk reduction education (Shaw et al., 2011). Petal (2008) argued 
that the mission of disaster-risk reduction education, both for children and for adults in all walks of life should 
serve to (1) convey an understanding of natural and environmental conditions and human actions and inactions that 
engender disasters, to stimulate changes in individual and group behavior, and (2) to motivate advocacy and raise 
expectations of social policy to reduce these threats. Moreover, disaster education should not merely teach ‘‘natural 
hazards’’ or organize ‘‘campaigns for risk awareness,’’ but should guide people to a discovery of their own 
solutions and their own capabilities. 
The Hyogo Framework for Action 2005–2015 (HFA) (http://www.unisdr.org/we/coordinate/hfa) is a 10-year 
plan to make the world safer from natural hazards. HFA has five priorities for action to reduce disaster losses. The 
ultimate goal of HFA is to reduce loss of life and social, economic, and environmental assets substantially when a 
disaster strikes. Especially, the priority for action 3 of HFA emphasizes the roles of ‘‘Knowledge and Education’’ 
and highlights formal and non-formal education and awareness-raising as important aspects of disaster risk 
reduction. Following the adoption of HFA, various educational materials were developed in the form of booklets, 
handbooks, textbooks, posters, activities, games, and practices. 
Based on these facts, our teams conducted disaster education for children in the Philippines. In this project, we 
specifically assessed group activities, Quizzes and disaster drills as educational tools because games might enhance 
learner motivation and because previous studies showed the beneficial effects of games on education (Shaw et al., 
2004; Shiwaku et al., 2007). In the disaster education field, previous studies also underscored the beneficial effects 
of a combination game of a board game and quizzes related to disasters (Disaster Awareness Game) on disaster 
education (Shaw & Takeuchi, 2009). This report describes the preliminary results of our disaster education in the 
Philippines. 
 
13.1 Locations of school and schedules 
 
 




Table 13-1. Schedule of disaster education 
Date and time: 27 August 2014, 10:00–12:00 
School: San Joaquin Central School in Palo II District 
Address: Barangay San Joaquin, Palo Municipality, the Philippines 
Date and time: 27 August 2014, 14:00–16:00 
School: Bislig Elementary School 
Address: Barangay Bislig, Tanauan Municipality, the Philippines 
Date and time: 28 August 2014, 09:30–11:30 
School:  Bacagay Elementary School 
Address: Barangay Bacagay, Tacloban city, the Philippines 
Date and time: 29 August 2014, 10:00–12:00 
School: Cabuynan Elementary School 





We conducted disaster education workshops at four elementary schools (Table 13-1 and Fig. 13-1). About 200 
students participated in the disaster education. Details of disaster education programs were presented in Table 13-2 
(see Fig. 13-2). Because of locations and time, we prepared two disaster education programs. For San Joaquin 
Central School in Palo II District and Bacagay Elementary School, disaster education program included 1) a lecture, 
2) group work using a Hazard map, 3) Group work using a Gensai Pocket Yui, and 4) quizzes of knowledge and 
behaviors related to disasters. For Bislig Elementary School and Cabuynan Elementary School, the disaster 
education program included 1) a lecture, 2) group work using a Hazard map, 3) Group work using a Gensai Pocket 
Yui, and 4) quizzes about knowledge and behaviors related to disasters. Before and after disaster education 
programs, students answered some questionnaires such as attitudes related to disasters and the usefulness of 
disaster education. 
 
Table 13-2. Programs of disaster education 
Program Contents Aims of programs 
Lecture Lectures about disasters using 
pictures, movies, and CG 
To learn mechanisms of 
disaster, history of disasters in 
the world, and behaviors for 
coping with disasters 
 
Group work using a Hazard 
map 
Disaster Imagination Game 
(DIG) using hazard map 
participants lives in 
To seek areas for evacuation 
and to recognize the Haiyan 
typhoon damage areas 
Group work using Gensai 
Pocket Yui (Handkerchief) 
Lectures using Gensai Pocket 
Yui. Activities to learn how to 
use the Gensai Pocket Yui 
To think about disaster 
responses using a handkerchief
Quizzes of knowledge and 
behaviors in disasters 
Quizzes for knowledge and 
behaviors related to disaster 
To verify knowledge about 
disasters and to learn 
appropriate behavior in disaster
Evacuation drill 
Note: only for Bislig 
Elementary School and 
Cabuynan Elementary School 
Evacuation drill from school to 
a safer place 
To learn the evacuation route 






Fig. 13-2. Disaster education program using hazard map (upper left), quiz (upper center), lecture (upper right and 
bottom center), Gensai pocket Yui (bottom left), and group photo (bottom right). 
 
 
13.4 Evacuation drills 
 
Evacuation drills were performed after the education class at two schools in Bislig and Cabuynan (Fig. 13-3) with 
two participants of Tanauan municipality officers. The Bislig Elementary School is very close to the coast. A storm 
surge overtopped all one-story school buildings. Approximately 50 students were evacuated to a small hill area next 
to the sea less than 10 min. We discovered two main problems during the evacuation. First, children were forced to 
walk along the beach and cross a small river to approach the hill (Fig. 13-4-Left). Second, the hill slope is steep 
enough that an adult would be unable to climb it (Fig. 13-5-Left). This was an excellent opportunity to present 
these shortcomings related to evacuation to both municipal officers to find ways to solve these problems (Fig. 
13-6-Left). 
At Cabuynan Elementary School, although the school is located next to the main road to Palo and Tacloban far 
from the sea, the storm surge flow depth was about one meter at the school. In August 2014, the school building 
had only one story but the construction of a two-story school structure was underway, which would allow school 
teachers, students, and nearby residents to use it as an evacuation building. The small hill behind the school was 
selected as an evacuation place. The school has access to the hill as an emergency passage through the village (Fig. 
13-4-Right). The location of the storm surge inundation limit is presented in Fig. 13-5-Right. It took less than 20 
min for 50 students to reach the hill (Fig. 13-6-Right). 
 
 










Fig. 13-5. Very steep slope of the hill near Bislig Elementary School (Left) and the storm surge inundation limit 
behind Cabuynan Elementary School (Right) 
 
 
Fig. 13-6. Completion of evacuation drills on the small hills near Bislig (Left) and Cabuynan (Right) elementary 
schools 
 
13.5 Preliminary results 
 
We presented the preliminary results of the pre- and post-questionnaires administered at each school. Fig. 13-7 
shows the proportion of answers for Question 1 (Natural disasters such as a storm surge are scary). The question 
was related to negative feelings related to a storm surge. The results indicated that negative feelings related to storm 
surges decreased after disaster education. Question 2 was related to attitudes for disaster education (Fig. 13-8). 
After disaster education, the positive attitudes about disaster education at the three schools (San Joaquin central, 
Bacagay elementary, and Cabuynan elementary schools) had increased. However, the attitudes about disaster 
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education at Bislig Elementary School were not changed by the disaster education. It is noteworthy that the Bislig 













This chapter described disaster education activities for children in the Philippines. We derived two main 
preliminary results. First, this disaster education program, which can reduce negative feelings related to storm 
surges, presents the possibility that disaster education can help to improve mental health in the Philippines. Second, 
after disaster education, the students had a positive attitude about disaster education. The positive attitude for the 
disaster education might increase motivation to participate in disaster education programs, which can increase the 
capacity to address disasters. 
Our disaster education programs have two strong points. First, our education programs include lectures about 
disasters and activities such as group work using a Hazard map and a Gensai pocket Yui, which might improve 
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knowledge of mechanisms related to natural disasters and discovery of their own solutions and their own 
capabilities during disasters. Those contents fit with the concept of action 3 of HFA. Second, we used pragmatic 
activities. For example, we used a real hazard map and conducted evacuation drills, which are pragmatic activities 
that can attract student interest. Additionally, they can prepare students for future disasters. 
In conclusion, we demonstrated the beneficial effects of disaster education for children in the Philippines. 
Nevertheless, some limitations apply. First, our programs specifically addressed only storm surges. Education 
programs must be undertaken for other disasters such as typhoon and tsunami events. Second, our report 
demonstrated the short-term effects of disaster education on the feelings and attitudes related to disasters. Future 
studies should investigate the duration of beneficial effects. 
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